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Abstract
A Computational and Experimental Examination of the FCC Incentive Auction
by Logan Gantner
In 2016, the Federal Communications Commission debuted a new auction mechanism, the
Incentive Auction, with the intention of obtaining high frequency television broadcasting
spectrum, repurposing it for cellular use, and reselling these licenses at profitable prices. In
designing this process, the traditional mechanism used for spectrum auctions, the Simulta-
neous Multiple Round Auction (SMR), was modified in order to speed the process. This new
mechanism, the Incentive Forward Auction (IFA), intended to reduce the number of rounds
per auction by lumping similar spectrum licenses together. However, the IFA discourages
straightforward bidding strategies and can result in bidders committing more in costs than
their established budgets will allow.
These mechanisms are compared using two methods: a simulated environment using
automated bidding strategies, and a lab environment using human subjects. In simulations,
it was found that the IFA was successful in reducing the number of rounds per auction
compared with the SMR. However, both simulation and experimental results found that
using the IFA resulted in consistent losses to auction efficiency and revenue.
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Chapter 1
FCC Spectrum Allocation
Wireless data communication was an extremely valuable innovation in the modern era. Tech-
nologies in this field were instrumental in advancing scientific understanding and greatly
expanded public exchange of information. Within the private sector alone, wireless commu-
nication is the foundation for the radio, television, cellular and paging industries. Today, the
worldwide telecommunications sectors account for over $2.2 trillion in yearly revenue [23].
Wireless information is transmitted rapidly and over long distances through the use of
the electromagnetic spectrum. However, the spectrum is an inherently finite resource—
minimum bandwidths are required for specific applications, and establishing clear spectrum
band licenses are necessary to establishment ownership rights and avoid interference between
the signals of competing interests. To this end, a spectrum license is defined with respect
to two pieces of information: the segment of spectrum to which the licensee has access, and
a geographic location in which they are granted usage. In the United States, for example,
television broadcasting stations are each assigned 6 MHz of bandwidth frequency. In each
geographic location, the 54-60 MHz band is traditionally used for local channel 2 services.
In the past, the United States has been organized into many different geographic partition
schemes for the purpose of spectrum allocation. These varied based on the spectrum location
and its intended use. Schemes included Television Market Areas (TMAs), Regional Economic
Areas (REAGs), and Major Economic Areas (MEAs) [10]. In 2014, a new scheme was
created to repurpose television broadcasting spectrum for the cellular market using partial
economic areas (PEAs). Figure 1.1 shows an updated map of the 416 PEAs. In this
work, we focus exclusively on PEAs as the geographic component of spectrum licenses.
Because spectrum is a finite resource with very high demand, there is a fundamental
problem of allocation. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is tasked with
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Figure 1.1: Partial economic areas used for spectrum licensing
assigning licenses to interested parties. For the past 25 years, they have adopted the use of
auction mechanisms guided largely by market principles for this purpose. In this chapter,
we discuss the events leading to a recently developed auction mechanism—the Incentive
Auction—and and examine its rules and pitfalls. In Chapter 2, we propose an alternate
mechanism—a variation of the Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction. We present several
bidding strategies to be used for both strategies, and examine the result when applying
them in a simulated auction environment. In Chapter 3, we do the same in an experiment
environment with human subjects.
1.1 History of Spectrum Auctions
Since the introduction of the radio for public use in the early twentieth century, spectrum
has been considered a public commodity. During the infancy of the radio industry, spectrum
was considered plentiful and licenses were awarded by the Federal Radio Commission on a
first-come-first-serve basis, with the primary intent to minimize interference between signals
[13]. After two decades, demand had exceeded available supply of spectrum, and the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) was formally created through the Communications
2
Act of 1934. The agency was created “for the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign
commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible to
all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and
radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.”
Since its inception, the FCC has attempted to tackle the license allocation problem in
various ways. For 54 consecutive years (from 1927 to 1984), licensees were determined exclu-
sively through a process called “comparative hearings”, also known colloquially as “beauty
contests”. During these hearings, an official committee would hear arguments from prospec-
tive license holders and determine which party would use the spectrum to best serve the
public interest [17].
In 1981, the FCC was tasked with awarding more than 1400 cellular licenses. Due to
concerns over the political and slow nature of assignment committees, a different mechanism
was required for this market. As a result, the FCC was authorized to implement a lottery
system from 1984 to 1989, assigning licenses to “qualified telephone companies” entirely
at random [22]. Despite this restriction, over 400, 000 applications were received—many
stemming from companies created specifically for this purpose with the aid of consulting
companies [14].
1.1.1 Early Usage of Spectrum Auctions
The use of spectrum auctions as a solution to the wireless license allocation problem is
quite modern, being first utilized in the US in the 1990s. However, the concept of spectrum
auctions preceded their application for decades. Ronald Coase recommended their use in
1959, arguing that “it is not clear why we should have to rely on the Federal Communications
Commission rather than the ordinary pricing mechanism to decide whether a particular
frequency should be used by [various interests]. Indeed, the multiplicity of these varied uses
would suggest that the advantages to be derived from relying on the pricing mechanism
would be especially great [2].” Coase references Leo Herzel making similar arguments as
early as 1951.
What followed was a systematic, multi-faceted campaign to introduce a market-based
mechanism for spectrum licenses. Although the social, efficiency and monetary costs of
beauty contests and random allocations were significant and known, the FCC held out against
adopting auctions in any form for 40 years. There have been many intersecting explanations
for the government’s lagging pace on the issue. These included anti-monopoly concerns,
interfering special interests of regulators, and issues with the agency of central planning [12].
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Ultimately, the winning argument would not be one of theory or merit, but of finances.
Faced with public scrutiny over the rising national debt, Congress passed the Omnibus
Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993. In addition to changes in many other agencies
and sectors, this gave the FCC the long-awaited authority “to grant [a spectrum] license or
permit to a qualified applicant through the use of a system of competitive bidding.” This
was subject to priorities ensuring that the process was fair and economically efficient, while
yielding to the government “a portion of the value of the public spectrum resource made
available for commercial use [21].”
Although drawing public revenues was a key stipulation of the act, the FCC was forbidden
from designing auction mechanisms with the purpose of maximizing revenue. Consistent with
the FCC’s roots, additional requirements were outlined calling for the protection of small
business and minority opportunities [5]. We discuss the reserve auction split (a specific
manner in which this expectation manifested itself) in Section 1.2.5, which produced unique
issues for participating bidders.
With expectations set, the FCC went on to design and conduct a total of nine spectrum
auctions from 1994 to 1996. During this period, a combination of government, private market
and academic forces collaborated in developing what became the standard in spectrum allo-
cation mechanisms—the simultaneous multiple round auction (SMRA). The SMRA
is a combinatorial clock auction—a number of spectrum licenses are available to bid on si-
multaneously over the course of a variable number of rounds, with a maximum cap on the
bidding price of each license ascending from round to round in response to bidder demand.
Each round, the bidder with the highest bid price per license was assigned to be the pro-
visional winner, potentially displacing the previous provisional winner. The auction ended
when a round produced no new bids. In this way, the SMRA intends to gradually reveal
information to the bidders while providing them the flexibility to react to this information
[4].
These preliminary auctions were a clear financial success, netting over $20 billion in
revenue. More challenging to assess is the question of efficiency, which requires judging
whether the licenses were optimally (or at least decently) assigned. While it is generally
accepted that revenue and efficiency are closely tied, these auctions were considered successful
based on additional indicators. Similar licenses consistently sold for similiar, if not identical,
prices, while bidders were successful in forming license aggregations. And unlike with random
allocations, there was very little post-auction resale activity [3].
SMR auctions continue to be used with regularity. From 1994 to 2009, there were a total
4
Figure 1.2: Incentive Auction band plan scenarios
of 85 auctions, almost exclusively making use of the SMR mechanism. These auctions sold a
combined 27, 484 licenses for a variety of purposes, netting the government $52.6 in earnings
[12].
1.1.2 The Spectrum Act and 2016 Broadcast Incentive Auction
The SMR mechanism was the exclusive choice of FCC spectrum auctions through the first
decade of the 20th century. But by 2012, the FCC had begun to explore alternate mecha-
nisms. This was spurred in large part by the aggressive expansion of cellular market. As
demand for high quality cellular transmission continued to rise, video compression technol-
ogy and the insurgence of Digital Terrestrial Television effectively reduced supply needed
in broadcasting. Responding to this, the World Radiocommunication Conference in 2007
authorized spectrum in the upper television broadcasting band to be used for telecommuni-
cation purposes [11].
Following suit, the United States Congress passed the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job
Creation Act of 2012. Title VI of this act, referred to separately as the Spectrum Act, tasked
the FCC with designing a new mechanism to repurpose ultra high frequency (UHF) television
stations in the 600 MHz band for commercial mobile use [18]. This mechanism, known as the
Incentive Auction (IA), was outlined to perform two primary tasks: creating incentives
for broadcasters to forfeit their rights to high-frequency television spectrum licenses, and
in turn selling those licenses to firms at prices that would cover all costs (to the sellers, as
well as administrative costs) [20]. These tasks were handled with independent reverse and
forward clock auctions, respectively.
In designing the IA mechanism, the FCC was faced with a needling problem. There was a
desire to free up as much of the broadcast band as possible for telecommunications, but only
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so far as to maintain profitability in the process. The choice of spectrum for repurposing was
referred to as the band plan, which concerned itself with the number and band location of
mobile licenses to be sold. Figure 1.2 shows the band plan scenarios anticipated by the FCC,
up to a maximum of 12 allocated licenses per region. Repurposing began at channel 51 (698
MHz), where it would link up with existing 700 MHz mobile licenses. New licenses required
sufficient guard bands to act as buffers, separating uplink and downlink components from
the remaining broadcasting spectrum, channel 37 (reserved for radio astronomy), and one
another [7].
To simultaneously handle the contrasting goals of the forward and reverse auctions, the
IA mechanism opted to stagger the two. An initial band plan was assumed with an associated
repurposing bandwidth (the “clearing target”). The reverse auction would be conducted to
determine the sellers, licenses and necessary costs, and the forward auction would proceed.
After an event of slowed activity was triggered, the auction would determine whether the
“final stage rule” was satisfied (see Section 1.2.4 for details). This rule primarily assessed
whether the ensuing revenue was sufficient to reimburse sellers and cover additional costs.
If this rule was not met, the mechanism would return to the reverse auction, assume the
next largest band plan (with supply reduced by one unit and the clearing target reduced
accordingly), and the process would continue anew. In this manner, an incentive auction
proceeds in a series of stages [15].
The Spectrum Act outlined a need for forward and reverse auctions within the mechanism,
but it was not specific in how these components must be conducted. It was possible that
the FCC may have opted for the standard SMR as a choice for each of the forward auction
stages. However, because of this passing-of-the-baton relationship between buying and selling
parties, there was some concern while designing the IA that the traditional SMR may be too
slow, and that a speedier sub-mechanism would be preferred [19]. The mechanism ultimately
chosen is the Incentive Forward Auction (IFA).
Like its SMR counterpart, the IFA is a combinatorial clock auction. It departs from the
SMR in two significant ways: (1) Rather than auctioning all licenses individually, similar
licenses (those having similar impairment levels within the same PEA) were treated as iden-
tical units, called “blocks”. Bidders would bid on blocks instead of licenses, which would
generally have a supply in excess of one. (2) The auction would no longer assign provisional
winners. Instead, all valid bids to increase demand would be processed with certainty. Bid-
ders who wished to reduce their demand were required to submit bids specifying this request.
In this way, the price for many related licenses can ascend simultaneously. These rules are
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more thoroughly discussed in the next section.
Because buyers were no longer bidding on licenses directly, an additional phase was
required within the Incentive Auction. This is the Assignment Phase, and consisted of a
series of individual forward auctions for each group of blocks. These auctions determined
which block winners would receive which licenses, and the final price that they would pay.
Figure 1.3 summarizes the IA process, where the process of switching between the forward
and reverse auctions is referred to as the Clock Phase.
The Clock Phase of the Broadcast Incentive Auction took place from August of 2016
until February of 2017. During this time, bidders spent a total of 30 (noncontinuous) days
participating in the IFA. The initial clearing target was set at 128 MHz, and was ultimately
reduced to 84 MHz over the course of four stages and 87 rounds. The auction brought in a
gross revenue of $19.8 billion, pulling roughly $12 billion in government profits after costs
[9].
1.2 The Incentive Forward Auction Structure and Rules
In this section, we examine the specifics of the IFA process at length. The bulk of the
dissertation concerns this forward auction component, its issues, and its viable alternatives.
Information in this section is based off education published by the FCC, found at [1].
Recall that the standard forward auction mechanism, the SMR, involves buyers bidding
on licenses directly. Each round, a single provisional winner is selected for each license that
received at least one bid. The IFA, by contrast, has buyers bidding for units of product.
A product consists of two pieces of information–a PEA, and one of two primary categories
(C1 and C2). The category specifies a product’s maximum possible impairment.
Because the FCC was not able to perfectly repackage UHF broadcast television stations
in every region, and because these stations require a buffer to protect them cellular service
interference, a number of licenses were only granted a partial coverage of their corresponding
PEA. This coverage is described as a percentage of the PEA’s population by the license’s
impairment [8]. C1 products were allowed up to 15% impairment, while C2 products could
have anywhere from 15% to 50% impairment. Impairment fundamentally reduces the value
of a license, and so was automatically discounted during the Assignment Phase, as we discuss
in Sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.4.
The generic units of product are called blocks, which are assigned to winning bidders as
licenses during the Assignment Phase once the IFA has concluded.
7
Figure 1.3: Flow of the Incentive Auction process
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1.2.1 Bidding and Pricing
The forward auction of the clock phase takes place over multiple rounds and consists of a
separate and independent clock auction for each product being sold. Each round, bidders
observe the results from the previous round and submit a set of sealed bids spanning one
or more products. Products have two prices associated with them each round–their (lower
bound) posted price and (upper bound) clock price. All bids consist of both a quantity
q and price p—the maximum amount of money that the bidder is willing to commit for the
specified quantity of an item during that round. Bid prices may take any value at fixed,
specified intervals between (and including) the posted and clock prices.
Further, bidders may submit multiple bids for the same product during the same round,
so long as the bids contain different quantities and prices. Doing so allows bidders to specify
non-constant demand curves between the posted and clock prices. Bidsets for the same
product must obey one-directionality: when a set of bids are submitted for a product,
each bid must demand a strictly lower quantity than any of the bids requesting lower prices.
If a bidset does not satisfy one-directionality, the auction will reject those bids and none of
them will be processed for the next round. This is one of several ways in which bids may be
rejected.
A product’s supply S is the number of blocks (or licenses) for sale within that PEA
and category. Because of the two-sided nature of the Incentive Auction, product supply is
subject to decrease during a stage transition. At the end of round t, the demand Dt for a
product is equal to the total number of valid bids that are submitted for that item, whereas
the processed demand PD t is the number of successfully processed bids. When processed
demand exceeds supply for a product, we say that it has excess demand ED t, defined
simply as
ED t = max{0,PD t − S} (1.1)
The processed demand for products is not provided as information for the bidders, but excess
demand is public information.
From round to round, the posted and clock prices of products may increase. The extent
of this depends on the relative values of a product’s supply and demand. If demand is strictly
less than supply, both the posted and clock prices will remain unchanged for the following
round. If the auction concludes successfully during such a round, the products will be “sold”
at the posted price to all bidders who submitted processed bids, and the assignment phase
will begin. If, however, demand matches or exceeds supply, the posted price will increase to
the largest possible value such that the resulting processed demand would not not fall below
9
Figure 1.4: Demand curve from Example 1.1
supply.
In the following two examples, we will assume for simplicity that bids are expressing
the maximum price that a bidder is willing to pay for the specified quantity. In reality,
bids do not work this way in the IFA. We discuss the specifics of how bidders communicate
preferences via bidding in Section 1.2.6.
Example 1.1. Suppose we have the following product and associated bids for a round:
Product Supply
Posted
Price
Clock
Price
A 2 $5000 $6000
Bidder Product Price Quantity
1 A $5200 1
2 A $5600 1
3 A $6000 1
Figure 1.4 shows the demand curve for Product A resulting from the round’s bids. Because
total demand for the item would drop from 2 to 1 if the price surpassed $5600, the posted
price is set to $5600 for the following round, with Dt = 3, PD t = 2, and ED t = 0. The clock
price is always maintained at a set percentage above the posted price (in this case, 20%), so
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the new clock price would increase to $6720. If all three bidders had submitted at the clock
price in this example, then the posted price would have instead been set to the clock price
($6000). All three bids would be processed, with PD t = 3 and ED t = 1.
It is of high priority that as many products of value are sold as possible. Because of
this, the auction always maintains a monotonicity of demand—once a quantity of product
is bid on, the auction enforces that buyers must continue bidding at this quantity until the
conclusion of the auction, up to its supply. This manifests itself in the manner that prices
increment, but also in the ability of buyers to revoke bids made during previous rounds.
When a buyer is no longer interested in maintaining her demand for a product, she may
communicate this by submitting bids with quantities strictly below her processed demand—
or no bids at all. The auction is generally willing to increase a bidder’s processed demand
for an item, but it will only grant a decrease to processed demand if there is sufficient excess
demand to accommodate the request. When multiple bidders attempt to reduce demand in
the same round, their requests are prioritized from lowest to highest submitted prices. In the
case of equal prices, the auction randomly determines which bidders will have their processed
demand reduced. When processed demand falls short of supply, requests to further reduce
demand will never be honored.
Example 1.2. Suppose we have the following product and associated bids for round t:
Round t
Product Supply
Posted
Price
Clock
Price
A 2 $5000 $6000
Round t Round t+ 1
Bidder Product PD t Bid Price
Bid
Quantity
PD t+1
Posted
Price
1 A 1 $5000 1 1 $5000
2 A 1 $5000 1 0 $5000
3 A 1 $6000 1 1 $5000
Figure 1.5 shows the demand curve for Product A resulting from the round’s bids. All three
bidders have a processed demand of 1 for Product A. By submitting their bids at the posted
price, Bidders 1 and 2 are signaling an intent to drop the product. However, both cannot
11
Figure 1.5: Demand curve from Example 1.2
drop without total demand falling below supply. In this example, Bidder 2 is randomly
selected to have her processed demand reduced, and the posted price remains fixed.
For this reason, bidding on products can come with some inherent risk. Once bid on,
a buyer can never be certain that she will be capable of dropping a product (and freeing
the associated amount from her budget). The random means by which bidders are selected
to reduce demand also introduces some unpredictability into many round outcomes. These
issues are discussed in detail in Section 1.3.
1.2.2 Participation Requirements
Bidding has a sticky nature in the IFA—it is easy to increase demand for a product, but
decreasing that demand is never guaranteed. The SMR was similar in this respect. Because
reducing processed demand can be difficult, bidders may be incentivized to observe the
activity within the auction without committing any actions themselves, even at the risk of
the auction concluding early. For the FCC, low revenues are undesirable and can lead to
negative press. To minimize this behavior, the Incentive Auction (as well as many earlier
mechanisms) punishes buyers who fail to maintain a sufficient volume of processed bids.
In addition to the posted and clock prices, each product r has a (distinct) quantity
associated with it called bidding units (br). Unlike prices, the number of bidding units per
12
product is set and fixed for the entirety of the auction, and is roughly proportional to the
population of the associated PEA. Buyers generally cannot bid on every available product
at the same time. During round t, bidder i must budget a quantity unique to themselves
called their eligibility (Ei,t). The auction will not accept a set of bids from a buyer unless
the sum of bidding units across all requested products at any price is less than or equal to
their eligibility.
Although a product’s bidding units are static, a bidder’s eligibility is not. At the end of
each round, the auction determines the sum total of bidding units across all processed bids
for each bidder. This quantity is called the bidder’s activity (Ai,t) for that round, and deter-
mines what the eligibility will be for the following round. When a bidder’s activity exceeds
a set percentage of their eligibility, called the activity requirement (AR), their eligibility
will be unchanged during the following round. Otherwise, eligibility for the following round
will be reduced proportional to the activity as a percent of eligibility. Specifically,
Ei,t+1 =
 Ei,t if Ai,t ≥ AR · Ei,t1
AR
· Ai,t otherwise
(1.2)
Example 1.3. An auction has activity requirement AR = 90%. Consider a bidder’s eligi-
bility and activity over the course of several rounds:
Round Eligibility Processed Activity
t 500 470
t+ 1 500 360
t+ 2 400 —
During round t, bidder i starts with eligibility Ei,t = 500 and submits a bidset resulting
in 470 units of processed activity. The activity requirement specifies that they must only
process 450 units of activity in order to maintain their eligibility, so Ei,t+1 = Ei,t = 500.
However, they are only processed for 360 units of activity during round t + 1 (80% of the
activity requirement), so their eligibility is reduced by 80% to 400 bidding units at the start
of round t+ 2.
Figure 1.6 shows the relationship between eligibility and activity. Note that eligibility is
non-increasing in time (i.e. Et+1 ≤ Et), and strictly decreases when the activity requirement
is not met. In this sense, activity can be viewed as the level of participation of a buyer, and
eligibility as the ability for them to bid on many products. When the buyer is insufficiently
active, they are penalized with reduced bidding power for the remainder of the auction, all
but enforcing active participation.
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Figure 1.6: Next round eligibility
Possible values for next round eligibility (Et+1) as a function of current round eligibility, the
activity requirement, and processed activity.
1.2.3 Discounts and Credits
The price that a bidder commits during the clock phase forward auction is, in reality, the
maximum cost that they could expect to incur from purchasing that product. There are two
types of discounts that the FCC applies to the purchasers of spectrum licenses.
The first of these discounts is the impairment discount. Although licenses are split roughly
by quality, there is still a degree of within-category variance that may be of significance to
buyers. This is adjusted for automatically. Suppose that at the conclusion of the forward
auction, a license l from product r has a base price pr and an impairment Il (a license
with 25% impairment would have Il = 0.25). The price of this license after adjusting for
impairment would be
padjl = (1− Il) · pr (1.3)
The impairment discount applies to all bidders, and is ultimately determined and applied
during the assignment phase. The second of these discounts, referred to as bidding credits,
applies only to special interests. Bidding credits are applied to varying degrees (as the
FCC deems appropriate) to rural interests and small businesses. Before the start of the
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auction, bidder i may be assigned a bidding credit percentage, BC i. The rural bidding
credit percentage applies equally to all available products. However, these bidders may only
receive a maximum of ten million dollars in credits, after which they will be charged full
price for all items.
For small business bidders, products are segmented into two categories. Products are
considered to be “small” if the partial economic area covers a population of 500,000 or
fewer individuals. Small businesses may receive up to 150 million dollars in bidding credits.
However, only a maximum of ten million of these may be applied to small market items.
Thus, if bidder i has committed a total cost CSi across all small products and C
L
i across all
remaining products, then her expected small business bidding credit would be
Credit = min
{
$150 million ,BC i · CLi + min{$10 million,BC i · CSi }
}
(1.4)
Depending on the amount of credit applied at the conclusion of the forward auction, a rural
or small business bidder will have an effective bidding credit percentage. That is,
BC effi = Credit/Ci (1.5)
At the end of the assignment phase, all discounts are applied in series. With all taken into
account, the adjusted price of an assigned license from product r is
padjl = (1− Il) · (1− BC effi ) · pr (1.6)
1.2.4 Closing Rules
At the end of each round of the forward auction, a check is performed to determine its
current state. This check assesses whether the Final Stage Rule (FSR) has been met.
Recall from the previous section that the final stage rule is the driving condition for whether
the auction is nearing its conclusion or needs to be modified in order to satisfy FCC targets
(i.e. reducing the clearing target and invoking a new stage). The objectives of the FSR are
two-fold:
1. To ensure that bidders are not purchasing licenses significantly below competitive spec-
trum pricing, and
2. To ensure that revenue accounts for the total costs of the auction and reallocation
process.
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Objective 1: This first goal is somewhat complicated by the fact that the number of
licenses to be reallocated (and the resulting “market value”) is not known at the start of
the auction. Specifically, mobile spectrum value may be expected to decrease in response
to a large infusion to supply. To handle this, the FCC has split this objective into two
components, only one of which must be satisfied in order to appease the final stage rule.
A megahertz-population (MHz-pop) is used as the basic unit of value for a product. As
a result, the expected value of bandwidth is weighted by the population of its respective
partial economic area. Prior to the start of the Incentive Auction, the FCC sets a value
for X, the price per MHz-pop benchmark. In the Broadcast Incentive Auction, the value
of X was fixed at $1.25/MHz-pop. At the start of each new stage, the licensed spectrum
benchmark T is updated based on the new clearing target. Let N be the set of all available
products, H the set of specifically high demand C1 products, pr the end-of-round posted
price for product r, and popr the population within the PEA associated with product r.
With this, objective 1 is satisfied if either of the two conditions are met:
• The average price per MHz-pop of high-demand items exceeds the price benchmark:∑
r∈H
pr · qr∑
r∈H
popr · 10Sr
≥ X (1.7)
• The total expected revenue exceeds a stage-sensitive benchmark:
∑
r∈N
pr · qr ≥ X · T ·
∑
r∈H
popr (1.8)
The first condition is the intuitive goal: to avoid a potentially embarrassing situation
in which bidders manage to systemically win licenses at far below what the FCC considers
to be their worth. The second condition loosens this constraint slightly, setting a revenue
threshold that is achievable for higher clearing targets (and thus, higher supply) without
necessarily meeting the specified average price.
Objective 2: Covering the minimum costs of the auction should not be a surprising objec-
tive, considering the origins of spectrum auctions. By far the most significant of these costs
are clearing costs—payments owed to broadcasters per the results of the reverse auction.
Whenever a new stage is triggered, supply is reduced and the reverse auction is resumed,
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reducing this cost at times very significantly. The clearing cost during the first stage of the
Broadcast Incentive Auction was roughly $86 billion. By the final stage this threshold had
fallen to just over $10 billion (still over 80% of total estimated costs). Apart from clearing
costs, revenue must also account for administrative costs and the estimated cost of relocating
broadcasters.
The cost requirement must be handled carefully: recall from Section 1.2.3 that discounts
will be awarded during the assignment phase. It is easy enough to factor in rural and
small business credits, which are static to the bidder. However, credits make the impact
from impairment discounts harder to predict. Furthermore, when demand falls below supply
there is no way to know a priori which licenses will fail to be awarded (and paid for).
Example 1.4. Suppose that a C1 product with a supply of 3 clears the Clock Phase of the
Incentive Auction at a price of $1000. The licenses associated with this product have the
following impairments:
License Impairment Effective Price
A 0% $1000
B 5% $950
C 12% $880
The effective price shows the price of the auction reduced according to the impairment
discount. Only two units of this product were won during the Clock Phase: One unit to
Bidder 1, with an effective credit percentage of 10%, and one unit to Bidder 2, who qualified
for no bidding credits.
We would like to determine the least amount of revenue that the auction can receive
from this product during the assignment phase. This occurs when there is no competition
between bidders for any specific license (which would drive up the prices). The lowest revenue
is achieved when license B is assigned to Bidder 1, license C is assigned to bidders 2, and
license A is assigned to the FCC (i.e. unpurchased), yielding
Revenue = (1− 0.10) · 950 + 880 = $1735
The FCC cannot know with certainty what revenue to expect prior to the Assignment
Phase. Even so, the FSR must guarantee that all costs will be covered before the Assignment
Phase begins. To handle this, each round the auction determines δr, the least possible amount
of revenue that may be generated per product. To calculate this, the total Sr licenses within
product r are ordered from least to greatest impairment. If there is excess supply, it is
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assumed that the most valuable (least impaired) licenses will be assigned to the FCC, after
which low impairment licenses are assumed purchased by the bidders with the greatest
effective bidding credit percentages. If C is the estimated total cost of running the auction,
then this worst-case revenue estimate is required to exceed C:
∑
r∈N
δr ≥ C (1.9)
The FSR is checked at the end of every IFA round. If there is no excess demand in the 40
high demand PEAs and the FSR is still not satisfied, this signals to the FCC that activity is
winding down and the benchmarks are unlikely to be met. In this case, an extended round,
a new stage, or both will be triggered. If the FSR is at any point satisfied after a forward
auction round, the auction will immediately transition to the final stage. During this stage,
the reserve split will occur and bidding will continue until no excess demand remains for any
product.
1.2.5 Reserve Eligible Bidders and the Reserve Split
At the start of the Incentive Auction, a number of bidders are classified as reserve eligible.
These bidders are given exclusive access to a number of blocks during the final stage, per the
FCC’s mission statement to protect smaller and special interests. When the final stage rule
is satisfied, the auction performs a check to see if any products have excess demand. If not,
the forward auction concludes immediately and the assignment phase can begin. Otherwise,
the auction performs the reserve split and the final stage begins.
To perform the reserve split, the auction selects a number of items from high-supply
C1 products and re-categorizes them to the C1R category. C1R products are identical to
C1 products once the assignment phase begins, but may only be bid on by reserve eligible
bidders during the forward auction. Let S1j and S
2
j denote the supply for C1 and C2 products
respectively within the same PEA. The number of reserve items SRj generated is limited in
the following ways:
• SRj will not exceed the C1 supply within that PEA: SRj ≤ S1j
• SRj will not exceed the total processed demand Dj from reserve-eligible bidders for the
C1 product: SRj ≤ Dj
• If there is exactly one reserve-eligible bidder with processed demand, then SRj ≤ 2.
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• In addition, SRj is limited by the quantity Mj, which depends on the amount of supply
within the associated PEA. During the first stage, Mj is determined by the aggregate
supply across both categories:
Mj =

3 if S1j + S
2
j ≥ 7
2 if S1j + S
2
j = 6
1 if 4 ≤ S1j + S2j ≤ 5
0 if S1j + S
2
j ≤ 3
(1.10)
If the FSR is not triggered during the first stage, Mj for each product can be lowered
contingent on the evolving supply and activity of reserve-eligible bidders.
To summarize, if k distinct reserve-eligible bidders have processed demand for product r
when the FSR is satisfied, then the amount of C1 products converted into C1R products
during the reserve split is given by
SRj =
 min(S
1
j , Dj,Mj) if k > 1
min(S1j , Dj,Mj, 2) if k = 1
(1.11)
When the SRj reserve products are created, the auction automatically moves that number
of reserve-eligible bidders into this new product. If there was more reserve demand than SRj ,
then the reserve-eligible bids will be randomly moved into C1R until supply matches demand.
This is done by cycling through all reserve-eligible bidders in a random order and assigning
one unit of demand to the reserve product at a time, ensuring as balanced a redistribution
as possible.
1.2.6 Types of Bids
In order to give bidders as much control as possible over their preferred demand functions
between the posted and clock prices for a given item, they are equipped with several varieties
of bids that they may employ. These bids are the simple bid, the all-or-nothing bid, and the
switch bid. Before we can distinguish between these bids and their resulting outcomes, we
must touch on how bids can fail, in full or in part.
Fully and Partially Acceptable Bids: Recall that a submitted bidset may not always
be honored, if it conflicts with fundamental auction conditions. If, for example, a bidset
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attempts to utilize more activity than a bidder’s current eligibility (assuming posted prices
for all products), then the bidset will be rejected in total and the round will proceed as if
no bids were submitted whatsoever. This is an entirely avoidable situation—the amount of
requested activity is never made unruly by the auction mechanism. There two main reasons
that a bid may unexpectedly be less than fully applied:
1. In order to preserve monotonicity of demand: That is, to ensure that excess supply for
a product never increases from round to round.
2. To prevent a bidder’s activity from accidentally exceeding their eligibility.
Suppose that a bidder wishes to reduce their demand for product A from 2 units to 0 units.
If there is sufficient excess demand for this product, then the bid will be be fully accepted
and applied. However, if there is not at least 2 units of excess demand, or if multiple bidders
attempt to reduce their demand during the same round, then the bid may not be applied
fully, or at all. If there were no excess demand, then demand would not be reduced at all.
If there was exactly one unit of excess demand, and no additional bidders attempted to
increase or reduce their demand for the round, then the bid would be considered partially
acceptable and may be applied in part, by reducing processed demand from 2 units to 1
unit.
Now suppose that a bidder is attempting to reduce demand in product A and increase
demand in the product B during the same round. They are depending on freeing activity
from product A in order to be eligible to hold more units of B. For the reasons just discussed,
the amount of processed demand reduced for product A may be fully or partially applied.
The auction will attempt to apply the bidder’s request to increase demand for product B
to the maximum extent possible, pending their success in shedding demand for product A.
In this way, bids either to increase or decrease demand may be considered fully or partially
acceptable, and applied appropriately.
Bid Collisions: Recall that bidsets for each product are required to be one-directional. In
particular, bidders are not allowed to submitting “colliding” bids—multiple bids associated
with the same product at the same price. This restriction is intuitive: a bidder should never
need to request both 2 and 4 units of a product at the same price, and it is unclear how the
auction should interpret such a request. Even so, it is important to emphasize that this rule
applies simultaneously to simple bids, switch bids and all-or-nothing bids. A bidder may not
submit two bids at the same price for a product even if the type of bid differs between them.
This limitation poses problems for both switch and all-or-nothing bids, as we will see.
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Type 1 (Simple Bids): Up to this point, all bids used in examples have been simple
bids. A simple bid is a means of requesting up to q units of a product with an associ-
ated price p, expressed in the form (p, q). Recall that a bidder can specify multiple bids,
(p1, q1), . . . , (pk, qk), for the same product in a given round. Suppose that during a round, a
product has posted and clock prices given by pr and Pr, respectively, and that the bids are
ordered such that
pr ≤ p1 < p2 < · · · < pk ≤ Pr
As a result of the one-directional requirement of bids, this implies that
q1 > q2 > · · · > qk
If simple bid (pk, qk) is the bidder’s highest priced bid submitted a product, it is interpreted
as a request for a maximum of qk units, applicable for any price (up to the current clock
price). If simple bid (pi, qi) is not the highest priced bid for the product, then the bidder is
requesting a maximum of qi units, applicable for prices not exceeding pi+1, the next ordered
price in their bidset. If a bidder has processed demand for a product and submits no bids for
the round, the auction assumes a single simple bid (p, q) = (pr, 0). The next few examples
illustrate the different possible outcomes from submitting simple bids.
Example 1.5. Product r has posted price pr = $5000 and clock price Pr = $6000. A bidder
with processed demand Dr = 1 submits a single simple bid, for (p, q) = ($5500, 2). Figure
1.7(a) shows the possible price/processed demand outcomes that may result from this bid.
It is possible for the bidder to be processed at either 1 or 2 units of this product for any price
between the posted and clock price. The auction will always process a request to increase
demand, unless the request is impossible due to a lack of eligibility. This can occur if a
request to reduce demand for a separate product is unsuccessful, failing to free up bidding
units.
In this case, the price of the bid is arbitrary—any choice between the posted and clock
prices would have the same effect.
Example 1.6. Product r has posted price pr = $5000 and clock price Pr = $6000. A bidder
with processed demand Dr = 4 submits a single simple bid, for (p, q) = ($5500, 2). Figure
1.7(b) shows the possible price/processed demand outcomes that may result from this bid.
The only difference between this and the previous example is the bidder’s current processed
demand. As a result, their simple bid is now a request to decrease demand for prices at or
exceeding $5500.
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Figure 1.7: Potential processed demands using simple bids
(a) Example 1.5
(b) Example 1.6
(c) Example 1.7
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As a result, the auction will not reduce demand for prices below $5500, and will process
exactly 2 units for prices exceeding $5500. However, if the final price is exactly $5500, one
of three outcomes may transpire. If there is sufficient excess demand, the auction will fully
process the request, and demand will be reduced to 2 units for the next round. If there is
not sufficient excess demand, the auction will reduce demand by either 1 unit or no units.
In the case that final demand is equal to 3, we say that the bid has been partially processed.
These types of outcomes can be avoided by submitting all-or-nothing bids, as we discuss
below.
Example 1.7. Product r has posted price pr = $5000 and clock price Pr = $6000. A bidder
with processed demand Dr = 2 submits simple bids
(p, q) ∈ {($5000, 4), ($5300, 3), ($5700, 1)}
Figure 1.7(c) shows the possible price/processed demand outcomes that may result from this
set of bids. The bidder is requesting a maximum of 4 units for prices up to $5300, 3 units up
to $5700, and no more than one unit up to the clock price. Because they have two processed
units and their request to increase demand may fail, they may maintain as few as two units
for prices between $5000 and $5700. However, if the price exceeds this range, the bidder
must be processed for 1 and only 1 unit.
Type 2 (Switch bids): As a result of the partially acceptable nature of bids, the out-
come of a submitted bidset can be unpredictable. A bidder can end up with more demand
for products than expected. This is particularly vexing for products within the same PEA,
where a buyer may not value licenses beyond a specific quantity. To help mitigate this, the
Incentive Auction allows bidders to submit switch bids when attempting to shift demand
between categories within an area. A bid of this type is expressed in the form (p, q, rfrom , rto),
indicating that for prices at or exceeding p, the bidder would like to reduce demand within
product rfrom (to a minimum of q) and increase demand within rto by the exact amount
that demand in rfrom is decreased. Using switch bids guarantees that the amount of pro-
cessed demand within a specific PEA will not be altered in net even when shifting between
categories.
A switch bid behaves very similarly to a simple bid requesting to reduce demand in the
from-product. It must be applied in total if the round price exceeds the bid price, but it
may be applied partially if the round price is equal to the bid price. No matter the outcome,
the sum of C1 and C1R demands will remain unchanged between the current and following
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rounds.
Type 3 (All-or-Nothing Bids): In examples 1.6 and 1.7, we saw that requests to increase
or decrease demand can be partially applied. This may not be acceptable for some bidders.
A cellular provider, for example, may only wish to provide coverage for PEAs in which they
possess two or more licenses. A single block is of no value to such bidders.
The incentive auction allows bidders to avoid this problem through the issuing of all-
or-nothing (AoN) bids. These bids are similar to simple bids—they consist of a price
and quantity expressing a cap on the number of units a bidder wishes to hold beyond the
specified price—but they cannot be partially processed. When the bid attempts to increase
demand, the interpretation is straightforward. When the bid attempts to decrease demand,
the bidder is communicating a desire to reduce demand, but a willingness to maintain current
demand for higher prices if this is not possible in its entirety.
Example 1.8. Product r has posted price pr = $5000 and clock price Pr = $6000. A bidder
with processed demand Dr = 1 submits a single AoN bid: (p, q) = ($5000, 3). Figure 1.8(a)
shows the possible price/processed demand outcomes that may result from this bid.
If the bidder has sufficient eligibility, they will be processed for 3 units at any price. If
there is not sufficient eligibility, the bidder may continue to be processed for their original
single unit, but they will never hold 2 units of processed demand.
Example 1.9. Product r has posted price pr = $5000 and clock price Pr = $6000. A bidder
with processed demand Dr = 2 submits a single AoN bid: (p, q) = ($5300, 0). Figure 1.8(b)
shows the possible price/processed demand outcomes that may result from this bid.
The bidder is requesting to reduce processed demand to zero for prices exceeding $5300.
If there is sufficient excess demand, this will be granted, and the bidder can be certain that
they will never be processed for exactly 1 unit of demand. However, if there is exactly one
unit of excess demand, the auction will continue to raise the price without reducing the
bidder’s demand (potentially up to the clock price).
The last example illustrates an undesirable property of AoN bids. When a bidder wishes to
reduce all of their units at once, they have little say in where the price should stop. The
auction includes one extra feature to counter this, called the backstop. If exactly one AoN
bid to reduce demand is issued by a bidder, they may optionally include a backstop price.
The backstop functionally converts the AoN bid into a simple bid for the same quantity at
the specified price, breaking the rigid behavior of the request in order to halt the price.
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Figure 1.8: Potential processed demands using AoN bids
(a) Example 1.8
(b) Example 1.9
(c) Example 1.10
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Example 1.10. Product r has posted price pr = $5000 and clock price Pr = $6000. A
bidder with processed demand Dr = 2 submits a single AoN bid: (p, q) = ($5300, 0) with a
backstop at $5700. Figure 1.8(c) shows the possible price/processed demand outcomes that
may result from this bid.
We may imagine this as the same bidder from Example 1.9. They do not wish to win
a single unit from this product, but they cannot afford both units at the clock price. As a
compromise, they allow the possibility of processing a single unit at $5700, if there is excess
demand and the full reduction is not possible at earlier prices. The bidder can now guarantee
that they will have zero demand for prices above this amount.
AoN bids were not frequently utilized during the 2016 Broadcast Incentive Auction. Of the
nearly 140,000 total bids, only 121 of these (less than 0.1%) were some form of AoN bid. A
grand total of 8 backstops were issued.
1.3 Problems Arising From the Incentive Auction
As we have been foreshadowing, the IFA will at times process bids in undesirable ways from
the perspective of the bidders. There are many circumstances in which this may happen.
In this section, we will cover several examples outlining common bidding requests that may
result in inadvertently unpleasant incidents. These examples are not intended to exhaust all
possible issues associated with the IFA mechanism.
Example 1.11. A bidder attempts to drop demand in one product while maintaining de-
mand in another, resulting in going over budget. This is the simplest case in which problems
naturally arise. Considering a bidder with a budget of $420 in the following state:
Product
Posted
Price
Clock
Price
Profit at
CP
Previous
Demand
Current
Demand
A $300 $330 $150 1 1
B $100 $110 $30 1 0
In this and the following examples, “quantity processed” indicate the bidder’s holding from
the previous round, and “quantity bid” indicates the bids submitted by the bidder for the
following round. In this example, the bidder is currently committing to $400 in costs. His
budget cannot support the commitment for these products if their prices increment next
round, so he elects to bid on the more profitable product A while dropping product B. This
occurs in the following:
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Product
Posted
Price
Clock
Price
Profit at
CP
Previous
Demand
Bid Status
A $330 $360 $120 1 Success
B $100 $110 $30 1 Failure
The auction blocked the bidder from reducing his quantity in product B due to a lack of
demand. As is guaranteed in such circumstances, the price for product B not not increase.
However, the price for product A did increase, and as a result, the bidder is now committed
to $430 in costs, bringing him over budget.
This is a lose-lose situation for the bidder. If he chooses not to actively bid on product
A (his most valuable product) to avoid this issue, he risks losing it, as well as its associated
activity.
Example 1.12. A bidder attempts to merge demand from several products, resulting in
going over budget. Consider a bidder with an eligibility of 100 and a budget of $250 who
submits bids for the following round:
Product
Posted
Price
Clock
Price
Activity
units
Quantity
Processed
Quantity
Bid
A $200 $220 80 0 1
B $100 $110 70 1 0
C $100 $110 20 1 0
The bidder is attempting to “merge” their holdings from products B and C into a single unit
of item A, resulting in the following outcome:
Product
Posted
Price
Clock
Price
Activity
units
Quantity
Processed
Bid Status
A $220 $240 80 1 Success
B $100 $110 70 0 Success
C $100 $110 20 1 Failure
The auction granted the bidder’s request to drop product B, but not product C. And be-
cause there was sufficient eligibility to hold product A, her bid to increase demand was still
processed. The bidder is now committed to $320 in costs compared with her $250 budget.
Under slightly different circumstances, a request like this can turn out quite differently, as
we see in the next example.
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Example 1.13. A bidder attempts to merge demand from several products, resulting in a
large eligibility loss. Consider the identical scenario fro the previous example, but with an
eligibility of 90 instead of 100:
Product
Posted
Price
Clock
Price
Activity
units
Quantity
Processed
Quantity
Bid
A $200 $220 80 0 1
B $100 $110 70 1 0
C $100 $110 20 1 0
Once again, the bidder is successful in reducing demand for product B but not C. Because
of their reduced eligibility, this results in the following:
Product
Posted
Price
Clock
Price
Activity
units
Quantity
Processed
Bid Status
A $220 $240 80 0 Failure
B $100 $110 70 0 Success
C $100 $110 20 1 Failure
Product C remains processed, leaving insufficient eligibility to hold product A. As a result,
only 20 units of activity were processed for the round, which will mean a steep loss in
eligibility for the bidder in all future rounds.
Example 1.14. A bidder attempts to move quantity between a reserve and non-reserve
product, resulting in holding a valueless unit. For this example, a bidder with an eligibility
of 140 has value for up to two pooled units of product A and its reserve equivalent, and up
to one unit each of products B and C:
Product
Activity
units
Quantity
Processed
Quantity
Bid
A 40 2 0
AR 40 0 1
B 60 1 0
C 80 0 1
This bidder is trying to accomplish two goals at once. First, they would like to switch one of
their units of product A to the reserve market. Second, they are attempting to merge units
of product A and B into a single unit of product C. This results in the following:
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Product
Activity
units
Quantity
Processed
Bid Status
A 40 2 Failure
AR 40 1 Success
B 60 0 Success
C 80 0 Failure
The auction allowed demand to be reduced for product B, but not for product A. As a result,
the bidder has only freed up 60 units of activity. Between the two bids to increase demand,
only product AR can be granted. The bidder is now holding three units of product A/AR.
Depending on the cost of the product, this error can lead to a net loss in profit for the bidder.
The auction design attempts to avoid this type of situation by allowing bidders to submit
relatively low-risk switch bids. However, switch bids require a one-to-one exchange between
categories: you may only issue a switch bid when you wish to move all of your bids from one
category to another. Because the bidder in this example wished to simultaneously reduce
demand for product A, switch bids were not an available option.
In the next chapter, we introduce an alternate mechanism that addresses these issues.
We then examine the how the two mechanisms compare on a range of issues when simulated
in a number of environments.
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Chapter 2
Simulating the Auction Environment
In order to further assess our impressions concerning the Incentive Auction mechanism (as
well as gaining additional insights), we made use of two approaches: a computational ap-
proach and an experimental approach. In this chapter, we discuss the computation approach,
in which the auction environment was simulated on the computer and executed using auto-
mated bidders.
An analysis of our simulation results would be lacking without a point of comparison.
We therefore take some time during this chapter to introduce an alternate mechanism in the
form of a modified SMR. After this, we discuss the various bidding algorithms implemented
within the two mechanisms, as well as the choice of parameters that composed the various
auction environments. Finally, we discuss the findings of these simulations with respect to
four major benchmarks—auction surplus, revenue, the number of rounds per auction, and
the rate of bidder bankruptcy.
2.1 Introduction
Prior to designing and implementing an experiment with human subjects, many simulations
of the FCC Incentive Auction clock phase were run over a variety of parameters. The primary
goals of these simulations were two-fold:
1. To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the Incentive forward auction mechanism
with respect to some reasonable alternative, and
2. To explore the benefits and drawbacks of various bidding strategies.
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The two goals are not unrelated. The performance of simpler bidding strategies exposed
complications elicited from the structure of the auction itself, which in turn led to more
informed, complex strategies.
A number of simplifications were made in translating the Incentive Auction into code.
For one, we are interested in isolating the effects of the clock phase, and specifically the
forward auction component, so we do not run a reverse auction to determine supply and
opening prices, nor an assignment phase. A simulation takes place over only a single stage
(plus the final stage where reserve items are split). There are no high-demand items; instead,
the auction will always run until no excess demand remains in any product, recording at the
end whether the FSR was satisfied. Because of this, there are no extended rounds or stage
transitions apart from the reserve split.
Although the assignment phase does not occur, licenses are still expected to have some
level of impairment (and an associated impairment discount). To handle this, each product
is assigned an expected impairment rate that is common knowledge to all bidders. When
choosing between items, bidders automatically factor the expected impairment discount into
the current posted and clock prices.
At the start of a simulation, the opening prices for a predetermined set of items is drawn
from a distribution. The values that bidders have for these items, as well as the number of
each item to which they assign value, are also drawn from distributions. We discuss these
distributions in more detail in Section 2.4.
We also make the following assumptions about the behavior of bidders participating in
the auction, regardless of their strategy:
• Bidders will never bid strictly between the posted and clock prices, although the auction
is able to handle such an occurrence. As a result, bidders never submit more than one
bid per product per round, and prices will only ever increment from the posted price
to the clock price (or not at all).
• When a bidder has value for multiple blocks of a single product, their value for each
block is never greater than their value for the previous block. A bidder will never value
two blocks of an item more than one block of that same item, for example. This largely
eliminates any incentive to make use of all-or-nothing bids.
• Although they share the same PEA, The values that bidders have for C1 and C2 items
are treated separately. If a bidder has value for one each of a C1 and C2 product,
then purchasing two C1 blocks will not satisfy the need for the C2 product, and the
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second purchased block will be treated as valueless. However, the values for C1 and
C1R products are pooled. Thus, if a bidder had value for two blocks of a C1 product,
then they could maximize their value with two blocks of the C1 product, or two blocks
of the corresponding C1R product, or one block of each.
We will proceed by presenting the alternative forward auction mechanism that will be
used to contrast the Incentive Auction, before outlining several bidding strategies that were
tested against both mechanisms. Finally, we present the results of the simulations and some
implications that can be drawn from them.
2.2 An Alternative Treatment: The Simultaneous Mul-
tiple Round Auction
When transitioning from previous spectrum auction mechanisms to the Broadcast Incentive
Auction, the primary goal of Congress via the FCC was the creation of a centralized two-
sided market that would maximize market supply of licenses while guaranteeing that gross
revenue would cover auction and administrative costs [17]. However, because of the linked,
relay-like relationship between the seller and buyer markets, there was a desire to increase
the speed of the forward auction. In debating the design of the eventual IFA mechanism,
Paul Milgrom et al argued that deviations from the SMR “should permit the auction to be
completed in a fraction of the time that would be required by a traditional SMR auction,
with no loss of efficiency or added difficulty for bidders [19].” We will touch on all of these
points when analyzing our simulations further on.
Recall from Section 1.1.1 that the previously used mechanism, the Simultaneous Multiple
Round Auction, considered all licenses within a single PEA distinctly and independently for
bidding. Such a volume of (very similar) products has the potential to create a very slow
convergence of activity. In 1996, for example, the FCC auctioned roughly 1500 Broadband
Personal Communications Services licenses. The process lasted from August of 1996 until
January of 1997, requiring 276 rounds and 85 days of bidding in what ended up being the
lengthiest auction to date [6]. Grouping spectrum licenses within the same PEA and creating
the assignment phase was meant to mitigate this lengthiness. The 2016 Broadcast Incentive
Auction repurposed roughly double the number of licenses, lasting for 87 rounds over the
course of 30 bidding days (as well as lengthy waiting times between each of the 4 periods)
[9].
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These changes likely contributed to a speedier format. However, we contend that some
of the changes made resulted in unnecessary adverse consequences for bidders and value-
revealing incentives. In particular, auction eligibility as a concept attempts to coerce bidder
activity each round, while the precarious nature of bid processing undermines this incentive.
The results for bidders are unexpected losses to eligibility while risking committing more
than intended (as discussed in Section 1.3). We propose a mechanism to address these issues
and reduce the need for complex bidding strategies.
The Incentive Auction diverged significantly from the SMRA in how it handled provi-
sional bidders for products at the end of each round. The SMRA had exactly one supply
for each license, and only one bidder was selected to hold the item at the end of each round.
This bidder either submitted the highest priced bid for the round, or was randomly chosen in
the event of multiple equal bid amounts. When a bidder attempted to bid on a product and
was not selected as the provisional bidder, activity was still processed toward their total eli-
gibility. The Incentive Auction, on the other hand, allows any number of provisional winners
in excess of a product’s supply, and penalizes eligibility when such bids are not processed.
We wish to extend the behavior of the SMRA to handle the situation where products have
multiple units of supply, while maintaining the large scale framework of the Incentive Forward
Auction (multiple stages consisting of reverse auctions and extended rounds, a reserve split,
and an assignment phase). The behavior of such a hybrid mechanism is outlined below.
2.2.1 Bidding and Provisional Winners
Unlike the Incentive auction, pricing is handled discretely rather than continuously. Every
round, each product r will have only one (posted) price pr associated with it, and a bidder i
will only submit the quantity qi,r that they are willing to commit for the product. There are
no switch bids and no all-or-nothing bids within this mechanism. When a buyer submits a
bid (quantity), the auction treats the request as qi,r individual unit bids, a number of which
may be processed for the round as provisional bids. The number of provisional bids will
never exceed the supply of the product and, similar to the Incentive Auction, will never
decrease in number from the previous round.
There are two types of provisional bids: low priority provisional (LPP) bids Lr and
high priority provisional (HPP) bids Hr. We treat these variables as sets of bids, with
|Lr| and |Hr| representing the number of low and high priority provisional bids, respectively.
When a bidder submits a bid for a round that is successfully processed, that bid is initially a
HPP bid for as long as the price holds constant. When there is positive excess demand for a
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product, the price increments by a set factor (similar to the relationship between the posted
and clock prices in the Incentive Auction), and all HPP bids are reclassified as LPP bids.
As a result, LPP bids for a product/round are associated with a low priority provisional
price plr. This price has no consequence for future bids, and is simply a record of the price
committed for legacy bids as the auction progresses.
A bidder’s total number of provisional bids for a given product is their processed demand
PD i,r for the product. When a bidder with processed demand submits a bid qi,r, they are not
necessarily committing every one of these units at the current price. The first PD i,r units
communicate only that they would prefer to hold their provisional bids at their corresponding
prices (always applying to HPP bids before LPP bids). Any additional submitted quantity
is committed at the current price.
As an example, suppose that a product has a LPP price plr = $5000, a posted price
pr = $5500, and that bidder i has processed demand PD i,r = 3, with one of their bids
in Hr and the other two in Lr. Regardless of the number of bids submitted, they have a
commitment satisfying
Commitment ≥ $5500 + 2 · $5000 = $15,500
to account for the three items currently held. If no bids are submitted, then the bidder
would like to be prioritized in freeing their activity from this product during bid processing.
If they submit qi,r = 1, then they are requesting that two bid be freed with high priority (the
LPP bids, in this case), but are not allowing their one HPP bid to be freed. With qi,r = 2,
They are again blocking their HPP bid from being freed, and are now setting one LPP bid
to be freed with high priority and the other with low priority. With qi,r = 4, all provisional
bids are set to be freed at low/no priority, and they request an additional HPP bid at the
posted price. Thus, their requested commitment for the round is
Committment = $5500 + 2 · $5000 + $5500 = $21,000
When a bidder has HPP bids, they are able to guarantee that up to that number of bids
remain in that product by the end of the round. However, LPP bids are always susceptible
to being displaced, and are guaranteed to be given a sufficient amount of excess demand for
the round.
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2.2.2 Processing the Bids
As with the Incentive Auction, once the bids are submitted the SMRA must assess their
validity, determine provisional winners for the round, and increment prices where needed.
Apart from attempting to submit bidsets with excess activity, bids will never be invalid
under this mechanism, so this check can be performed as soon as bids are submitted. The
bid processing procedure for each product r flows as follows:
1. Submitted bid quantities are itemized (split into individual unit bids) and separated
into two categories: maintenance bids and additive bids. Maintenance bids specify
that a bidder would like to maintain their current provisional bids, while additive bids
request to further increase their processed demand. If a bidder with processed demand
PD i,r = 2 submits a bid qi,r = 5, this bid will be split into two maintenance bids and
three additive bids. If the same bidder had instead submitted a quantity of two or less,
then all itemized bids would be categorized as maintenance bids.
2. The auction then determines the excess demand EDr for the product. If PDr is the
total number of provisional bids from the previous round and AB r is the total number
of additive bids, then for a supply Sr the excess demand is calculated as
EDr = max{0,PDr + AB r − Sr} (2.1)
In the event that processed demand has reached capacity, the formula for excess de-
mand for all future rounds reduces to the number of additive bids. Observe that pro-
visional bids are counted toward processed demand even when bidders do not request
to maintain their bids.
3. If EDr = 0, all additive bids (if any) are immediately added to the HPP bid set, Hr.
No existing provisional bids are freed in this case.
4. If EDr > 0, the auction does the following:
(a) Randomly sort all additive bids into a queue. If PDr < Sr, immediately add the
first (Sr − PDr) bids from the queue into Hr.
(b) Based on the maintenance bids, group provisional bids into three randomly or-
dered queues: Hr bids without associated maintenance bids are added to the
undesired HPP queue, Lr bids with associated maintenance bids are added to the
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desired LPP queue, and Lr bids without associated maintenance bids are added
to the undesired LPP queue.
(c) Provisional bids are sequentially removed in the order specified by the provisional
queues as bids from the additive queue are added to Hr. Provisional bids from the
undesired LPP queue are removed until the undesired LPP queue is exhausted,
followed by the desired LPP queue, and finally the HPP undesired queue (desired
HPP bids are never removed). This process continues until either the additive
queue or all provisional queues are exhausted.
(d) If any additive bids remain and PDr < Sr, add the next (Sr−PDr) additive bids
from the queue into Hr.
5. If |Hr| = Sr, this means that all blocks are requested at the posted price. In this case,
transfer all bids from Hr into Lr, set p
l
r = pr, and increment the posted price.
We will run through several examples to illustrate this process. For all the following exam-
ples, we assume that product r has a price increment of 10% with pr = $5500 and p
l
r = $5000
(or no LPP price, if processed demand is below supply).
Example 2.1. A product has previously been bid on, but has not yet had its price incre-
mented. Its state is
Initial State:

Sr = 5
Lr = {}
Hr = {1, 1}
Because all bids are unit bids, they are represented by an integer indicating the index of
the issuing bidder. In the case, there are no LPP processed bids and two HPP processed
bids, both held by Bidder 1. The bids submitted for the round (after being itemized) are
separated for processing as follows:
Submitted bids = {1, 1, 1, 2} ⇒ Maintenance bids = {1, 1}
Additive bids = {1, 2}
In other words, Bidder 1 submitted q1,r = 3 and Bidder 2 submitted q2,r = 1. Because
Bidder 1 already had a processed demand of 2, his first two itemized bids are processed as
requests to maintain this demand, and only the third unit is considered additive. Bidder 2
is a newcomer, so his one and only bid is additive. From here we calculate
EDr = max{0 , (|Lr|+ |Hr|) + |Additive bids| − Sr} = max{0 , (0 + 2) + 2− 5} = 0
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There is no excess demand, so all additive bids can immediately be processed, leaving us
with
Final State:
{
Lr = {} plr unassigned
Hr = {1, 1, 1, 2} pr = $5500
Example 2.2. We begin with the same state as the previous example:
Initial State:

Sr = 5
Lr = {}
Hr = {1, 1}
This time, more bids are submitted:
Submitted bids = {1, 2, 2, 3, 4, 4} ⇒ Maintenance bids = {1}
Additive bids = {2, 2, 3, 4, 4}
Enough new bids were submitted that the product has positive excess demand:
EDr = max{0 , (0 + 2) + 5− 5} = 2
Because EDr > 0, the auction forms two random queues: an additive bid queue, which
is a simple rearrangement of the additive bids, and the provisional queue, which lists and
randomly orders all provisional bids that may be displaced by the additive bids. Because
of the random nature of this process, the queues that follow are just one of many possible
outcomes that may have occurred in this instance.
Additive Bid Queue = ← 4 2 4 3 2 ←
Provisional Queue = ← 1 ←
In this case, because Bidder 1 submitted q1,r = 1 but had PD1,r = 2, she is requesting to
drop one of her provisional units. This undesired bid is represented in the provisional queue.
One of Bidder 4’s bids replaces one of Bidder 1’s bids in Hr. At this point, the provisional
queue is empty, but there are three units of the product available. Thus, the next three bids
from the additive queue (corresponding to Bidders 2, 4, and 3) are added to Hr. Bidder 2’s
second bid is chosen as a provisional bid during this round. Finally, we find that |Hr| = Sr,
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so the bids are moved into Lr and the price increments, leading to the following:
Final State:
{
Lr = {1, 2, 3, 4, 4} plr = $5500
Hr = {} pr = $6050
Example 2.3. For the last example, we examine an item whose price has been incremented
at some point already:
Initial State:

Sr = 8
Lr = {1, 1, 2}
Hr = {1, 3, 3, 4, 5}
Again, a variety of additive and maintenance bids are submitted. Because we now have
both LPP and HPP bids to keep track of, we will distinguish between these with l and h
superscripts where needed.
Submitted bids = {1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 4, 4} ⇒ Maintenance bids = {1
h, 1l, 2l, 3h, 4h}
Additive bids = {2, 4}
Let’s examine Bidder 1’s bids in detail. Because she has q1,r = 2 and PD1,r = 3, all of her
bids are for maintenance. However, a portion of her processed demand is invested in both
Lr and Hr. Recall that when attempting to maintain bids, that maintenance will always
prioritize HPP bids over LPP bids when possible. This means that her first maintenance
bid is processed to maintain her only HPP unit, and only then does her second maintenance
bid select one of her LPP bids to maintain, leaving the final LPP bid to be discarded with
high priority. Because the price has incremented in the past, the excess demand is simply
EDr = |Additive bids| = 2
There is positive excess demand, so the random queues are formed. Again, the following is
one of multiple possible realizations from this step:
Additive Bid Queue = ← 4 2 ←
Provisional Queue = ← 1l ← 2l 1l ← 3h 5h ←
This time around, the provisional queue contains bids from all three possible categories. The
left-most component contains the one LPP bid that Bidder 1 no longer wishes to maintain.
The middle component contains the remaining LPP bids from Bidders 1 and 2 that are
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attempting to be maintained. Finally, the right-most component contains the HPP bids that
are no longer desired. Bidder 3 has two bids in Hr but submitted only a single maintainence
bid. Bidder 5 has one but submitted no bids at all.
Because the additive queue is shorter than the provisional queue, all additive bids are
added to Hr, displacing bids 1
l and 2l and resulting in the following:
Final State:
{
Lr = {1} plr = $5000
Hr = {1, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 5} pr = $5500
Although there was positive excess demand, the price did not increment this round. The
price will only increment when the amount of excess demand matches or exceeds |Lr|.
2.2.3 Eligibility and Activity
The last change which needs addressing is how the auction processes bidder activity each
round. We propose a more conservative treatment to avoid unexpected losses to eligibility,
made possible by the discrete nature of pricing. Recall that the Incentive Auction would
grant activity only for products that were successfully processed, which in turn depended on
both the pricing of the product and the success in dropping (or failure in adding) alternative
products. Instead, the SMR sums activity per bidder from two different sources, regardless
of the round results within each market:
1. All additive bid requests
2. All provisional bids
Additive Bids: Whenever a bidder requests to increase their processed demand for a prod-
uct, each requested unit (limited to the total supply) will count toward total activity. This
leniency is necessary for the nature of provisional bidding in this mechanism—frequently, the
auction will select only a subset of requests to be processed into provisional bids. Punishing
unsuccessful bidders with a loss of eligibility would be detrimental to the bottom line of all
parties involved.
Provisional Bids: As with the Incentive Auction, bidding on products has a sticky ten-
dency. Once held, products cannot always be readily dropped, and when they are dropped
it may occur unexpectedly after many unsuccessful attempts. To offset this negative trait,
all provisional bids from previous rounds count toward a bidder’s activity total. This is true
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whether or not the bidder has requested to maintain these bids. This allows a bidder to
consistently signal that they wish to be removed from a market, without risking the loss of
activity associated with being dropped.
Viewed from a different perspective, the activity from a bidder’s provisional bids are
automatically deducted from their eligibility at the start of a given round. This effectively
reduces the decision space of a bidder, oftentimes drastically. If, for example, every requested
bid is processed from the previous round, then 100% of the bidder’s eligibility becomes tied
in provisional bids, and they are limited to the submission of maintenance bids only. In this
way, maintenance bids are very cheap to submit—they cost no additional activity, and will
not increase in price.
Example 2.4. A bidder has an eligibility of Ei = 1300 and is considering bidding on the
following products:
Product Bidding Units Processed Demand
A 350 2
B 200 1
C 400 0
D 150 0
Factoring in the amount of activity monopolized from their processed demand, the bidder
only has
1300− 2 · 350− 1 · 200 = 400
units of activity to invest in additive bi ds. Suppose they submit a bidset consisting of one
unit of product A, two units of product B, and one unit of product D. Their additive bids
consist of one unit each of product B and D. Thus, their total activity for the round is
Total Actvity = (Provisional Activity) + (Additive Activity)
= (2 · 350 + 200) + (200 + 150) = 1250
2.3 Auction Bidding Strategies
A number of strategies were implemented for the IFA and SMR auction mechanism. Strate-
gies were deployed homogeneously (with all bidders making use of identical strategies) and
heterogeneously (with different strategies mixed together competitively). The first few sec-
tions focus on the implementation of strategies within the IFA mechanism before discussing
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SMR strategies, which only vary slightly. Before we dive in to these, we need a bit more
notation. We assume that each bidder i will operate under a strict budget, Bi. Recall also
that bidders have differing (and non-increasing) marginal values for each unit of product.
That is, given a product r with a supply of Sr, bidder i will have marginal values Vi,r,1,
Vi,r,2, . . . , Vi,r,Sr satisfying
Vi,r,1 ≥ Vi,r,2 ≥ · · · ≥ Vi,r,k ≥ · · · ≥ Vi,r,Sr ≥ 0 (2.2)
Finally, recall that products will come with a number of discounts depending on the
impairment of the products and the status of the bidder. For each product, a bidder assumes
for each product the discount associated with its expected impairment applied to the price,
as well as applicable special interest credits. We choose Ci,r to represent the expected cost
after discounts (always using the current round clock price as the base value, unless otherwise
specified). A bidder’s marginal expected profit for the kth unit of product r is then given
by
Pi,r,k = Vi,r,k − Ci,r (2.3)
Because these quantities assume the clock price for each product, they are a conservative
estimate of profit, and are the basis for all bidder strategies that we consider.
2.3.1 The IFA Lexicographic Strategy
The lexicographic strategy, in spite of its name, is the simplest type of strategy simulated.
The term implies a total mathematical ordering of a finite set [16] (in this case, licenses in
accordance with their profit). The concept is straightforward: a bidset is formed by includ-
ing as many licenses as can be afforded (limited by both budget and eligibility), prioritizing
licenses worth the greatest expected profit first. One might imagine a very naive or inexperi-
enced participant to employ the lexicographic strategy as their first attempt at optimization.
We must be a bit careful with the details, as simulated bidders pool values between C1 and
C1R products. With this in mind, the strategy makes use of the following algorithm:
1. Expected profits Pi,r,k are calculated for each marginal license.
2. A subset of the marginal licenses are filtered out from consideration. Specifically, if
r′ is a C1 product with associated C1R product r′′, then only one of these two will
be included as a license for each marginal unit, based on which has greater expected
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profit:
Selected license =
argmax
r∈{r′,r′′}
(
Pi,r,k
)
, k = 1, 2, . . . , Sr′ (2.4)
This prevents the strategy from recommending redundant licenses, and also favoring
the more valuable of the redundancies. When r is a C2 product, its associated licenses
are all included for consideration (as we assume its value is not shared across other
products).
3. Marginal licenses with negative expected profit are filtered out of consideration.
4. Remaining licenses are sorted from greatest to least profit.
5. Licenses that can be afforded are added one at a time from the sorted list into the
bidder’s bidset for the round. A license is considered affordable if, after factoring the
licenses already added to the bidset, bidding on this new license will not commit the
bidder to going over their eligibility or budget limits (assuming clock prices).
Step 5 continues until there are no marginal licenses remaining to consider (or either of the
bidder’s budget or eligibility is exhausted by the updated bidset).
Example 2.5. Suppose that bidder i has a budget of $4000, an eligibility of 230, and has
already determined the expected profit of all marginal licenses based on results from the
previous round. This information is summarized in the table below:
PEA Category Supply
Bidding
Units
Clock
Price ($)
Pi,r,1 ($) Pi,r,2 ($) Pi,r,3 ($)
A C1 3 40 1000 800 600 200
A C1R 2 40 850 950 750 —
A C2 1 40 600 400 — —
B C1 3 65 300 800 −100 −300
C C1 1 150 1300 1200 — —
We start by determining which licenses will be considered within the A region. Since the
reserve products have higher marginal profits, we discard the first two marginal licenses
within the A|C1 product. We do not end up comparing (or discarding) the third license
between these two, since the reserve product becomes limited by its supply. We also remove
the second and third licenses from product B|C1, since these are worth negative profit.
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Finally, the remaining licenses are ranked and processed. We express marginal licenses
in the form
(PEA | Category | Unit number)
For example, (A|C1R|2) is worth $750 in profit. The processing occurs in the table below,
where the costs of affordable items are deducted from the remaining budget and eligibility.
License Remaining Budget Remaining Eligibility Can Afford?
(C|C1|1) $4000 230 Yes
(A|C1R|1) $2700 80 Yes
(B|C1|1) $1850 40 No
(A|C1R|2) $1850 40 Yes
(A|C2|1) $1000 0 No
(A|C1|3) $1000 0 No
The bidder first adds the two most valuable licenses, (C|C1|1) and (A|C1R|1), to their bidset.
At this point, they only have 40 units of activity free from their eligibility, so they cannot
afford the next most valuable license, (B|C1|1), which requires 65 units of activity. Finally,
they add (A|C1R|2), which exhausts their remaining activity. In total, their bidset requests
one unit of C|C1 and two units of A|C1R.
Advantages The most obvious advantage to the lexicographic strategy is its simplicity.
It requires no software or mathematical knowledge, and may realistically be employed by a
relatively unsavvy or small firm. A less obvious advantage is that the strategy will always
find a suggested bidset. Later strategies have the chance to fail under poor conditions,
requiring the implementation of backup strategies. In this way, the lexicographic strategy
has the most predictable behavior.
Disadvantages The lexicographic strategy has at least two distinct disadvantages. Most
significantly, the strategy invests no attention in addressing the activity costs of th products.
Products with lower activity costs are never deliberately prioritized. In the example, the
most profitable item is prioritized first despite costing significantly more eligibility than any
other item and greatly limits the ability to hold other items. The strategy also makes no
attempt to meet the activity requirement and maintain eligibility for future rounds.
In addition to this, the strategy pays no regard to the likelihood that bids will fail to be
processed. As we have seen in Section 1.3, budget-related issues are liable to occur when
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frequently attempting to switch processed demand between products. The lexicographic
strategy is inclined to recommend persistent “bid hopping” when the profits between multiple
products are very close to one another. When the difference in expected profits is not very
large, or when excess demand is low or turbulent, it could be argued that maintaining current
processed demand is superior to significant movement in the market.
2.3.2 The IFA Straightforward Strategy
Ignoring bidding issues associated with the incentive auction, the lexicographic strategy fails
in the sense that it does not optimize expected profit. The straightforward (SF) strategy
assumes bids will always be processed and submits bidsets that maximize profits, thus re-
vealing preferences between products. The structure of this problem—maximizing utility by
selecting between items under two independent budget constraints—bears resemblance to
the classic knapsack problem, as described in [24]. We therefore approach this using linear
programming.
Some notation is required before proceeding. For the sake of brevity we will not include
the bidder’s index for this or the following strategy.
• δr,k is the decision variable—a binary variable specifying whether the bidder will
request the kth unit of product r as part of their bidset. When δr,k = 1, the bidder
requests the associated marginal license; if δr,k = 0, they do not. When r is a C1
product, we will at times denote δC1Rr,k to be the decision variable for the associated
C1R license, when such a license exists.
• Ar is the activity cost of product r.
• E is the eligibility of the bidder.
• Cr is the clock price of the product (after applying discounts).
• B is the budget of the bidder.
• Vr,k is the value held for the kth unit of product r.
• Nr is the number of licenses for product r to which the bidder assigns value.
• 1P (V ) is the negative profit indicator variable for the value of a license:
1P (Vr,k) =
 1 if Vr,k < Cr0 otherwise (2.5)
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Finally,
∑
r implies a sum over all available products, r. With this, the revelation optimiza-
tion takes the following form:
Maximize
∑
r
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k · Pr,k
subject to the Budget Constraint
Maximum Eligibility Constraint (2.6)
Profitable Constraints
Supply Constraints
Pooled Value Constraints
We will address each of these named constraints in detail. It should be noted that, as
in the previous section, profit Pr,k is always assumed at the clock price and is therefore a
conservative estimate.
The Budget Constraint: Presumably, a bidder would prefer not to commit a greater
cost than their established budget, B. When this type of bidder requests units of a product,
they conservatively assume that they will pay the (maximum) clock price Cr for the product,
even if the product has never exhibited positive excess demand. The constraint takes the
form ∑
r
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k · Cr ≤ B (2.7)
That is, the maximum requested commitment shall not exceed the budget.
The Maximum Eligibility Constraint: In parallel with the budget constraint is the
maximum eligibility constraint, which specifies that the total activity of a bidset may not
exceed the bidder’s eligibility. There are two distinctions worth mentioning: first, this is a
hard condition, since any bidset not satisfying this property would immediately be rejected
by the auction. Second, this condition is less conservative than the budget constraint, since
the activity of successful bids is known a priori and need not be estimated. The constraint
takes the form ∑
r
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k · Ar ≤ E (2.8)
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The Profitable Constraint: It is preferred that bidders never opt for unprofitable prod-
ucts, even if it would allow them the maintain a higher eligibility for the future. Recall that
1P (Vr,k) indicates whether a license is unprofitable. Then the constraint takes the form
∑
r
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k · 1P (Vr,k) ≤ 0 (2.9)
The Supply Constraints: A bidder is limited to submitting bids for a maximum of Nr
licenses per product. At times it is possible for Nr to exceed Sr—particularly, after the
reserve split has occurred. To prevent this, a series of constraints limit the number of bids
submitted by the supply of each product. These constraints take the form
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k ≤ Sr for each product, r (2.10)
The Pooled Value Constraints: Finally, the pooled value constraint ensures, as with
the lexicographic strategy, that bidders will not mistakenly submit bids for the same unit of
C1 and corresponding C1R products. This is accomplished with
δr,k + δ
C1R
r,k ≤ 1 for each C1 product r and unit, k (2.11)
Linear Program Summary: Substituting the constraints in their mathematical form,
the revelation strategy optimizes the following:
Maximize
∑
r
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k · Pr,k
subject to
∑
r
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k · Cr ≤ B
∑
r
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k · Ar ≤ E (2.12)
∑
r
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k · 1P (Vr,k) ≤ 0
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k ≤ Sr for each product, r
δr,k + δ
C1R
r,k ≤ 1 for each C1 product r and unit, k
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It should be noted that the profitable and supply constraints were not strictly needed as
part of the linear program—they could also be handled by processing the auction data prior
to optimization.
Advantages: Compared with the lexicographic strategy, the SF strategy makes some sig-
nificant improvements. It properly balances the weights of activity and monetary costs,
putting forward bidsets that will (theoretically) draw greater profits. Like the lexicographic
strategy, it is also guaranteed that a solution to the optimization exists, since each of the
5 constraints are upper bound constraints. Thus, submitting no bids at all automatically
satisfies the constraints, guaranteeing that the solution space will never be empty. When all
bids are successful, the straightforward strategy results in properly maximizing profits for
the current round of an auction.
Disadvantages: Although it is in many ways an improvement, the SF strategy suffers
some of the same pitfalls of the lexicographic strategy. Activity and eligibility are at least
acknowledged in the optimization, but the activity requirement is not. An important de-
cision that all bidders must make during the auction is the extent to which they wish to
compromise between opting for high profit products versus preserving their eligibility and
subsequent bidding power. Revelation bidders do not bother with this at all. Optimizing
profit sometimes means shedding large amounts of eligibility. In this sense, the revelation
strategy is a very short-sighted optimizer.
Furthermore, no attempt is made to anticipate failed bids. One might be misled to believe
that the existence of a hard budget constraint will prevent the bidder from committing to
greater than their budget. However, we know from Section 1.3 that this is not the case. There
is no clear reason to expect that the SF strategy should be any less prone to these issues
than the lexicographic strategy, and we will see that both suffer budget-related problems
under unfavorable circumstances.
Finally, both this and the lexicographic strategies are simplistically conservative in their
product cost estimates. Realistically, a human bidder may observe consistently low-demand
markets and make an educated guess about whether prices are likely to increment. This
can improve the profitability of bidsets over those submitted by the revelation strategy, even
when all bids are successfully processed.
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2.3.3 The IFA Complex Optimization Strategy
The revelation strategy is correct in its attempt to optimize profit, but it is too simplistic
and naive for this mechanism. The complex strategy attempts to build upon the revelation
strategy by adding the following behavior:
1. The bidder will attempt to maintain eligibility when possible and reasonable
2. The bidder will make educated guesses about the price of a product, rather than
assuming that the price will always increase to the clock price.
3. The bidder will not submit bids to reduce demand beyond what is likely to succeed.
These behaviors are open-ended and there are many means through which they may be
interpreted and handled. As a first pass, a complex bidder exhibits behavior 1 by requiring
the total activity of their bidset to satisfy the activity requirement. Behavior 2 dictates both
the objective function and cost-related constraints by making use of each product’s excess
demand. The assumptions made here are very closely tied to those of behavior 3, where the
bidder again makes use of excess demand in assessing the likelihood of success in reducing
demand.
We require a bit more notation before the optimization can be tackled.
• Cr is the clock price of product r, and cr the posted price (after applying discounts).
• r is the price increment variable—a non-decision variable for product r determining
the bidder’s expectation for the pending price of that product, with
Expected posted price next round =
{
Cr, if r = 0
cr, if r = 1
(2.13)
• γr is the posted price variable—a non-decision variable for product r specifying the
number of bids expected to be processed at the posted price, of those submitted by
the bidder this round.
• EDr is the excess demand for product r from the previous round’s processed bids.
• PDr is the bidder’s processed demand from the previous round for product r.
• AR is the activity requirement for the auction.
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It may seem redundant for us to define both price increment and posted price variables.
After all, when γr > 0 we can automatically infer that r = 1. And in this case, we know
that γr must equal the total number of bids submitted for the product, since licenses within
a product share the same cost. Even so, both sets of variable are required to preserve
linearity for both the objective function and constraints. With this, the optimization takes
the following form:
Maximize
∑
r
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k · Pr,k +
∑
r
γr · (Cr − cr)
subject to the Budget Constraint
Maximum Eligibility Constraint
Supply Constraints (2.14)
Pooled Value Constraints
Profitable Constraints∗
Minimum Eligibility Constraint
Minimum Demand Constraints
Product Consolidation Constraint
Price Increment Constraints
Dummy Constraints
The objective once again sums the profits at the clock price for submitted bids. The second
sum in the objective adds back the difference in cost between posted and clock prices for
products that are expected not to increment in price. In effect, this is equivalent to summing
the expected profit across all bids.
The first four constraints are identical to those from the revelation strategy. The last
six bolded constraints add our desired functionality to the linear program. The (asterisked)
profitable constraints are a special case: the straightforward optimization also contained a
profitable constraint, but with the introduction of dummy variables the constraint is now
handled differently. As before, we address these constraints one at a time.
Profitable Constraints: In the SF optimization, the single profitable constraint dictated
that a bidder never opt for a product whose value did not exceed the current clock price.
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We now formulate this constraint with respect to the bidder’s expectation of the product’s
likelihood to increment during the following round. The constraint is broken into multiple
subconstraints of the form
{
δr,k(Vr,k − Cr) + r(Cr − cr) ≥ 0
}
for each unit k of product r (2.15)
The leftmost term in parentheses represents profit for unit k of product r, assuming the clock
price. In the event that a price increment for product r is anticipated next round (r = 0),
the constraint forces the decision variable to be zero if profit at the clock price is negative.
When we do not expect an increment (r = 1), the constraint is loosened by adding the
difference in the clock price and posted price to the profit term, effectively assuming posted
price profit.
Minimum Eligibility Constraint: Akin to the maximum eligibility constraint barring
requested activity above eligibility, the minimum eligibility constraint requires requested
activity to reach the activity requirement. However, this constraint can be a bit narrow,
if eligibility falls too low. If, for example, a bidder with a 95% activity requirement drops
to 200 eligibility, then maintaining their current eligibility requires them to submit a bidset
totaling at least 190 units of activity—a 10 unit target. To mitigate this, the minimum
eligibility constraint is loosened to allow at least a 50 unit target at all times. The constraint
has the form ∑
r
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k · Ar ≥ min(E · AR, E − 50) (2.16)
Minimum Demand Constraints: It is a common occurrence for the lexicographic and
revelation bidders to attempt to reduce demand in markets with no excess demand. When
this fails, they will frequently attempt to repeat this request for dozens of consecutive rounds,
maximizing the likelihood of an unanticipated outcome. This is not a particularly realistic
response—we might expect a human bidder to give up after one or two failed attempts, or
to prioritize shifting demand in markets with positive excess demand while the opportunity
lasts.
This is the main idea behind the minimum demand constraint. It prohibits the bidder
from reducing their demand beyond what is likely to succeed. We define DSr , the minimum
demand required to maintain aggregate demand at or above supply for product r (assuming
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no shift in demand from other bidders):
DSr = max(0,PDr − EDr) (2.17)
If, for example, a bidder has a processed demand of 3 in a market with an excess demand of
2, then DSr = 1. The bidder might reasonably expect a request to reduce their demand below
DSr to fail. Observe that when there is no excess demand, D
S
r is always equal to processed
demand. Further, when processed demand is zero, DSr = 0 as well.
The constraint should be a bit more subtle than simply requiring demand to match DSr .
Consider the following example: Bidder j is holding one processed license in a market with
zero excess demand. The license is profitable to the bidder at the posted price, but not at the
clock price. Because there is no excess demand, the bidder does not attempt to reduce their
demand. However, some new bidders enter the market and the price increments, resulting
in Bidder j holding an unprofitable license.
We would prefer to loosen the constraint in the event that licenses are unprofitable (at
either the posted or clock prices). Define DPPr to be the number of licenses that would be
profitable at the current posted price, and DCPr to be the number of licenses that would be
profitable at the current clock price. Then the constraint takes the form{∑
k
δr,k ≥ r ·min(DSr , DPPr ) + (1− r) ·min(DSr , DCPr )
}
for each product r (2.18)
In the case that DCPr > D
S
r , the value of r does not matter and the constraint breaks down
into the requirement that round demand matches or exceeds DSr . Otherwise, the value of r
determines whether we expect a posted or clock price, and reduces the minimum demand to
avoid potentially unprofitable holdings.
Product Consolidation Constraint: One potential source of problems when bidding in
the IFA arises when attempting to consolidate products—that is, when attempting to drop
several sources of activity while adding a single unit of high-activity product. This sort of
action is problematic because it requires the success of multiple independent requests. It is
easy to imagine a situation in which some, but not all, of the requests to reduce demand
are processed, freeing insufficient activity for the new bid to add demand and resulting in
an unnecessary loss of eligibility. Even if there were sufficient activity to pick up the new
product, failing to drop some may result in going over budget. This behavior is limited with
the following constraint:
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∑
r
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k ≥
∑
r
PDr − dmax (2.19)
In other words, the total number of bids requested for the current round may not fall below
a buffer of the number of currently processed bids. The buffer, dmax, is a bidding strategy
parameter that we address further in Section 2.4.
Price Increment Constraints: This and the following constraint are not concerned with
the stated behavioral goals of the bidder. Rather, they exist to ensure that r and γr operate
logically. The price increment constraints dictate the largest number of bids that can be
submitted during the current round before the price is expected to increment, and is given
by {
γr ≤ DSr
}
for each product r (2.20)
This follows directly from the definitions for γr and D
S
r .
Dummy Constraints: The last set of constraints consists of the following three families:
(i) γr ≤ 100r
(ii) γr ≤
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k
(iii) γr ≥
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k − 100(1− r)

for each product r (2.21)
The value 100 where it appears is effectively infinite, since the number of bids for any product
will always fall far short of this. Rather than interpret each constraint individually, it is easier
to look at how they break down for each value of r. When r = 0, we have the following:
(i) γr = 0
(ii)
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k ≥ 0 (nonconstraining)
(iii)
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k ≤ 100 (nonconstraining)

for each product r (2.22)
In other words, when r = 0 (signifying that a price increment is anticipated), the number of
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bids expected to be awarded at the posted price is held at zero, and no additional restrictions
are placed on the number of bids that may be submitted per product. We might have
expected that the number of bids should be held above the count required to trigger a price
increment. However, the utility of the bidder is always improved when the price increment
variable is equal to one, so this is handled automatically. When r = 1, we have the following:
(i) γr ≤ 100 (nonconstraining)
(ii)
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k ≥ γr
(iii)
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k ≤ γr

for each product r (2.23)
The only effective constraint here is that the number of bids submitted must equal γr. This
makes sense: if no price increment is expected, then the number of bids submitted must
equal the number of bids we expect to be processed at the posted price.
The First Backup Optimization: Unlike the SF strategy, The complex optimization
is not guaranteed to have any feasible solutions. As a simple example, imagine that only
two items are available, each costing 70 units of activity to bid. We have an eligibility of
130 and the minimum eligibility constraint demands that a bidset must have a combined
activity total of at least 80 units. There is no way to accomplish this. Other constraints can
further exacerbate the situation. In such situations, the complex bidders solve a new, looser
optimization:
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Maximize
∑
r
Nr∑
k=1
δr,k · Pr,k +
∑
r
γr · (Cr − cr)
subject to the Budget Constraint
Maximum Eligibility Constraint
Supply Constraints (2.24)
Pooled Value Constraints
Minimum Demand Constraints
Price Increment Constraints
Dummy Constraints
The objective function and constraints for this linear program are identical to those of the
primary complex optimization, with the exception that the minimum eligibility, product
consolidation, and profitable constraints have been dropped. This backup linear program
is very similar to the one used by the SF strategy. Four of the first five constraints are
identical to those used by the SF strategy (with the profitable constraint replaced by the
related minimum demand constraint). The last two constraints act only to shift assumed
cost between the posted and clock prices.
The Second Backup Optimization: Even this backup linear program is not guaranteed
to have a feasible solution. If the bidder’s processed commitment is within their budget,
a viable bidset will always exist by bidding the least amount possible as specified by the
minimum demand constraints. However, if a bidder enters a round over budget, and their
holdings have particularly low excess demand, then there will be no way to satisfy the budget
and minimum demand constraints simultaneously. In such cases, the complex strategy de-
faults to the second (final) backup optimization. This is not a linear program at all. Instead,
it makes use of the following algorithm:
1. Begin with a bidset containing the products and quantities currently processed from
the previous round. Assume a total cost using posted prices for each product.
2. Partition each unit of product from the bidset into two groups, based on whether the
associated product has positive excess demand from the previous round.
3. Sort the units within each group by ascending profit, assuming the clock price.
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4. While the total cost of the bidset exceeds the budget:
(i) Iterate through the sorted list of units having positive excess demand. For each
unit, deduct the bidset’s quantity for the associated product by one, and reduce
the total cost by the posted price of the product.
(ii) Repeat for the list of units having no excess demand.
5. Submit the resulting bidset.
Because this optimization will only be triggered in the event that the bidder is already over
budget, it grossly limits the actions that may be taken. The bidder may not target any
new products; they may only attempt to drop products that they are currently holding.
Furthermore, the strategy acts to target the products that are most likely to be dropped
successfully (those with positive excess demand), prioritized by potential profit. This op-
timization is very similar to the lexicographic strategy, but restricted to products that the
bidder has already processed and ordered loosely by excess demand. Needless to say, this
strategy will always submit a bidset.
Advantages: This strategy makes some significant improvements on either the lexico-
graphic or SF strategies. First, it is the only strategy that makes weighted decisions about
pricing. By assuming the clock price for all products, the first two strategies exhibit unnec-
essarily conservative behavior that can be harmful to eligibility preservation and accurate
comparisons of products. The strategy more directly attempts to manage eligibility by
requiring, when possible, that total activity comes close to the activity requirement. In
addition, the strategy blocks attempts to reduce demand where it is unlikely to succeed. Be-
cause of the tiered design of the strategy, it is equipped to handle different circumstances in
a targeted fashion (particularly, what to do when the bidder finds themselves over budget).
Disadvantages: The naming of the complex strategy suggests a significant disadvantage:
it can be challenging to determine the reasoning behind the resulting bidset. From the
perspective of running simulations, the complex strategy is also computationally expensive
to perform. While the primary optimization contains many features for clever bidding,
this linear program is rarely used in cases where the bidder is forced to shed eligibility.
The minimum eligibility constraint is particularly strict, requiring the bidder at times to
bid for activity points on low cost products that are otherwise of very little value. The
minimum demand constraint, for all of its benefits, prohibits bidders from attempting to
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reduce demand in problematic markets unless there is excess demand. This means that
others bidders actively attempting to leave the market will receive priority in the event
that new bidders enter the market or increase demand. Fortunately, this is offset by the
limitation that negative profit products cannot be requested at all. Finally (and perhaps
most significantly), the complex strategy encourages buyers to bid strategically instead of
revealing their preferences.
2.3.4 SMR Bidding Strategies
For the SMR mechanism, we employ slight variations on the IFA lexicographic and straight-
forward strategies. The algorithms used by both versions of the strategies are identical, but
optimize over a subset of products in the SMR case. This works as follows:
1. For each unit of product processed from the previous round, reduce the bidder’s current
eligibility by the associated activity cost, and their budget by the associated posted
price.
2. Remove each processed unit from the pool of units under consideration, starting with
the most valuable products. If, for example, bidder i has (nonincreasing) values
Vi,r,1 ≥ Vi,r,2 ≥ Vi,r,3 ≥ · · · ≥ Vi,r,Sr
associated with product r and is holding two units of processed demand, then they will
only optimize over values Vi,r,3, . . . , Vi,r,Sr (assuming there is any remaining supply).
3. Perform either the lexicographic or SF strategy over the reduced selection of products,
using the reduced values for budget and eligibility.
4. For each bid created by the strategy, if there is any processed quantity from the previous
round, add this to the bid.
5. Submit the bidset.
Effectively, this modification works by removing all processed product units from considera-
tion when optimizing. In fact, neither strategy attempts to submit maintenance bids unless
they wish to submit additive bids for a product with processed demand—at which point
maintenance bids become necessary. The complex strategy is not implemented for the SMR
mechanism, since most of the issues within the IFA mechanism that this strategy attempts
to handle have been eliminated.
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Advantages: The relative advantages between the two strategies are largely the same as
those of the IFA mechanism. With respect to mechanism, the IFA strategies have many
benefits over their SMR counterparts. There is no longer a need for price speculation, since
all additive bids can only be processed at the clock price. This means that bidsets will never
result in unexpected bankruptcies. The strategies do not need to concern themselves with
the outcome of unsuccessful bids, since these will never result in a loss of eligibility.
Disadvantages: The relative disadvantages between the two strategies are largely the
same as those of the IFA mechanism. Although the SF strategy accounts for activity costs
in its optimization, neither strategy attempts to manage eligibility by meeting the activity
requirement. Furthermore, both strategies suffer a disadvantage specific to the mechanism:
a failure to submit maintenance bids to properly express holding preferences. In reality,
a bidder may wish to prioritize maintaining demand for high-value products, including in
situations where they are not attempting to increase demand. This is a minor disadvantage,
and including this feature would require a significant overhaul of both strategies.
2.4 Simulation Parameters
There are quite a few parameters to consider within the incentive auction. Some of these
parameters are held fixed across al simulations, while others are varied to observe their
effects. For the purpose of organization, we categorize these parameters as auction, bidder
and product parameters. In the following three sections, we briefly discuss each of these
parameters. In section 2.5, we briefly summarize the significant, non-static parameters that
will be the focus of our analysis.
2.4.1 Product Parameters
Location: The location includes both the geographical region and locality for a prod-
uct. This information is used in determining which products certain bidders may value, as
discussed in the next section.
Market Scale: The market scale is a high-level label used for organizing products into
groups. The scale is a treatment effect that varies across simulations. The three scales are:
• The small scale, consisting of only a single region and a handful of localities.
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• The biregional scale, consisting of two full-sized regions
• The national scale, consisting a six full-sized regions. The national scale was designed
to emulate the market for the 2015 wireless spectrum forward auction.
All product-related parameters that follow hold constant values within each scale.1
Population: The population residing within the associated PEA. This information is used
to determining closing conditions.
High Demand Flag: A label used for the purposes of determining timing for the reserve
split and closing rules.
Basic Product Information: This includes a product’s supply, bidding units, and open-
ing price.
Expected Value to Bidders: The value that each bidder holds for a product is drawn
from a distribution with an expected value inherent to the product itself. The process by
which bidders determine value for products is outlined in the next section.
Expected Impairment: In reality, specific licenses for products each have distinct im-
pairment values which will manifest during the post-forward auction allocation phase. To
simplify matters, each product within a simulation is assigned an expected impairment value,
which bidders and auction assume for all impairment-related calculations.
Impairment Value Discount Distribution: Bidders generally discount the value of
products based on their impairment. However, this impairment discount rate differs from
bidder to bidder. The discount rate that a bidder applies is randomly drawn from a uniform
distribution with mean and standard deviation fixed for each product.
2.4.2 Bidder Parameters
Strategy: The algorithm employed by the bidder in making their bidding decisions. This
algorithm is either the lexicographic, straightforward, or (in the case of the IFA mechanism)
complex strategy. These strategies are outlined in Section 2.3.
1Complete scale information can be found at:
https://github.com/logantner/FCC-Incentive-Dissertation/
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Type: Each bidder’s interaction with the market is largely dictated by their type, which
loosely specifies their resources and breadth of value across all products. These types are as
follows:
• National bidders: These have the largest budgets of all the bidder types, and have
value for products across all regions and localities.
• Regional bidders: These have smaller budgets than national bidders, and have value
for products across all localities within a specific region.
• Local bidders: These have the smallest budgets, and their value for products is limited
to a small number of localities within a specific region.
• Opportunistic bidders: These are very similar to national bidders, having value for
products spanning all regions. However, opportunistic bidders have only a fraction of
the budget of their national counterparts. They are analogous to smaller firms looking
to participate in the auction for investment or speculative purposes.
The bidder type is a higher level attribute, influencing values of lower level attributes such
as budget and coverage distributions. In this sense, it is largely an organizational tool.
Coverage Distribution: Bidder type broadly determines regions and localities bidders
can have value. The value coverage distribution determines how much products from these
allowed sectors will be valued. For example, if a regional bidder has a value coverage of 60%,
then they will be assigned (roughly) 60% of the products from their assigned region to have
positive value. The coverage itself is drawn from a uniform distribution whose limits depend
on both the bidder type and market scale. These values can be found in Table 2.1.
In the case of national, opportunistic and regional bidders, the value coverage is drawn
and used to determine the quantity of valued products. These products are then drawn
from the relevant item pool (all items for national and opportunistic, the assigned region
for regional) using a weighted distribution with respect to the expected value of each item.
Local bidders are a special case. Instead of sampling a region, they sample one or more
localities from an assigned region as their item pool. Their coverage is always uniformly
drawn between 0% and 100%, with a minimum item count of 1, after which they sample
from their item pool like normal.
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Maximum Localities (local types only): As mentioned when discussing coverage, local
bidder types sample one or more localities in determining value draws. The number of
localities is drawn uniformly between one and the maximum number of localities, which
is itself a function of the market scale. Because local bidders always randomize coverage
uniformly between 0% and 100% of their item pool, Table 2.1 presents the locality range for
local bidders instead of their coverage range.
Maximum Valued Licenses: In addition to being assigned products of value, bidders
will additionally be assigned a number of valued licenses within these products. This value is
drawn uniformly between a single unit and a maximum number of licenses. This maximum
number depends on the bidder type and the market scale, but is also subject to a binary
treatment effect. Each row of table 2.1 displays the two values that a bidder type within
a scale may assume, depending on the treatment. For example, opportunistic bidders in a
national market will have value for up to two licenses of each product in the lower demand
treatment, and up to four licenses of value in the higher demand treatment. The maximum
number of licenses is always capped at the supply of a product, where supply would be a
limiting factor.
Value Distribution: Once licenses of value are determined, bidders are assigned random
value draws for each of these licenses. A value, V , is drawn from a uniform distribution as
V ∼ U(µ−
√
3σ, µ+
√
3σ)
The expected value, µ, is fixed to the product.2 The distribution’s width, on the other hand,
depends on σ and is a binary treatment effect across simulations. Its value will either be
one third of the product’s mean value, or 2% of the mean value. The intention is to create
environments which differ significantly in competitive engagement.
When a bidder has value for more than one license within a product, these values are
drawn independently from the same distribution. Afterward, they are sorted from highest
to lowest value to guarantee monotonicity of values. These are base values, and have not yet
factored details such as expected impairment.
2Complete product information can be found at:
https://github.com/logantner/FCC-Incentive-Dissertation/
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Table 2.1: Bidder information by type and market scale.
Each cell under max valued licenses contains two values representing the two possible valued
license counts based on the treatment implemented. Local bidders always drew coverage
between 0% and 100%, so coverage indicates the maximum number of localities that local
bidders may select from.
Scale Bidder Type
Min
Budget
(millions)
Max
Budget
(millions)
Coverage
Max
Valued
Licenses
Small
National 10 20 80 - 100 % 2 / 2
Opportunistic 1 2 80 - 100 % 1 / 2
Regional 3 12 80 - 100 % 1 / 2
Local 0.5 2 1 locality 1 / 2
Biregional
National 108 3046 20 - 90 % 3 / 3
Opportunistic 10.8 304.6 20 - 90 % 1 / 2
Regional 11 174 25 - 75 % 1 / 2
Local 22 109 4 localities 1 / 2
National
National 326 9136 20 - 90 % 5 / 5
Opportunistic 32.6 913.6 20 - 90 % 2 / 4
Regional 11 174 25 - 75 % 2 / 4
Local 22 109 4 localities 2 / 4
Impairment Value Discount: The value that a bidder is assigned for each value assumes
that the bidder applies no discount to the product based on its impairment. In reality
potential buyers may respond to impairment very differently based on their needs, and so
are assigned unique impairment discount rates that are applied to their product valuations:
Bidder Value = (Base Value) · (Expected impairment) · (Impairment discount)
The impairment discount rate is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution specific to the
product, as discussed in the previous section.
Budget and Budget Distribution: Each bidder is assigned a budget when generated.
This budget is drawn from a uniform distribution, whose limits are a function of bidder type
and market scale. These values can be found in Table 2.1.
Starting Eligibility: Finally, each bidder is assigned a starting eligibility as a function of
their budget. Bidders receive a unit of starting eligibility for each $2500 of budget, rounded
down. This applies to all bidders in all market scales.
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Reserve Eligibility Status: This includes an indicator of whether the bidder is reserve
eligible and may therefore bid on reserve products after the reserve split. National bidders
are never reserve eligible, while opportunistic, regional and local bidders are always reserve
eligible. Reserve eligible bidders treat the value of reserve products identically to their
non-reserve counterparts.
2.4.3 Auction Parameters
Mechanism: Either the IFA or SMR auction mechanism. This is the most significant of
all treatment effects.
Clock Increment: The amount that the price increments in the event of sufficient demand,
as a percentage of the posted price. This is a binary treatment effect, with increments of
either 5% or 10%.
Scale: The simulation scale is a higher-level version of the product scale which incorporates
bidder information as well as product information. Like the market scale, the simulation scale
is split into small, biregional, and national categories, and always uses product sets of the
same name. We will simply refer to simulation scale as “scale” for future reference.
Bidder Count: The total number of bidders participating in an auction. This value
depends on both the scale of the simulation, as well as a binary treatment effect. Table 2.2
contains specific bidder population counts. Each cell contains two values which represent
the lower and higher population treatment effects, respectively.
Bidder Type Partition: The number of bidders assigned to each bidder type (national,
opportunistic, regional, and local). Like total bidder count, this depends on both the scale
Table 2.2: Bidder type distributions within each simulation scale.
Each cell contains two values representing the two possible bidder counts based on the
population treatment implemented.
Scale
Total
Bidders
National
Bidders
Opportunistic
Bidders
Regional
Bidders
Local
Bidders
Small 16 / 32 2 / 4 2 / 4 4 / 8 8 / 16
Biregional 30 / 45 6 / 9 4 / 6 10 / 15 10 / 15
National 50 / 70 10 / 13 6 / 9 17 / 24 17 / 24
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and bidder population treatment effect. Table 2.2 details this information. Each cell contains
two values which represent the lower and higher population treatment effects, respectively.
Bidding Strategy Partition: Similar to the bidder type partition, this is the number of
bidders assigned to each strategy outlined in Section 2.3. For each simulation, an auction
is performed using a pure strategy set (i.e. all bidders use either the lexicographic, SF, or
complex strategies), as well as a mixed strategy set, in which bidders are split equally across
available strategies for the given mechanism.
Activity Requirement: The minimum percentage of eligibility usage required to main-
tain the current amount for future rounds. The activity requirement is fixed for all simula-
tions at 95%.
Parameters for Closing Rules: Recall in Section 1.2.4 the rules used by the FCC for
assessing the conclusion of the forward auction. The parameters concerning this procedure
differ only by simulation scale, as follows:
• A price per MHz-pop benchmark X = $0.05/MHz-pop for small scale simulations, and
X = $0.5/MHz-pop for biregional and large scales.
• A clearing target of 20 for the small scale, and 50 for the biregional and large scales.
• A licensed spectrum benchmark T = 70 for all scales.
• A minimum revenue requirement of one million dollars for the small scale, and one
hundred million dollars for the biregional and large scales. These values are affiliated
with Objective 2 of Section 1.2.4.
2.5 Simulation Results
For the purpose of this work, we are limiting the results and analysis of simulations to four
major measurements: The amount of revenue earned by an auction, the total surplus of the
auction, the number of rounds that the auction took to complete, and the percentage of
bidders committing in excess of their established budget at the conclusion of an auction (i.e.
the bankruptcy rate).
The revenue, surplus, and number of rounds are auction-level metrics and demonstrate a
broad sense of success (or lack thereof) of a mechanism within an environment. The surplus
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here is defined as the sum of bidder-held values across all products based on their final
allocations. For both the revenue and surplus, we must pay special consideration to the
case where a bidder is bankrupt at the end of the auction. Do we assume that the items
awarded to these individuals should not apply to surplus, and that the costs should not be
included in the revenue? We offer several metrics for measuring these quantities, discussed
further in Sections 2.5.5 and 2.5.4. Making changes to auction mechanisms for the purpose
of optimizing revenue is generally avoided, as improving surplus is the primary goal and is
considered strongly tied to revenue [5]. Even so, we include the impact on revenue as part
of a complete analysis.
Because timeliness was a factor in the motivation for designing the Incentive Forward
Auction [19], the number of rounds is particularly important when comparing auction mech-
anisms. Finally, because accidental bankruptcy has been established as an issue with the
Incentive Auction, we would like to assess how this issue is affected by various factors, and
whether the SMR is successful in eliminating it.
For the sake of brevity, the following shorthand is used throughout the analysis to rep-
resent the various treatment effects discussed in Section 2.4:
• ValVar: At the start of an auction simulation, each bidder draws their base value for
a given product from a common normal distribution. When ValVar = 0, the standard
deviation of this distribution is 2% of the mean value; otherwise, it is 30% of the mean.
• nB: The number of bidders participating. Recall that a value of 0 indicates fewer
bidders, with the exact number varying by scale as follows:
– The small scale varies between 16 and 24 bidders.
– The bi-regional scale varies between 30 and 45 bidders.
– The national scale varies between 50 and 70 bidders.
• Dem: The maximum quantity that regional, local and opportunistic bidders may
demand for each product. A value of 0 indicates less maximum demand, with the
exact number varying by scale as follows:
– In the small scale, national bidders always have a maximum demand of 2 licenses,
with regional, local and opportunistic bidders varying between a cap of 1 and 2
licenses.
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– In the bi-regional scale, national bidders always have a maximum demand of 3
licenses, with regional, local and opportunistic bidders varying between a cap of
1 and 2 licenses.
– In the national scale, national bidders always have a maximum demand of 5
licenses, with regional, local and opportunistic bidders varying between a cap of
2 and 4 licenses.
• CInc: The clock increment for each product. When CInc = 0, prices increment by
5% of their previous value; otherwise, they increment at 10%.
• SMR: The mechanism employed. When SMR = 0, the Incentive Forward Auction
mechanism is used; otherwise, the SMR is used.
• Lex: A dummy variable determining whether the lexicographic strategy was purely
implemented.
• SF: A dummy variable determining whether the straightforward strategy was purely
implemented.
• Comp: A dummy variable determining whether the complex strategy was purely
implemented.
Note that the Lex, SF and Comp variables indicate auctions in which their respective strate-
gies were purely implemented. When all three variables take a value of 0 it is implied
that an even mixture of strategies was applied. Recall from Section 2.4 that simulations
were performed within three different environments: small, bi-regional and national scales.
Within the small and bi-regional environments, a total of 10,000 simulations were collected
for each possible permutation of control variables. Within the national environment, 1000
such simulations were collected.
The overlapping nature of the control variables necessitates a study of the interactions
between them when addressing any of the performance metrics. Since Lex, SF and Comp
are all dummies representing a single variable (strategy), a linear regression may include a
maximium of six-way interaction terms. This can be undesirable for a number of reasons,
particularly when attempting to interpret the meaning of regression coefficients. When
assessing the efficacy of higher-order interaction terms, we must balance two points:
1. Is the corresponding interaction coefficient significant in the regression?
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2. Does including the interaction term (significantly) improve the model’s prediction qual-
ity?
Assuming all variables are included with maximum-order interaction effects, there are 112
coefficients to consider per model. In most cases, more than half of these coefficients were
found to be significant in the regression, with an emphasis on the lower-order effects. Rather
than focus on this, we will assess point (2), taking into consideration the AIC, BIC and
adjusted R2 values as batches of higher-order terms are introduced into the model. The
results parallel one another across all three measurements, with the AIC values summarized
in Table A.1.
For all scales, the AIC and BIC decreased substantially when transitioning from a direct
effects model to a two-way interaction model. In most cases, the AIC and BIC continue to
decrease for three-way and higher complexity models. However, the difference between these
and the two-way models differ very narrowly—in all cases AIC is reduced by less than a single
percentage point, and typically only a fraction of this. Similarly, the adjusted R2 is relatively
improved by increasing from direct effects to include two-way interactions. Increasing to
third-way or higher interactions does not notably increase R2 further. Considering the
increased difficulty to interpret more complex interaction effects, we choose to limit our
analysis to the results of direct and two-way interaction models.
We find the following, discussed in the following sections:
• Auctions using the SMR mechanism take substantially longer than those using the IFA
mechanism, especially for larger scales.
• Doubling the clock increment is expected to reduce the number of rounds by roughly
50%, at little cost to either revenue or surplus.
• SMR bidders never go bankrupt, and complex bidders greatly reduce the likelihood to
do so.
• The SMR mechanism and complex IFA bidders substantially increase revenue and
surplus compared with other IFA strategy mixtures.
• Both revenue and surplus are independent of the choice of strategy when using the
SMR mechanism.
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2.5.1 The Data and Models
We present the data in three formats, found in the Appendix. The first set of tables in
Section A.2 consists of averaged dependent variables for each implemented treatment, as
well as pooled averages. Section A.3 contains raw and scaled coefficients for fixed effects
models, while Section A.4 contains coefficients for two-way interaction models. Section A.4
contains the range of marginal effects predicted by these interaction models.
It is prudent to discuss the meaning of the values within the direct and two-way interac-
tion tables. As an example, the small scale direct effects model of Table A.27 contains raw
coefficients extracted from the regression
NumRounds = 1.23− 0.55 · ValVar− 0.38 · nB + 0.03 ·Dem + · · · − 0.73 · Comp
In both the direct effects and interaction models, the constant value represents the expected
value for the base case. The base case represents a simulation with a choice of zero for
all relevant parameters. In the event that all variables are included in a model, this is
a simulation with a narrow bidder value distribution, fewer bidders, a lower amount of
demand per bidder, a lower (5%) clock increment, and a mixed set of bidder strategies. All
non-constant coefficients represent deviations from this base state.
In the direct effect tables, the raw values represent absolute deviations, while the scaled
coefficients represent deviations as a percent of the constant coefficient. The (small scale)
two-way interaction model from Table A.35 is an extension of the scaled direct effect models,
with the primary row/column containing direct effects and the remaining elements repre-
senting two-way effects. These values are extracted from the regression
NumRounds = 35.6 + 0.8 · ValVar− 1.1 · nB + · · · − 1.1 · Comp
+ 2.3 · ValVar · nB + 0.4 · ValVar ·Dem + . . . 0.1 · SMR · SF
For example, the term (2.3 · ValVar · nB) is represented in the cell corresponding to the
ValVar row and nB column, as 6.6% of the constant coefficient (i.e. 2.3/35.6 = 0.066). We
can interpret this coefficient as a component of the effect of switching from a narrow to
a wide value variance, given that we will be including a greater number of bidders in the
simulation (nB = 1). Equivalently, it can be interpreted as a component of the effect of
increasing the number of bidders in the simulation, given that bidders are drawing from a
wide distribution (ValVar = 1). We will refer to these as conditional effects.
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In addition to this, we can determine the joint effect from applying a wide value distribu-
tion from a large number of bidders by including both direct effects. In this case, we would
find the joint effect from using ValVar = 1 and nB = 1 to be
Joint effect = 2.3%− 3.2% + 6.6% = 5.7%
The two-way interaction models are most valuable in their ability to describe the effects of
dependent variables as a function of the value of other dependent variables. Because of the
binary nature of the independent variables, we can easily extract the entire range of effects.
For example, the (scaled) value variance effect is given by
ValVar Effect = 2.3 + 6.6 · nB− 1.2 ·Dem− 4.0 · CInc + 7.0 · SMR
− 1.4 · Lex + 0.8 · SF− 0.4 · Comp
In the case of the small scale number of rounds per auction, the value variance will have a
maximum (most positive) effect when nB = Dem = SMR = SF = 1, and a minimum (most
negative) effect when CInc = Lex = 1. These effects are given by
Maxmimum ValVar Effect = 2.3 + 6.6 + 1.2 + 7.0
= 17.1%
Minimum ValVar Effect = 2.3− 4.0− 1.4
= −3.1%
It is important to remember that we cannot choose Lex = 1 and Comp = 1 simultaneously,
since these are mutually exclusive dummy variables representing the strategy of the bidders.
From the minimum and maximum effects, we can see that broadening the value distribution
can have the effect of increasing or decreasing the expected number of rounds compared with
the base value, contingent on the state of the simulation.
2.5.2 Number of Rounds Per Auction
Simulation results strongly corroborate the hypothesis that SMR auctions take a greater
number of rounds to complete compared with the IFA mechanism. This is supported in the
averages found in Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7, the direct effects models from Table A.27, and
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Figure 2.1: Simulation results of auction length and bankruptcies
Strategy comparisons of auction length (as measured by the total number of rounds)
and bankruptcy rates. Because SMR bidders never went over budget, bankruptcies are
limited to IFA treatments. Each point represents the expected value of a treatment
from the corresponding two-way interaction model, with equivalent treatments connected.
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the two-way interaction models from Table A.35. Figure 2.1 shows the expected number of
rounds per treatment as estimated by the two-way models. Within this figure, light gray
lines connect equivalent treatments applied to IFA and SMR auctions. These plots make
two points immediately clear—that the SMR mechanism is expected to increase the number
of rounds regardless of treatment, and that the disparity between treatments is much more
dramatic at larger scales.
When averaging across treatments, small scale IFA auctions took about 28 rounds, com-
pared with 31 rounds for SMR auctions—an 11% increase. Many treatments have little to
no intra-mechanism change. By comparison, switching from the IFA to SMR mechanism in-
creased the average length of the auction from 86 to 271 rounds on the biregional scale, and
from 102 to 325 rounds on the national scale. In both cases, this exceeded a 200% expected
increase in length. Even in the least extreme case on the national scale (a large number
of SF bidders with a wide value distribution, higher demand and a 10% clock increment),
the model still anticipates that using the SMR will add about 60 rounds to the auction—an
increase of roughly 40%.
Figure 2.1 does not present auctions exclusively using the complex optimization strategy,
since a version of this was not implemented for the SMR mechanism. However, on the
national scale this strategy assortment resulted in auctions completing the fastest. Below we
find the range of marginal effects (on number of rounds) in switching from each IFA strategy
prescription to the pure complex strategy set:
Marginal Effect
Strategy Minimum Maximum
Lexico −76.3 12.5
SF −74.1 −25.2
Mixed −64.5 −27.0
Only the lexicographic strategy set is expected to perform slightly faster under any cir-
cumstances (specifically, with 10% clock increments), and all strategy sets are expected to
improve by 60 − 80 rounds in the extreme. We might expect this round reduction to have
negative impacts on the auction surplus or revenue when bidders make use of the complex
strategy. However, we see in sections 2.5.4 and 2.5.5 that the reverse of this is true, thanks
in large part to bankruptcy losses.
Finally, as we would expect, Figure 2.1 shows that treatments are distinctly clustered
based on the clock increment, with auctions that employ larger (10%) clock increments
taking fewer rounds to complete. We discuss the implications of this further in Section 2.5.6.
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Summary of results:
• Switching from IFA to SMR mechanisms on the small scale increased auction length
by an average of 11%
• On the biregional and national scales, switching to the SMR mechanism more than
tripled the expected number of rounds.
2.5.3 Bankruptcy Rates
Simulations confirm that the SMR mechanism satisfies one of its primary intentions—neither
SMR bidding strategy has a single instance of going over budget. The bid processing rules
are such that a bidder cannot go over budget without deliberately requesting a higher com-
mitment than their budget. For this reason, this section examines only IFA data and its
intra-mechanism effects. Averages of these values can be found in Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4,
while direct effects and two-way interaction models can be found in Tables A.26 and A.34,
respectively.
The right column of Figure 2.1 shows the expected bankruptcy rate for each IFA treat-
ment as determined by the two-way models. While there is not a clear advantage between the
lexicographic and SF strategies, the complex strategy is effective at reducing the bankruptcy
rate in all cases. The average bankruptcy frequency is reduced by a factor of roughly 8 on
the small and biregional scales, and by a factor of 4 on the national scale. In a vast majority
of circumstances, complex bidders go over budget fewer than one in a hundred times. While
these results are encouraging, issues prevail on the national scale where bankruptcies exceed
4% given wide value distributions and less crowded markets.
Wide value distributions were a problem for all strategies on the national scale—more
than doubling the average bankruptcy rate. Decreasing the number of bidders had a similar
effect, implying that greater market competition was linked to reduced budget issues on this
scale.
Bankruptcies play an important role in how we measure both revenue and surplus. For
this reason, results from this and the following two sections are meaningfully correlated.
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Summary of results:
• SMR bidders never went over budget
• IFA complex strategy bidders significantly reduced bankruptcy rates compared with
other IFA strategies in all cases.
• Bankruptcies were more of an issue when bidders had wide value distributions
2.5.4 Auction Surplus
Before we begin to analyze auction surplus, we need to determine how it is to be measured.
When all bidders are able to afford their commitments, the calculation is straightforward.
Do we assume that bidders who bankrupt themselves by the final round and are unable to
pay for their bids, are ultimately allocated their licenses anyway? We will consider both
extremes to this question.
• We denote the pessimistic auction surplus (surplus1 as shorthand) to be surplus in
which bankrupt bidders are assigned none of the products they would have otherwise
been awarded. Bankrupt bidders contribute zero to total surplus.
• We denote the opimistic auction surplus (surplus2 as shorthand) to be surplus in
which bidders are assigned all of their products regardless of bankrupt status.
We focus on the pessimistic interpretation, since this is how the FCC has chosen to conduct
the Incentive Auction in the past. Tables A.8 – A.13 display surplus averages. Tables
A.28 and A.29 contain direct effects models, while Tables A.36 and A.37 contain two-way
interaction models. Figure 2.2 displays the results of the interaction models in two forms.
The left column shows direct comparisons of pessimistic surplus across mechanisms, holding
all factors (including strategy) constant. The right column shows how the “best” strategies
from each mechanism (complex for IFA; SF for SMR) compare with respect to both surplus
metrics.
From this, it is clear that the SMR mechanism is expected to improve pessimistic surplus
compared with every combination of IFA strategies. The table below shows the percentage
increase to surplus when comparing lumped SMR and IFA treatments:
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Figure 2.2: Simulation results of auction surplus
Strategy comparisons of surplus. Each point represents the expected value of a treatment
from the corresponding two-way interaction model, with equivalent treatments connected.
(a) Small scale
(b) Biregional scale
(c) National scale
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Scale Surplus1 Surplus2
Small 4.3% 1.0%
Biregional 9.9% 1.6%
National 10.9% 3.5%
The benefit to surplus of using the SMR increases with scale. Much of this increase can
be explained by the elimination of bankruptcies. Including both pessimistic and optimistic
surplus allows us to see the exact extent of this. Even if all bidders over budget were still
awarded their items, the SMR mechanism would still improve surplus by an expected 3.5%
on the national scale.
Of all IFA strategies, the complex strategy performs the best. This is not surprising,
given its substantially reduced bankruptcy rates. The direct effects models of Table A.28
suggest an increase of roughly 3% on the small scale, up to double digit increases on the larger
scales. It is fair to question whether the SMR can outperform a group of IFA complex bidders,
given these circumstances. When limiting to the SMR SF and IFA complex strategies and
averaging across treatments, the SMR improves surplus over the IFA as follows:
Scale Surplus1 Surplus2
Small 2.2% 1.5%
Biregional 2.9% 1.1%
National 3.1% 1.0%
Even when assuming the ideal IFA strategy, the SMR maintains a respectable improve-
ment to both measurements of surplus across all scales. There were instances where the
two performed roughly equal to one another—specifically, when bidders had narrow value
distributions. And while the strategy distribution was very important within the IFA, it
was virtually arbitrary within the SMR. There was no treatment within any scale where
the choice of SMR strategy made more than a 1% impact on surplus. This robustness to
SMR strategy was common to many dependent variables, and underscores the power of this
mechanism.
Summary of results:
• The SMR has a positive impact on surplus with respect to nearly every treatment
• When holding bidding strategies fixed, SMR bidders on the national scale increase
Surplus1 by an average of 10.9%, and Surplus2 by an average of 3.5%
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• When comparing SMR treatments to complex IFA treatments, Surplus1 increases
by an average of 3.1% and Surplus2 by an average of 1.0%
• Surplus is independent of strategy when using the SMR mechanism
2.5.5 Auction Revenue
Similar to surplus, auction revenue may be calculated differently depending on how we wish
to handle bidder bankruptcies. We will consider four metrics in our analysis:
• We denote the pessimistic auction revenue (revenue1 as shorthand) to be revenue
in which bankrupt bidders contribute nothing to auction revenue.
• We denote the realistic auction revenue (revenue2 as shorthand) to be revenue in
which bankrupt bidders contribute their upfront payment to auction revenue.
• We denote the generous auction revenue (revenue3 as shorthand) to be revenue in
which bankrupt bidders contribute their entire budgets to auction revenue.
• We denote the optimistic auction revenue (revenue4 as shorthand) to be revenue
in which all bidders, including bankrupt bidders, somehow contribute 100% of their
final round commitments as revenue.
We have chosen the shorthand in such a way that the revenue is necessarily ordered:
Revenue1 ≤ Revenue2 ≤ Revenue3 ≤ Revenue4 (2.25)
Because realistic revenue measures how the Broadcast Incentive Auction collected revenue,
this will generally be the focus of our analysis. Tables A.14 – A.25 display revenue averages.
Tables A.30 – A.33 contain direct effects models, while Tables A.38 – A.41 contain two-way
interaction models. Figure 2.3 displays the results of the interaction models in two forms.
The left column shows direct comparisons of realistic revenue across mechanisms, holding all
factors (including strategy) constant. The right column shows how the “best” strategies from
each mechanism (complex for IFA; SF for SMR) compare with respect to all four revenue
metrics.
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We see, as with auction surplus, that revenue is aided to some extent by running in
the SMR mechanism compared with IFA strategies. The table below shows the average
percentage increase to revenue when comparing lumped SMR and IFA treatments:
Scale Revenue1 Revenue2 Revenue3 Revenue4
Small 9.0% 7.5% 5.8% 5.6%
Biregional 20.3% 16.1% 14.0% 13.3%
National 19.9% 15.7% 13.9% 13.4%
These numbers are not trivial: even Revenue4, which ignores bankruptcies entirely, is ex-
pected to increase by more than 10% for the larger scales. However, Figure 2.3 highlights
that much of this improvement comes from the relatively low revenue accumulated by purely
lexicographic IFA bidders. While this is an interesting result in itself, it is not a particularly
likely scenario in reality. Omitting pure groups of lexicographic bidders from consideration,
the SMR improves on the IFA as follows:
Scale Revenue1 Revenue2 Revenue3 Revenue4
Small 7.9% 6.3% 4.4% 4.2%
Biregional 14.1% 10.1% 7.6% 6.9%
National 10.1% 4.9% 2.6% 2.0%
While these results are much more tempered (especially on the national scale), the expecta-
tion of an improvement to revenue continues to hold for all metrics. And when it comes to the
question of which IFA strategy performs best for revenue, there is not a clear answer between
SF and complex. While the SF strategy significantly outperforms the complex strategy for
Revenue1 and Revenue2 on all scales, the SF strategy actually picks up a percentage point
over complex for Revenue4 on the national scale. Even so, we choose to compare SMR SF
bidders against purely complex IFA bidders, since they are consistently the most competitive
with respect to realistic revenue. In this matchup, the SMR improves over the SMR by the
following average percentages:
Scale Revenue1 Revenue2 Revenue3 Revenue4
Small 6.2% 5.9% 5.5% 5.5%
Biregional 4.3% 3.5% 2.6% 2.6%
National 2.2% 0.7% 0.3% 0.2%
As was the case with surplus, matching up best strategies reduces the expected benefit of
using the SMR mechanism, but the expectation is consistently an improvement. This is not
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entirely the case when we break things into individual treatments. On the national scale,
our two-way model anticipates a slight advantage to the IFA given narrow bidder value
distributions. This expected discrepancy is very slight—less than 1% difference.
Finally, as with revenue, it is necessary to point out that while the best IFA strategy
combinations are competitive with the SMR, they are not robust in the way that the SMR
is. When comparing strategies within the SMR mechanism while holding the treatment
fixed, no revenue metric was expected to deviate by more than 5%. Within the IFA, revenue
could be cut by as much as 50% if bidders behaved lexicographically. The reduced revenue
of mixed strategies suggests that revenue is negatively impacted if even a fraction of bidders
behave in such a manner.
Summary of results:
• The SMR has a positive impact on revenue with respect to nearly every treatment
• When holding bidding strategies fixed, SMR bidders on the national scale increase
revenue by an average of 13.4% − 19.9%, depending on metric. When excluding
lexicographic bidders, the increase is 2.0%− 10.1%
• When comparing SMR treatments to complex IFA treatments, national scale sur-
plus increases by an average of 0.2%− 2.2%
• Revenue is independent of strategy when using the SMR mechanism
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Figure 2.3: Simulation results of auction revenue
Strategy comparisons of revenue. Each point represents the expected value of a treatment
from the corresponding two-way interaction model, with equivalent treatments connected.
(a) Small scale
(b) Biregional scale
(c) National scale
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2.5.6 The Clock Increment
Although the clock increment was a control variable, it is significant enough to merit an
isolated discussion. Recall from Section 2.5.2 that the clock increment was observed to have
a significant impact on the expected number of rounds per auction. Figure 2.1 shows that
the clock increment splits treatments into discrete clusters. We outline some point statistics
on auction length data below:
Clock Increment
Mechanism/Scale 5% 10% Reduction
IFA, Small 36 19 46.5%
SMR, Small 40 22 46.4%
IFA, Biregional 110 62 43.8%
SMR, Biregional 348 194 44.1%
IFA, National 131 72 44.8%
SMR, National 419 232 44.6%
While the expected number of rounds changes dramatically with scale, the impact from the
clock increment does not. When averaging across treatments, doubling the clock increment
to 10% is expected to reduce the number of rounds by roughly 45% for every mechanism
and scale combination. Although intuitive, this confirms that increasing the clock increment
can be an effective tool for cutting down on auction length with great predictability. This
begs the question: does increasing the clock increment negatively impact either surplus or
revenue, and if so, to what extent?
Figure 2.4 shows the effect of increasing the clock increment on both pessimistic surplus
(surplus1) and realistic revenue (revenue2) per treatment, as determined by our two-way
interaction models. The model suggests very little impact on surplus, for either mechanism.
Averaged across treatments, increasing the clock is expected to reduce pessimistic surplus
by less than a percentage point within each scale, although there were national scale IFA
treatments where the reduction was as high as 5%. The response was even more muted
within the SMR, where no treatment increased or decreased surplus by more than 1%.
Revenue was somewhat more responsive to the clock increment. Increasing to 10% had
the effect of reducing revenue within the SMR mechanism by roughly 1.5% on average for
all scales. Revenue was also expected to decrease slightly on the small and national scales
for IFA auctions, but on the biregional scale many treatments resulted in a slight increase to
revenue. No single treatment resulted in a loss of more than 3% on any scale. Thus, while
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Figure 2.4: Simulation effects of clock increment
Comparisons of surplus and revenue with contrasting clock increments. Each point represents
the expected value of a treatment from the corresponding two-way interaction model, with
equivalent treatments connected.
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there is some expectation of loss as a result of speeding up the auction, it is small compared
with expected changes from switching mechanisms.
Summary of results:
• Increasing the clock increment from 5% to 10% consistently reduced the number
of rounds per auction by roughly 45%.
• Increasing the clock increment reduced surplus by less than 1% on average.
• Increasing the clock increment reduced revenue by 1.5% on average.
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Chapter 3
An Experimental Approach
3.1 Motivation
The simulated auction environment is very helpful in several ways. It inexpensively allows
the production of trials within many different and complex auction environments, as well
as testing the efficacy and effects of bidder strategies within these environments. However,
simulations come with significant implicit assumptions. The behavior of simulated bidders is
necessarily rigid, and there is no way of knowing that any combination of bidding strategies
captures realistic human behavior. As a results, we have an interest in producing a laboratory
auction environment with human subjects as bidders.
This experimental data provides much more fluid, organic and authentic input. It removes
the need to presume bidder behavior, and can help confirm observations originating from
simulated data. However, it comes with its own set of notable limitations. Experimental
data is much more expensive to obtain, requiring extensive time, physical resources, and
incentivized participants. As a result, we are able to obtain only a small fraction of the
number of data points produced via simulation. Of these data points, far fewer bidders and
products are utilized than was the case for the FCC Broadcast Incentive Auction. Finally,
because subjects must be familiarized with the auction mechanism in a relatively short
amount of time, the mechanism must be extensively simplified. Despite this, experimental
data provides critical insights to analysis.
In Section 3.2 we discuss in greater detail the experimental design and execution. In
Section 3.3 we discuss the results and analysis of the experiment.
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Table 3.1: The number of sessions conducted within each treatment category.
The “Display 1” treatment specifies that the lexicographic strategy was bound to the first
option button, with “Display 2” specifying that the lexicographic strategy was bound to the
second option button.
Display Option
Display 1 Display 2 No Display
Mechanism
IFA 5 5 3
SMR 5 5 3
3.2 Structure and Design
3.2.1 Overview
A session of the FCC experiment consisted of a static group of subjects performing a series
of independent auctions. A group consisted of six subjects who remained together until the
conclusion of a session. For this reason, we use “group” and “session” interchangeably. After
receiving instructions, subjects completed a single practice auction followed by ten regular
auctions. Auctions consisted of a variable number of rounds, with the final round of regular
auctions determined by a lack of excess demand within all products simultaneously. The
practice auction was distinct in that it was halted at the end of the fifth round. At the end
of each session, one of the ten regular auctions was randomly selected as the payout auction,
with payouts determined based on the total net profits of each bidder’s winnings. Bidders
using the IFA mechanism were paid one dollar for each 330 awarded session dollars, while
bidders using the SMR mechanism were paid one dollar for each 250 awarded session dollars.
Across all sessions, subjects were awarded an average of $28.87.
Each round, subjects were presented with a spreadsheet of information about the auc-
tion’s products. As part of the effort to keep the auctions simple to explain and comprehend,
every product had a supply of exactly one for each auction (a side effect of this decision was
a lack of reserve split). Thus, the only decisions subjects needed to make each round was
whether to select and bid on each available product (at the labeled clock price). In addi-
tion, some groups were provided with “bidding options”—two buttons which, when selected,
would recommend items to bid. These options determined their recommendations using the
same lexicographic and SF bidding strategies utilized for the simulations. At the end of each
round, subjects were presented with a summary of their processed and unprocessed bids, or
winnings and total profits if the auction had concluded.
83
Sessions were conducted with a 2× 3 treatment design. The first treatment variable was
the auction mechanism, the second was the display treatment. As with the simulations, both
the IFA and SMR mechanisms were implemented. In addition, groups varied by how the
automatic bidding options were presented. For some groups, options were not provided at
all. For others, options were generically labeled as “Option 1” and “Option 2”. Some groups
had the lexicographic strategy bound to Option 1, with others binding the lexicographic
strategy to Option 2. A total of 26 experiment observations were collected, with group
sample sizes for each treatment summarized in Table 3.1.
3.2.2 Environment
The Products: Each auction consisted of 15 products. These products had static names
and activity costs which carried over from auction to auction. However, the values that
bidders could have for a product changed each auction, with the range of possible values
differing from product to product. Table 3.2 summarizes the activities and possible bidder
values for each product. The initial posted price was $2000 for each product at the start of
each new auction. The clock increment was set at 10% of the current posted price, rounded
to the nearest hundred dollars. Thus, each product’s price incremented as follows:
$2000→ $2200→ $2400→ $2600→ $2900→ $3200→ . . .
Table 3.2: Activity costs and possible nonzero bidder values per product.
Product Activity Cost Value Range
A 100 9,000− 11,000
B 30 9,000− 11,000
C 80 7,000− 9,000
D 70 7,000− 9,000
E 60 7,000− 9,000
F 70 5,500− 6,500
G 70 5,500− 6,500
H 50 5,500− 6,500
I 50 5,500− 6,500
J 40 3,500− 4,500
K 40 3,500− 4,500
L 40 3,500− 4,500
M 20 3,500− 4,500
N 20 3,500− 4,500
O 20 3,500− 4,500
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The Bidders: Throughout each session of the experiment, the same six subjects competed
with one another over the course of all eleven auctions. Each auction, bidders had nonzero
value for exactly eight of the fifteen available products. Each auction, bidders were assigned
a new budget in the range of $5000− $10000. At the start of the first round of each auction,
bidders had an eligibility of 500—an amount that allows them to bid on most or all of their
valued products. This means that bidders are always budget-constrained during the first
round of bidding each period. This decision allowed subjects more autonomy in determining
which strategy they wished to pursue.
The Interface: Figure 3.1 contains a sample screenshot of the interface used by subjects
for making informed bidding decisions. Most of the information about products and round
results was contained within the spreadsheet in the upper left quadrant of the interface. This
table contained the following columns:
• Selection: A checkbox which, when selected, specified that the subject was willing to
commit to the associated product at the next (“clock”) price.
• Item: The name of the product described by the associated row.
• Activity Units: The activity cost of bidding on this product.
• Current Price: The product’s posted price, which all current holders (if any) were
committing to at present.
• Next Price: The product’s clock price, which would be the following round’s current
price in the event that there was positive excess demand. This is also the price that
bidding subjects were committing to for the next round.
• Profit at Next Price: The amount of profit (in experiment currency) that the bidder
stood to earn should they win the product at its next price.
• Excess Demand: The amount of excess demand for the product from the previous
round, defined here as
Excess Demand =
{
0 , if demand = 0,
demand− 1 , otherwise.
• Profit Per Activity Unit: The amount of profit that the product would net at the
next price for each unit of activity invested into it.
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• Profit Per Dollar Spent: The amount of profit that the product would net at the
next price for each unit of experiment currency invested into it at the next price.
The final two columns contained information that could be deduced from predecessor columns,
and were included as potential optimization tools for the subjects. The table also included
aggregate information in the bottom row concerning activity, prices and profits. These
aggregates were a function of the currently checked selections. This information was also
communicated within the Expected Cost and Activity meters below the table, which were
updated in real time as bidders checked and unchecked their selections. The behavior of these
meters differed by mechanism, as we discuss shortly. Finally, table rows were highlighted in
green to indicate that a bidder was currently holding that product.
When subjects were finished preparing their bidding selections, they pressed the green
“Submit” button to finalize their decisions. After this point, subjects could take no more
actions for the round. There was a limited amount of time in which to submit bids, displayed
at the top of the interface. If subjects did not submit their selections before the timer reached
zero, the auction would behave as if they pressed the submit button with no products
selected. The amount of time granted was three minutes for the first round, and decreased
by 30 seconds for each subsequent round until reaching a minimum of 30 seconds for round
6 and beyond. Finally, if all six subjects submitted their bids before the clock reached zero,
the round immediately concluded and round results were displayed before the next round
commenced.
In the example displayed, the bidding options are visible and presented above the green
submission button. Subjects were informed of the strategies utilized by each of these options
during the instructions. In addition, tool tips reminded the subjects of the optimizations
used by each option. When a subject clicked an option, the ensuing strategy calculateed the
recommended bidset and checked all of the associated products. However, the option did
not submit these bids for the round, and the bidder could continue to make selections as
long as time permitted.
Finally, the graphs to the right gave an account of the subject’s bidding history for that
auction. The top plot recorded the evolution of the subject’s eligibility (referred to simply
as activity units), while the bottom plot recorded the bidder’s (processed) commitment
per round. Commitments that exceeded the bidder’s budget and would have resulted in a
bankruptcy status were represented by a red bar in this graph.
Between each round, bidders were given updates on the success or failure of bidding
attempts. Figure 3.2 shows an example of this summary. These round updates included
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• Any failure to increase demand for a product due to lack of activity.
• And failure to reduce demand for a product due to insufficient excess demand (IFA).
• Any failure to provisionally win a product that was successfully bid on (SMR).
• An indication that all requests to increase and reduce demand were successful.
At the end of each auction, a summary of the subject’s auction winnings were displayed, as
in Figure 3.3. When a bidder had gone over budget for that particular auction, the products
won were still shown, but an additional message indicated that total profits for that period
would consequently be equal to zero. Finally, at the end of the experiment, one of the ten
regular auctions was selected for payment, and a summary displayed the selected round, as
well as potential earnings for all completed auctions, as in Figure 3.4.
Differences Between Mechanisms: The rules under which the auction performed bid
processing within the IFA and SMR mechanisms were identical to those used within the
simulated auction environment, with the caveat that reserve splits did not occur in the
experiment. There were two ways in which the bidder experience with the interface differed
with respect to mechanism: in the behavior of the cost bars, and the behavior of the option
buttons.
The activity and expected cost bars ignored provisional holdings in the IFA mechanism.
As subjects clicked the boxes associated with their selections, the bars filled up in amounts
proportional to the cost of their selections. In both mechanisms, the cost bar assumed
the next price for each item—the upper bound on how much the bidder may have been
committing with their selections. However, in the case of the SMR mechanism, the activity
and expected cost bars always included representations for current holdings. The expected
cost for an unchecked held product was equal to its current price. If the bidder chose to
select a held product, the expected cost increased slightly—from the current price to its
next price—and the activity remained unchanged. This is because the SMR mechanism
automatically “charged” the activity cost of held products against the bidder’s eligibility,
even if they did not bid on the product again. In both mechanisms, the auction blocked
the subject from submitting if their activity total exceeded their eligibility, and displayed a
warning if their expected costs exceeded their budget.
Finally, the options differed slightly between the two mechanisms in their selections. The
IFA options continued to ignore current holdings, suggesting optimizations over the entire
range of products. The SMR options, on the other hand, would never recommend bidding
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on currently held products, as they optimized over the space of unheld products under an
accordingly reduced budget and eligibility. In particular, a bidder who provisionally won all
of the products that they bid on (or held) from the previous round would be advised not
to bid on any products whatsoever, since they would have no available activity for unheld
items under this circumstance.
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Figure 3.1: The bidding interface for the FCC experiment
Figure 3.2: Experiment results summary between two rounds of an auction
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Figure 3.3: Results displayed at the conclusion of a mid-session auction
Figure 3.4: Results displayed at the conclusion of an experiment session
The highlighted row indicates which of the ten auctions was chosen at random and includes
the payout in dollars that the subject received (not including a 7 dollar show-up payment).
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3.3 Results
For the purpose of analysis, we are interested in examining the number of rounds per auction,
the rate at which bidders went bankrupt, the auction surplus, and the auction revenue. We
also briefly discuss auction length and its implications.
We are interested in the rate at which bidders held commitments exceeding their estab-
lished budgets at the conclusion of an auction. We discuss in Section 1.3 how the nature of
the incentive auction elicits unintentional overbidding in a variety of circumstances. When
simulating bidding behavior, we find that it is possible to eliminate bankruptcies altogether.
However, it is unclear whether human bidders would display this same aversion. We therefore
wish to compare the rate at which bidders go over budget with respect to each mechanism,
and to assess the reasoning for doing so.
Finally, auction surplus and revenue are standard auction performance metrics that we
wish to examine. We expect that reducing uncertainty of outcome in the auction design
(when transitioning from the IFA to the SMR) may encourage bidders to bid with greater
alignment to their preferences, improving surplus (and potentially revenue). There are mul-
tiple ways that we may choose to measure both surplus and revenue, discussed in greater
detail in their respective sections.
A total of four control variables are needed to describe the experimental treatments.
These controls are as follows:
• SMR: Recall “SMR” from Section 2.5, which takes a value of 1 when the SMR mech-
anism is implemented, and a value of 0 when the IFA mechanism is implemented.
• Auction: The current (regular) auction within a group, treated as a cardinal variable.
The value of Auction ranges from 1 to 10, and does not include the practice auction.
• Option1: A dummy variable representing the presentation of options in the interface.
A value of 1 indicates that the lexicographic strategy was displayed to the left of the
straightforward strategy, labeled as “Option 1”.
• Option2: A dummy variable representing the presentation of options in the interface.
A value of 1 indicates that the lexicographic strategy was displayed to the right of the
straightforward strategy, labeled as “Option 2”. When both Option1 and Option2 are
equal to 0, this indicates that no automated strategy options were supplied to subjects.
Because each group of subjects experiences auctions in a necessarily sequential order, auction
results within groups are treated as a time series, which necessitates panel data analysis. In
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Table 3.3: Random effects (experiment) model results.
Coefficients for bankruptcies represent proportions of subjects going bankrupt. Coefficients
for surplus and revenue models represent thousands of bidding experiment dollars. Bold
values indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 5% level.
Const SMR Auction Option1 Option2
NumRounds
coeff 9.137 0.708 0.211 0.780 0.530
p-val 0.000 0.160 0.003 0.240 0.425
Bankruptcies
coeff 0.043 -0.009 0.001 0.002 0.012
p-val 0.006 0.396 0.704 0.905 0.402
Surplus1
coeff 74.4 5.5 0.4 -1.8 -2.3
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.074 0.324 0.213
Surplus2
coeff 79.8 4.6 0.4 -1.5 -1.0
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.173 0.349
Revenue1
coeff 27.1 2.3 0.4 0.1 -0.3
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.896 0.745
Revenue3
coeff 28.7 1.9 0.4 0.3 0.3
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.622 0.671
Revenue4
coeff 29.1 1.9 0.4 0.2 0.3
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.730 0.638
the case of each dependent variable, the Hausman test strongly prefers a random effects
model over a fixed effects model. Table 3.3 summarizes the results of these random effects
models, which are discussed in greater detail throughout the next four sections.
3.3.1 Number of Rounds Per Auction
Consistent with small scale simulations, subjects within the SMR mechanism took slightly
more rounds on average compared with their IFA counterparts. However, the results of
Table 3.3 suggest that there is no evidence suggesting that the auction mechanism played
any significant role in the auction duration. This is not a surprising result, considering that
the primary benefit of using the IFA–merging licenses into products with non-unit supply—
effectively does not exist in this experiment. However, duration is expected to increase
slightly as more auctions are performed. This behavior can be seen in Figure 3.5, where
averages are accumulated within each mechanism and auction.
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Figure 3.5: Within-auction averages
(a) Number of rounds per auction (b) Auction bankruptcies
(c) Auction surplus (d) Auction revenue
3.3.2 Bankruptcy Rates
Perhaps unexpectedly, neither the mechanism nor any other control factor contributed sig-
nificantly to the incidence of bankruptcies. Within both mechanisms, approximately 4%
of bidders went bankrupt per auction. This low incidence combined with a relatively low
sample size calls the entire bankruptcy model into question. The random effects model has
a Wald χ2 value of 1.83 with an associated p-value of 0.77.
The most significant takeaway is that SMR bidders went over budget at all. This sug-
gests that, although the mechanism at no point forces bidders into a position where their
commitment exceeds their budgets, subjects took the initiative to do so regardless in poten-
tially strategic ways. Roughly equal bankruptcy rates also simplifies the across-mechanism
comparisons of surplus and revenue.
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All of this raises the question of why SMR bidders would ever go over budget. If we
take as a given that the mechanism itself is not forcing bidders into bankruptcy, then it
is likely that subjects may be strategically bidding beyond their means. This strategic
behavior would account for many of the IFA bankruptcies as well. One motivation for
bidding over budget is a desire to preserve eligibility. To measure this for a given bidder,
we define excess eligibility each round as the difference between the eligibility that would
have resulted from the straightforward strategy bidset and the subject’s final eligibility for
the round. Thus, excess eligibility is positive when a bidder provisionally wins products
summing higher activity than their optimal bidset for the round.
Choosing a unified measurement for excess eligibility across both mechanisms is difficult,
since the two treat holdings differently. SMR bidders are not required to bid on held prod-
ucts, since these count toward processed activity automatically. Should a held SMR product
automatically count toward requested activity and the associated excess eligibility calcula-
tion? This would significantly bias the calculation. An IFA bidder requesting to drop a bid
would receive a negative contribution to their excess eligibility, while the same SMR bidder
would receive no contribution whatsoever in waiting to drop a held product. Considering
that bidders may attempt to drop the same product for many consecutive rounds, this issue
compounds on itself.
However, the two are perfectly comparable during the first round, when holdings have
yet to become a factor in the bidding process. IFA bidders submitted bids resulting in an
average of 6.5 excess eligibility points during the first round, compared with an average of 25.6
excess eligibility from SMR bidders. At the end of round 1, IFA bidders had positive excess
eligibility 34.1% of the time, compared with a 54.9% incidence rate from SMR bidders. These
statistics suggest that SMR bidders are willing to manage their eligibilities more aggressively
than IFA bidders, both in frequency and amount. And they are successful in doing so. Figure
3.6 shows the average amount of eligibility per auction round maintained by IFA and SMR
bidders. SMR bidders consistently hold an eligibility advantage over IFA bidders throughout
the duration of an auction, averaging 10.4 additional points.
Summary of results:
• Bankruptcies were independent of mechanism, occurring at an average rate of
roughly 4%
• SMR bidders averaged 25.6 points of excess eligibility in the first round, compared
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Figure 3.6: Average eligibility of subjects
Averages are split by auction mechanism and accumulated by round number.
with 6.5 points from IFA bidders.
• SMR bidders maintained an average of 10 additional points of eligibility over IFA
bidders from round to round.
3.3.3 Auction Surplus
As in Section 2.5, we examined two metrics for surplus, denoted Surplus1 and Surplus2.
Surplus1 is the calculation of surplus assuming that products corresponding to bankrupt
bidders are left unassigned. This version of surplus was implemented within the experiment.
Surplus2 is the calculation of surplus assuming that all products are assigned to winning
bidders regardless of bankrupt status. Although unimplemented within the experiment,
Surplus2 shows the effects of mechanism on surplus in the absence of bankruptcy effects.
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Including both allows us to examine upper and lower bound estimates of surplus.
Table 3.3 supports the claim that switching from the IFA mechanism to SMR significantly
benefits auction surplus. When assuming that bankrupt bidders do not contribute to surplus,
the SMR mechanism is expected to increase surplus by $5,500 relative to a $74,400 baseline
(an increase of 7.4%). Even in the case where bidders would be assigned their products
regardless, SMR increases surplus by an expected $4,600 relative to a $79,800 baseline (an
increase of 5.8%). As a disclaimer, it should be mentioned that subject behavior would most
likely have shifted in the event that products were assigned to them regardless of bankruptcy
status.
Summary of results:
• Auction surplus increased by more than 5% when comparing SMR auctions to IFA
auctions, even when ignoring the effects of bankruptcy.
3.3.4 Auction Revenue
Recall the four metrics for measuring revenue defined in Section 2.5.5:
• Revenue1: The calculation of revenue assuming that bankrupt bidders contribute
nothing to total revenue.
• Revenue2: The calculation of revenue assuming that bankrupt bidders contribute
their upfront payments to total revenue.
• Revenue3: The calculation of revenue assuming that bankrupt bidders contribute
their budgets to total revenue.
• Revenue4: The calculation of revenue assuming that all bidders, including bankrupt
bidders, somehow contribute their entire commitment to total revenue.
Notably, Revenue2 is missing from Table 3.3 and our discussion. Recall that Revenue2 is
calculated by assuming that bidders forfeit their upfront payments in the event of bankruptcy.
Upfront payments were in turn a function of the starting eligibility of each bidder. In
the experiment, however, all bidders began with the same eligibility at the start of each
auction in such a way that they were not immediately activity-constrained. This means
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that upfront payments would always equal their budgets, and there would be no difference
between Revenue2 and Revenue3.
The results of 3.3 demonstrate a robustness of the effects of mechanism across the vari-
ants of revenue. The amount that the SMR mechanism is expected to increase auction
revenue ranges from 6.5% (Revenue4) to 8.4% (Revenue1). More strikingly, because the
bankruptcy rate is statistically equal between the two mechanisms, this means almost all of
the increase in revenue (and surplus) is a result of bidder strategy and behavior. Further-
more, all forms of revenue are expected to increase as bidders become more familiar with
the auction environment (i.e. as Auction increases).
Summary of results:
• Auction revenue increased by more than 6% when comparing SMR auctions to IFA
auctions, even when ignoring the effects of bankruptcy.
• All forms of revenue increased slightly as bidders become more familiar with the
auction.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
The Incentive Auction was a novel approach in centralizing a private two-sided market.
It balanced the goals of maximizing the supply of repurposed cellular spectrum licenses
while achieving a profit for the FCC. However, the decision to redesign the SMR into the
IFA mechanism for the forward auction component was an optional decision in this scheme
which resulted in positive and negative repercussions. As argued by Milgrom in the process
of designing the mechanism, these changes “should permit the auction to be completed in
a fraction of the time that would be required by a traditional SMR auction, with no loss
of efficiency or added difficulty for bidders [19].” Indeed, simulations confirmed that SMR
auctions took far more rounds than IFA auctions to complete—as many as three times the
number of rounds, under some circumstances.
However, this increase in speed did not come without its costs. Simulations showed that
using the IFA caused bidders employing any strategy to unintentionally go over budget,
implying that the risk of doing so was inherent to the mechanism an unavoidable. The
incidence of bankruptcies is very serious to both the bidder and the FCC, since failure to
pay for winnings results in a forfeiture of the down payment for the bidder and a failure to
allocate the license(s). Simulations using the SMR, by contrast, did not result in bankruptcies
for any bidding strategy, calling into question the argument that the IFA should cause “no
added difficulty for bidders.”
Experimental results showed that there was no discernible difference in bankruptcy rates
between mechanisms. However, bidders participating in SMR auctions were able to maintain
consistently greater eligibilities than their IFA counterparts. This was a likely factor in
explaining the additional 7% surplus and 8.4% revenue enjoyed by these SMR auctions.
These numbers were consistent with simulation results, where increases to surplus ranged
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from 2 − 11% and increases to (realistic) revenue ranged from 1 − 16%. It is interesting to
note that much of the benefit in simulations can be attributed to losses from bankruptcies,
whereas the experimental mechanisms were largely independent of these effects.
Finally, it should be argued that the benefits of reduced auction length do not outweigh
the downsides of the IFA mechanism. While using the IFA has the potential to reduce auction
length by hundreds of rounds, this effect can be replicated in part with simple to changes to
auction parameters such as the clock increment. Simulations found that doing so had minimal
effects on either revenue or surplus, and would continue to encourage straightforward bidding
strategies. Further, the benefit of auction reduction is not very significant. During the 2016
Broadcast Incentive Auction, later rounds were conducted at a rate of 6 per day, and likely
could have been performed more frequently. The FCC should consider carefully whether
reducing auction length by several bidding days is worth the potential cost of billions to
surplus and revenue elicited by an unpredictable mechanism.
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Appendix A
Simulation Data Tables
A.1 Interaction Model AICs and BICs
Table A.1: AIC for each model as a percentage of its corresponding (left-most)
direct-effects model.
Max N-Way Interaction
1 2 3 4 5 6
Small
Scale
NumRounds 100 96.6 96.1 96.1 96.1 96.1
Revenue1 100 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.6
Revenue2 100 99.5 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.4
Revenue3 100 99.3 99.2 99.2 99.2 99.2
Revenue4 100 99.3 99.2 99.2 99.2 99.2
Surplus1 100 99.9 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.8
Surplus2 100 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.6 99.6
Bi-Reg
Scale
NumRounds 100 98.8 98.7 98.7 98.7 98.7
Revenue1 100 99.1 99.1 99.1 99.1 99.1
Revenue2 100 98.9 98.8 98.8 98.8 98.8
Revenue3 100 98.7 98.6 98.6 98.6 98.6
Revenue4 100 98.7 98.6 98.6 98.6 98.6
Surplus1 100 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.7
Surplus2 100 98.9 98.8 98.8 98.8 98.8
National
Scale
NumRounds 100 97.5 97.1 97.1 97.1 97.1
Revenue1 100 98.2 98.1 98.1 98.1 98.1
Revenue2 100 96.9 96.8 96.8 96.8 96.8
Revenue3 100 96.0 95.8 95.8 95.8 95.8
Revenue4 100 95.9 95.6 95.6 95.6 95.6
Surplus1 100 99.4 99.3 99.3 99.3 99.3
Surplus2 100 98.0 97.8 97.8 97.8 97.8
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A.2 Averages
Table A.2: Average small-scale bankruptcy percentages. The final row represents
averages across all parameter sets.
IFA Strategies
ValVar nB Dem CInc Lexico SF Complex Mixed
0 0 0 0 1.3 1.9 0.1 1.3
0 0 0 1 1.5 2.2 0.3 1.5
0 0 1 0 1.2 2.0 0.1 1.3
0 0 1 1 1.4 2.2 0.3 1.5
0 1 0 0 0.7 1.0 0.1 0.7
0 1 0 1 1.1 1.2 0.2 0.9
0 1 1 0 0.8 1.0 0.1 0.8
0 1 1 1 1.1 1.2 0.2 1.0
1 0 0 0 0.7 0.9 0.0 0.6
1 0 0 1 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.6
1 0 1 0 0.7 1.0 0.0 0.7
1 0 1 1 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.7
1 1 0 0 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.4
1 1 0 1 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.4
1 1 1 0 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.5
1 1 1 1 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.4
0.9 1.2 0.1 0.8
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Table A.3: Average biregional-scale bankruptcy percentages. The final row rep-
resents averages across all parameter sets. SMR strategies were not included
because no bankruptcies occurred within this mechanism.
IFA Strategies
ValVar nB Dem CInc Lexico SF Complex Mixed
0 0 0 0 12.8 8.8 0.9 7.4
0 0 0 1 12.1 9.9 1.2 8.8
0 0 1 0 7.1 9.2 1.2 7.3
0 0 1 1 7.3 11.1 1.6 9.0
0 1 0 0 7.8 4.9 0.2 3.7
0 1 0 1 9.0 6.3 0.3 4.9
0 1 1 0 5.2 5.1 0.3 3.6
0 1 1 1 5.7 6.6 0.3 4.6
1 0 0 0 11.2 9.5 0.8 7.7
1 0 0 1 9.7 8.7 1.2 7.7
1 0 1 0 7.9 11.5 1.7 8.4
1 0 1 1 7.3 11.6 2.3 9.1
1 1 0 0 6.5 5.1 0.5 4.5
1 1 0 1 6.1 5.4 0.6 4.8
1 1 1 0 4.8 6.3 0.8 5.0
1 1 1 1 4.6 6.9 1.0 5.8
7.8 7.9 0.9 6.4
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Table A.4: Average national-scale bankruptcy percentages. The final row rep-
resents averages across all parameter sets. SMR strategies were not included
because no bankruptcies occurred within this mechanism.
IFA Strategies
ValVar nB Dem CInc Lexico SF Complex Mixed
0 0 0 0 7.1 3.1 0.2 5.1
0 0 0 1 7.2 3.2 0.3 5.9
0 0 1 0 4.1 3.5 0.4 6.8
0 0 1 1 4.3 3.8 0.4 7.1
0 1 0 0 6.5 1.3 0.1 1.7
0 1 0 1 6.3 1.5 0.1 1.9
0 1 1 0 4.0 1.6 0.1 2.2
0 1 1 1 3.9 1.7 0.2 2.0
1 0 0 0 9.2 9.0 2.5 9.8
1 0 0 1 8.4 10.3 3.2 11.5
1 0 1 0 6.0 9.0 4.2 11.6
1 0 1 1 5.5 11.7 4.7 14.0
1 1 0 0 7.0 5.5 1.0 6.1
1 1 0 1 6.4 6.9 1.2 7.5
1 1 1 0 4.6 5.6 1.7 7.4
1 1 1 1 4.3 7.5 1.8 8.9
5.9 5.3 1.4 6.8
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Table A.5: Average small-scale number of rounds per auction. The final row
represents averages across all parameter sets.
Number of Rounds Per Auction
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 38 41 35 41 34 35 41
0 0 0 1 21 22 18 22 18 19 22
0 0 1 0 39 40 34 40 34 35 40
0 0 1 1 21 21 18 21 18 19 21
0 1 0 0 36 35 35 35 35 35 35
0 1 0 1 19 19 18 19 18 19 19
0 1 1 0 36 35 35 35 35 35 35
0 1 1 1 19 19 18 19 18 19 19
1 0 0 0 37 43 36 43 35 36 43
1 0 0 1 20 23 19 23 19 19 23
1 0 1 0 38 43 37 43 35 37 43
1 0 1 1 20 23 20 23 19 20 23
1 1 0 0 38 42 38 42 37 38 42
1 1 0 1 20 23 20 23 20 20 23
1 1 1 0 39 42 38 42 37 38 42
1 1 1 1 21 23 20 23 20 20 23
29 31 28 31 27 28 31
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Table A.6: Average biregional-scale number of rounds per auction. The final
row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Number of Rounds Per Auction
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 65 412 125 410 100 114 411
0 0 0 1 35 224 70 224 54 63 223
0 0 1 0 65 400 133 397 100 122 399
0 0 1 1 35 220 76 220 55 67 220
0 1 0 0 123 367 142 370 106 138 368
0 1 0 1 70 206 81 209 60 78 207
0 1 1 0 122 321 145 318 99 137 319
0 1 1 1 67 179 83 179 57 78 180
1 0 0 0 62 344 112 344 88 99 344
1 0 0 1 34 190 63 190 48 55 190
1 0 1 0 60 333 121 334 89 108 333
1 0 1 1 32 187 69 188 50 60 188
1 1 0 0 115 321 133 322 97 126 321
1 1 0 1 64 183 77 184 56 72 183
1 1 1 0 116 285 139 284 91 129 285
1 1 1 1 64 164 81 164 53 74 163
71 271 103 271 75 95 271
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Table A.7: Average national-scale number of rounds per auction. The final row
represents averages across all parameter sets.
Number of Rounds Per Auction
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 118 506 149 474 96 158 496
0 0 0 1 63 277 84 262 53 85 273
0 0 1 0 119 467 149 429 93 158 457
0 0 1 1 63 255 85 235 52 84 249
0 1 0 0 141 419 149 396 88 149 414
0 1 0 1 80 235 85 222 51 82 233
0 1 1 0 149 379 149 351 86 147 372
0 1 1 1 84 215 86 200 49 81 211
1 0 0 0 112 546 156 370 90 148 452
1 0 0 1 60 290 84 209 51 81 248
1 0 1 0 121 561 157 338 87 146 437
1 0 1 1 63 292 86 191 50 79 236
1 1 0 0 145 430 159 311 87 146 370
1 1 0 1 77 235 87 183 50 82 212
1 1 1 0 153 446 160 287 86 143 349
1 1 1 1 80 244 88 164 49 80 201
102 362 120 289 70 116 326
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Table A.8: Average small-scale pessimistic auction surplus (surplus1), in millions
of dollars. The final row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Average Pessimistic Auction Surplus (Surplus1)
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 30.7 31.9 28.9 31.9 31.6 30.1 31.9
0 0 0 1 30.6 31.9 28.8 31.9 31.1 29.9 31.9
0 0 1 0 30.8 32.0 29.0 32.0 31.7 30.2 32.0
0 0 1 1 30.6 31.9 28.8 31.9 31.4 30.0 31.9
0 1 0 0 30.9 32.2 29.7 32.2 31.8 30.6 32.2
0 1 0 1 30.5 32.0 29.6 32.0 31.4 30.4 32.0
0 1 1 0 31.0 32.2 29.9 32.2 32.0 30.6 32.2
0 1 1 1 30.5 32.1 29.6 32.1 31.6 30.3 32.1
1 0 0 0 38.1 39.1 37.7 39.1 38.7 38.0 39.1
1 0 0 1 38.1 39.1 37.8 39.0 38.6 38.0 39.0
1 0 1 0 39.1 39.9 38.6 39.9 39.6 38.9 39.9
1 0 1 1 39.1 39.8 38.5 39.8 39.4 38.8 39.8
1 1 0 0 40.8 43.3 40.4 43.3 41.4 40.7 43.3
1 1 0 1 40.9 43.2 40.6 43.2 41.3 40.7 43.2
1 1 1 0 41.5 43.7 41.2 43.8 42.0 41.3 43.8
1 1 1 1 41.6 43.7 41.2 43.7 41.8 41.4 43.7
35.3 36.8 34.4 36.8 36.0 35.0 36.8
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Table A.9: Average small-scale optimistic auction surplus (surplus2), in millions
of dollars. The final row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Average Optimistic Auction Surplus (Surplus2)
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 31.9 31.9 32.0 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9
0 0 0 1 31.8 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.8 31.8 31.9
0 0 1 0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 31.9 32.0 32.0
0 0 1 1 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9
0 1 0 0 32.1 32.2 32.1 32.2 32.0 32.1 32.2
0 1 0 1 31.9 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 32.0
0 1 1 0 32.1 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.1 32.1 32.2
0 1 1 1 32.0 32.1 32.0 32.1 32.0 32.0 32.1
1 0 0 0 38.9 39.1 39.4 39.1 38.8 39.1 39.1
1 0 0 1 38.9 39.1 39.5 39.0 38.8 39.1 39.0
1 0 1 0 39.9 39.9 40.3 39.9 39.7 40.0 39.9
1 0 1 1 39.9 39.8 40.2 39.8 39.6 39.9 39.8
1 1 0 0 41.8 43.3 42.1 43.3 41.4 41.8 43.3
1 1 0 1 41.7 43.2 42.0 43.2 41.4 41.8 43.2
1 1 1 0 42.5 43.7 42.7 43.8 42.0 42.4 43.8
1 1 1 1 42.4 43.7 42.6 43.7 42.0 42.4 43.7
36.4 36.8 36.6 36.8 36.2 36.4 36.8
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Table A.10: Average biregional-scale pessimistic auction surplus (surplus1), in
billions of dollars. The final row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Average Pessimistic Auction Surplus (Surplus1)
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 4.90 5.87 5.01 5.87 5.71 5.04 5.87
0 0 0 1 4.93 5.86 4.92 5.86 5.65 4.94 5.86
0 0 1 0 5.24 5.89 5.08 5.89 5.73 5.09 5.89
0 0 1 1 5.20 5.87 4.94 5.87 5.66 4.97 5.87
0 1 0 0 5.17 5.93 5.28 5.93 5.84 5.45 5.93
0 1 0 1 5.04 5.89 5.11 5.89 5.80 5.32 5.89
0 1 1 0 5.44 5.93 5.32 5.94 5.85 5.47 5.93
0 1 1 1 5.37 5.90 5.14 5.90 5.80 5.35 5.90
1 0 0 0 5.83 7.09 6.09 7.06 6.83 6.12 7.07
1 0 0 1 5.96 7.09 6.15 7.06 6.76 6.09 7.07
1 0 1 0 6.25 7.22 6.13 7.19 6.94 6.22 7.20
1 0 1 1 6.30 7.20 6.14 7.18 6.86 6.15 7.19
1 1 0 0 6.84 7.74 6.99 7.71 7.49 7.04 7.73
1 1 0 1 6.88 7.73 6.94 7.71 7.44 6.99 7.72
1 1 1 0 7.11 7.83 7.03 7.81 7.61 7.13 7.82
1 1 1 1 7.13 7.82 6.95 7.79 7.54 7.03 7.81
5.85 6.68 5.83 6.67 6.47 5.90 6.67
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Table A.11: Average biregional-scale optimistic auction surplus (surplus2), in
billions of dollars. The final row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Average Optimistic Auction Surplus (Surplus2)
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 5.78 5.87 5.81 5.87 5.85 5.82 5.87
0 0 0 1 5.77 5.86 5.81 5.86 5.84 5.82 5.86
0 0 1 0 5.70 5.89 5.83 5.89 5.87 5.83 5.89
0 0 1 1 5.69 5.87 5.83 5.87 5.85 5.83 5.87
0 1 0 0 5.88 5.93 5.88 5.93 5.90 5.89 5.93
0 1 0 1 5.87 5.89 5.86 5.89 5.87 5.87 5.89
0 1 1 0 5.88 5.93 5.89 5.94 5.91 5.90 5.93
0 1 1 1 5.87 5.90 5.87 5.90 5.88 5.88 5.90
1 0 0 0 6.72 7.09 6.96 7.06 6.93 6.87 7.07
1 0 0 1 6.73 7.09 7.01 7.06 6.92 6.90 7.07
1 0 1 0 6.89 7.22 7.11 7.19 7.09 7.01 7.20
1 0 1 1 6.89 7.20 7.15 7.18 7.07 7.04 7.19
1 1 0 0 7.41 7.74 7.63 7.71 7.57 7.60 7.73
1 1 0 1 7.44 7.73 7.65 7.71 7.55 7.62 7.72
1 1 1 0 7.54 7.83 7.75 7.81 7.69 7.72 7.82
1 1 1 1 7.55 7.82 7.76 7.79 7.67 7.73 7.81
6.48 6.68 6.61 6.67 6.59 6.58 6.67
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Table A.12: Average national-scale pessimistic auction surplus (surplus1), in
billions of dollars. The final row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Average Pessimistic Auction Surplus (Surplus1)
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 23.5 26.9 25.3 26.9 26.7 22.1 26.9
0 0 0 1 23.3 26.8 25.1 26.8 26.3 21.9 26.8
0 0 1 0 24.1 26.9 25.3 26.9 26.6 21.9 26.9
0 0 1 1 24.0 26.8 25.0 26.8 26.4 21.7 26.8
0 1 0 0 24.6 27.0 26.4 27.0 26.8 25.4 27.0
0 1 0 1 24.5 26.9 26.0 26.9 26.6 25.2 26.9
0 1 1 0 25.2 27.0 26.4 27.0 26.9 25.4 27.0
0 1 1 1 25.2 26.9 26.1 26.9 26.6 25.3 26.9
1 0 0 0 30.4 36.4 29.2 36.8 34.9 27.6 36.7
1 0 0 1 30.8 36.4 28.9 36.8 34.2 26.8 36.7
1 0 1 0 31.5 36.6 30.2 37.0 34.8 28.1 36.8
1 0 1 1 31.6 36.6 29.2 37.0 34.4 26.6 36.8
1 1 0 0 33.1 38.1 33.6 38.3 37.5 32.3 38.2
1 1 0 1 33.4 38.1 33.0 38.2 37.1 31.3 38.2
1 1 1 0 34.1 38.3 34.0 38.5 37.5 32.4 38.4
1 1 1 1 34.2 38.2 33.3 38.5 37.2 31.5 38.4
28.3 32.1 28.6 32.3 31.3 26.6 32.2
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Table A.13: Average national-scale optimistic auction surplus (surplus2), in bil-
lions of dollars. The final row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Average Optimistic Auction Surplus (Surplus2)
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 24.6 26.9 26.5 26.9 26.8 26.4 26.9
0 0 0 1 24.6 26.8 26.2 26.8 26.6 26.2 26.8
0 0 1 0 24.4 26.9 26.6 26.9 26.8 26.4 26.9
0 0 1 1 24.5 26.8 26.3 26.8 26.6 26.3 26.8
0 1 0 0 25.8 27.0 26.7 27.0 26.9 26.6 27.0
0 1 0 1 25.8 26.9 26.4 26.9 26.6 26.4 26.9
0 1 1 0 25.7 27.0 26.7 27.0 26.9 26.7 27.0
0 1 1 1 25.7 26.9 26.5 26.9 26.7 26.5 26.9
1 0 0 0 32.3 36.4 36.2 36.8 36.4 34.6 36.7
1 0 0 1 32.5 36.4 36.2 36.8 36.3 34.6 36.7
1 0 1 0 32.4 36.6 36.4 37.0 36.6 34.9 36.8
1 0 1 1 32.4 36.6 36.4 37.0 36.5 34.9 36.8
1 1 0 0 34.8 38.1 37.9 38.3 38.0 36.7 38.2
1 1 0 1 34.9 38.1 37.8 38.2 37.8 36.7 38.2
1 1 1 0 34.9 38.3 38.0 38.5 38.1 36.9 38.4
1 1 1 1 35.0 38.2 37.9 38.5 37.9 36.9 38.4
29.4 32.1 31.8 32.3 32.0 31.1 32.2
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Table A.14: Average small-scale pessimistic auction revenue (revenue1), in mil-
lions of dollars. The final row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Average Pessimistic Auction Revenue (Revenue1)
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 25.5 28.8 26.8 28.8 28.4 26.9 28.8
0 0 0 1 24.8 28.3 26.2 28.3 27.2 26.1 28.3
0 0 1 0 25.5 29.0 26.9 29.0 28.6 27.2 29.0
0 0 1 1 24.8 28.5 26.3 28.5 27.6 26.4 28.5
0 1 0 0 29.5 31.5 28.7 31.5 30.5 29.4 31.5
0 1 0 1 28.4 30.9 28.1 30.9 29.4 28.6 30.9
0 1 1 0 29.5 31.6 29.0 31.6 30.6 29.5 31.6
0 1 1 1 28.5 31.0 28.1 31.0 29.6 28.6 31.0
1 0 0 0 23.3 27.0 26.1 27.0 26.0 25.2 27.0
1 0 0 1 22.8 26.9 25.8 26.9 25.6 24.8 26.9
1 0 1 0 24.4 28.2 27.4 28.2 27.3 26.5 28.2
1 0 1 1 23.9 27.9 26.9 27.9 26.8 26.0 27.9
1 1 0 0 30.1 35.9 31.4 35.9 31.3 30.9 35.9
1 1 0 1 29.6 35.7 31.0 35.7 30.8 30.4 35.7
1 1 1 0 31.3 36.8 32.5 36.8 32.4 32.0 36.8
1 1 1 1 30.7 36.5 32.0 36.5 31.8 31.5 36.6
27.0 30.9 28.3 30.9 29.0 28.1 30.9
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Table A.15: Average small-scale realistic auction revenue (revenue2), in millions
of dollars. The final row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Average Realistic Auction Revenue (Revenue2)
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 25.9 28.8 27.9 28.8 28.5 27.6 28.8
0 0 0 1 25.3 28.3 27.4 28.3 27.4 26.9 28.3
0 0 1 0 26.1 29.0 28.2 29.0 28.7 27.9 29.0
0 0 1 1 25.4 28.5 27.5 28.5 27.8 27.2 28.5
0 1 0 0 29.9 31.5 29.7 31.5 30.6 30.0 31.5
0 1 0 1 29.0 30.9 29.1 30.9 29.6 29.3 30.9
0 1 1 0 30.1 31.6 30.0 31.6 30.7 30.2 31.6
0 1 1 1 29.2 31.0 29.2 31.0 29.8 29.4 31.0
1 0 0 0 23.6 27.0 26.7 27.0 26.0 25.5 27.0
1 0 0 1 23.1 26.9 26.3 26.9 25.6 25.1 26.9
1 0 1 0 24.7 28.2 28.0 28.2 27.3 26.8 28.2
1 0 1 1 24.2 27.9 27.5 27.9 26.8 26.4 27.9
1 1 0 0 30.4 35.9 31.9 35.9 31.4 31.3 35.9
1 1 0 1 29.8 35.7 31.5 35.7 30.8 30.7 35.7
1 1 1 0 31.7 36.8 33.1 36.8 32.4 32.4 36.8
1 1 1 1 31.0 36.5 32.5 36.5 31.8 31.8 36.6
27.5 30.9 29.2 30.9 29.1 28.7 30.9
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Table A.16: Average small-scale generous auction revenue (revenue3), in millions
of dollars. The final row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Average Generous Auction Revenue (Revenue3)
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 26.5 28.8 29.5 28.8 28.6 28.5 28.8
0 0 0 1 25.8 28.3 28.9 28.3 27.9 27.8 28.3
0 0 1 0 26.5 29.0 29.6 29.0 28.8 28.7 29.0
0 0 1 1 25.9 28.5 29.0 28.5 28.1 28.1 28.5
0 1 0 0 30.6 31.5 31.0 31.5 30.7 30.8 31.5
0 1 0 1 29.7 30.9 30.3 30.9 29.9 30.1 30.9
0 1 1 0 30.6 31.6 31.1 31.6 30.7 30.9 31.6
0 1 1 1 29.8 31.0 30.3 31.0 30.0 30.2 31.0
1 0 0 0 23.8 27.0 27.3 27.0 26.1 25.9 27.0
1 0 0 1 23.3 26.9 26.9 26.9 25.7 25.5 26.9
1 0 1 0 25.0 28.2 28.6 28.2 27.4 27.2 28.2
1 0 1 1 24.4 27.9 28.1 27.9 26.9 26.7 27.9
1 1 0 0 30.8 35.9 32.6 35.9 31.4 31.7 35.9
1 1 0 1 30.1 35.7 32.1 35.7 30.9 31.2 35.7
1 1 1 0 32.0 36.8 33.7 36.8 32.5 32.9 36.8
1 1 1 1 31.3 36.5 33.1 36.5 31.9 32.2 36.6
27.9 30.9 30.1 30.9 29.2 29.3 30.9
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Table A.17: Average small-scale optimistic auction revenue (revenue4), in mil-
lions of dollars. The final row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Average Optimistic Auction Revenue (Revenue4)
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
0 0 0 0 26.6 28.8 29.6 28.8 28.6 28.6 28.8
0 0 0 1 25.9 28.3 29.0 28.3 27.9 27.9 28.3
0 0 1 0 26.6 29.0 29.8 29.0 28.8 28.8 29.0
0 0 1 1 26.0 28.5 29.1 28.5 28.1 28.2 28.5
0 1 0 0 30.6 31.5 31.1 31.5 30.7 30.9 31.5
0 1 0 1 29.8 30.9 30.4 30.9 29.9 30.2 30.9
0 1 1 0 30.7 31.6 31.2 31.6 30.7 31.0 31.6
0 1 1 1 29.9 31.0 30.5 31.0 30.0 30.3 31.0
1 0 0 0 23.9 27.0 27.4 27.0 26.1 25.9 27.0
1 0 0 1 23.4 26.9 27.0 26.9 25.7 25.5 26.9
1 0 1 0 25.0 28.2 28.7 28.2 27.4 27.3 28.2
1 0 1 1 24.5 27.9 28.2 27.9 26.9 26.8 27.9
1 1 0 0 30.8 35.9 32.7 35.9 31.4 31.8 35.9
1 1 0 1 30.2 35.7 32.1 35.7 30.9 31.2 35.7
1 1 1 0 32.1 36.8 33.8 36.8 32.5 32.9 36.8
1 1 1 1 31.3 36.5 33.2 36.5 31.9 32.3 36.6
28.0 30.9 30.2 30.9 29.2 29.3 30.9
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Table A.18: Average biregional-scale pessimistic auction revenue (revenue1), in
billions of dollars. The final row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Average Pessimistic Auction Revenue (Revenue1)
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 2.74 5.43 3.59 5.33 5.12 3.89 5.39
0 0 0 1 2.77 5.33 4.02 5.24 4.97 3.97 5.29
0 0 1 0 2.87 5.48 3.69 5.39 5.19 3.95 5.44
0 0 1 1 2.86 5.38 4.09 5.31 5.05 4.04 5.34
0 1 0 0 4.02 5.73 4.89 5.72 5.60 5.19 5.73
0 1 0 1 4.03 5.59 4.83 5.58 5.43 5.01 5.59
0 1 1 0 3.94 5.75 4.94 5.74 5.62 5.22 5.74
0 1 1 1 3.96 5.60 4.87 5.59 5.46 5.05 5.60
1 0 0 0 2.62 4.85 3.44 4.62 4.38 3.52 4.74
1 0 0 1 2.68 4.81 3.70 4.62 4.33 3.60 4.71
1 0 1 0 2.73 5.02 3.52 4.80 4.60 3.62 4.91
1 0 1 1 2.75 4.98 3.76 4.79 4.53 3.68 4.89
1 1 0 0 4.25 6.16 5.13 5.99 5.69 5.21 6.09
1 1 0 1 4.29 6.12 5.17 5.98 5.61 5.20 6.05
1 1 1 0 4.19 6.31 5.27 6.15 5.90 5.37 6.24
1 1 1 1 4.24 6.26 5.27 6.13 5.79 5.30 6.20
3.43 5.55 4.39 5.44 5.20 4.49 5.50
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Table A.19: Average biregional-scale realistic auction revenue (revenue2), in
billions of dollars. The final row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Average Realistic Auction Revenue (Revenue2)
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 3.08 5.43 3.88 5.33 5.18 4.16 5.39
0 0 0 1 3.09 5.33 4.38 5.24 5.03 4.29 5.29
0 0 1 0 3.06 5.48 4.00 5.39 5.25 4.23 5.44
0 0 1 1 3.06 5.38 4.52 5.31 5.12 4.38 5.34
0 1 0 0 4.34 5.73 5.16 5.72 5.62 5.40 5.73
0 1 0 1 4.43 5.59 5.19 5.58 5.45 5.27 5.59
0 1 1 0 4.19 5.75 5.25 5.74 5.64 5.45 5.74
0 1 1 1 4.25 5.60 5.29 5.59 5.48 5.33 5.60
1 0 0 0 2.91 4.85 3.74 4.62 4.42 3.76 4.74
1 0 0 1 2.93 4.81 4.01 4.62 4.38 3.86 4.71
1 0 1 0 2.94 5.02 3.92 4.80 4.67 3.91 4.91
1 0 1 1 2.95 4.98 4.18 4.79 4.61 4.01 4.89
1 1 0 0 4.50 6.16 5.41 5.99 5.72 5.43 6.09
1 1 0 1 4.53 6.12 5.48 5.98 5.65 5.45 6.05
1 1 1 0 4.39 6.31 5.64 6.15 5.95 5.64 6.24
1 1 1 1 4.44 6.26 5.68 6.13 5.84 5.63 6.20
3.69 5.55 4.73 5.44 5.25 4.76 5.50
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Table A.20: Average biregional-scale generous auction revenue (revenue3), in
billions of dollars. The final row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Average Generous Auction Revenue (Revenue3)
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 3.14 5.43 4.11 5.33 5.25 4.42 5.39
0 0 0 1 3.16 5.33 4.68 5.24 5.12 4.59 5.29
0 0 1 0 3.08 5.48 4.18 5.39 5.31 4.46 5.44
0 0 1 1 3.09 5.38 4.76 5.31 5.20 4.64 5.34
0 1 0 0 4.50 5.73 5.39 5.72 5.65 5.57 5.73
0 1 0 1 4.62 5.59 5.46 5.58 5.50 5.47 5.59
0 1 1 0 4.22 5.75 5.42 5.74 5.68 5.58 5.74
0 1 1 1 4.30 5.60 5.49 5.59 5.52 5.48 5.60
1 0 0 0 2.97 4.85 3.88 4.62 4.44 3.89 4.74
1 0 0 1 2.98 4.81 4.16 4.62 4.42 4.01 4.71
1 0 1 0 2.96 5.02 4.02 4.80 4.70 4.02 4.91
1 0 1 1 2.97 4.98 4.31 4.79 4.66 4.14 4.89
1 1 0 0 4.58 6.16 5.56 5.99 5.75 5.58 6.09
1 1 0 1 4.60 6.12 5.65 5.98 5.69 5.62 6.05
1 1 1 0 4.42 6.31 5.77 6.15 5.97 5.76 6.24
1 1 1 1 4.47 6.26 5.82 6.13 5.88 5.76 6.20
3.76 5.55 4.92 5.44 5.30 4.94 5.50
Table A.21: Average biregional-scale optimistic auction revenue (revenue4), in
billions of dollars. The final row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Average Optimistic Auction Revenue (Revenue4)
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
0 0 0 0 3.19 5.43 4.16 5.33 5.25 4.48 5.39
0 0 0 1 3.21 5.33 4.76 5.24 5.13 4.68 5.29
0 0 1 0 3.11 5.48 4.23 5.39 5.32 4.52 5.44
0 0 1 1 3.12 5.38 4.83 5.31 5.21 4.73 5.34
0 1 0 0 4.54 5.73 5.44 5.72 5.65 5.61 5.73
0 1 0 1 4.69 5.59 5.54 5.58 5.50 5.53 5.59
0 1 1 0 4.25 5.75 5.47 5.74 5.68 5.63 5.74
0 1 1 1 4.34 5.60 5.56 5.59 5.52 5.55 5.60
1 0 0 0 3.01 4.85 3.92 4.62 4.44 3.93 4.74
1 0 0 1 3.02 4.81 4.20 4.62 4.42 4.06 4.71
1 0 1 0 2.99 5.02 4.06 4.80 4.70 4.06 4.91
1 0 1 1 3.00 4.98 4.36 4.79 4.66 4.20 4.89
1 1 0 0 4.60 6.16 5.60 5.99 5.75 5.62 6.09
1 1 0 1 4.63 6.12 5.70 5.98 5.69 5.67 6.05
1 1 1 0 4.44 6.31 5.80 6.15 5.97 5.80 6.24
1 1 1 1 4.49 6.26 5.88 6.13 5.89 5.82 6.20
3.79 5.55 4.97 5.44 5.30 4.99 5.50
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Table A.22: Average national-scale pessimistic auction revenue (revenue1), in
billions of dollars. The final row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Average Pessimistic Auction Revenue (Revenue1)
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 11.8 26.1 25.0 26.1 26.0 21.3 26.1
0 0 0 1 12.0 25.5 24.3 25.5 25.2 20.9 25.5
0 0 1 0 11.4 26.1 24.9 26.1 26.0 21.1 26.1
0 0 1 1 11.7 25.6 24.2 25.5 25.3 20.8 25.6
0 1 0 0 14.0 26.3 26.0 26.3 26.2 24.9 26.3
0 1 0 1 14.5 25.6 25.3 25.6 25.5 24.3 25.6
0 1 1 0 13.9 26.4 26.0 26.3 26.3 24.9 26.4
0 1 1 1 14.5 25.7 25.3 25.7 25.5 24.4 25.7
1 0 0 0 13.7 30.0 24.9 30.2 28.9 21.0 30.1
1 0 0 1 14.1 29.9 24.9 30.1 28.3 20.6 30.0
1 0 1 0 13.9 30.1 25.7 30.3 29.0 21.5 30.2
1 0 1 1 14.1 29.9 25.1 30.2 28.6 20.5 30.1
1 1 0 0 17.8 33.5 30.0 33.5 32.9 26.8 33.5
1 1 0 1 18.2 33.2 29.5 33.2 32.4 26.2 33.2
1 1 1 0 18.1 33.6 30.3 33.7 33.0 26.9 33.7
1 1 1 1 18.4 33.3 29.7 33.4 32.5 26.3 33.4
14.5 28.8 26.3 28.9 28.2 23.3 28.8
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Table A.23: Average national-scale realistic auction revenue (revenue2), in bil-
lions of dollars. The final row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Average Optimistic Auction Revenue (Revenue2)
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 12.3 26.1 25.6 26.1 26.0 22.8 26.1
0 0 0 1 12.5 25.5 25.0 25.5 25.3 22.7 25.5
0 0 1 0 11.6 26.1 25.6 26.1 26.1 23.2 26.1
0 0 1 1 11.9 25.6 24.9 25.5 25.4 22.6 25.6
0 1 0 0 14.5 26.3 26.2 26.3 26.2 25.5 26.3
0 1 0 1 15.1 25.6 25.5 25.6 25.5 24.9 25.6
0 1 1 0 14.1 26.4 26.2 26.3 26.3 25.6 26.4
0 1 1 1 14.7 25.7 25.5 25.7 25.6 25.0 25.7
1 0 0 0 14.4 30.0 28.5 30.2 29.8 24.2 30.1
1 0 0 1 14.7 29.9 28.9 30.1 29.6 24.2 30.0
1 0 1 0 14.3 30.1 28.9 30.3 30.2 24.7 30.2
1 0 1 1 14.4 29.9 29.0 30.2 29.9 24.4 30.1
1 1 0 0 18.5 33.5 32.7 33.5 33.2 29.2 33.5
1 1 0 1 19.0 33.2 32.7 33.2 32.8 29.3 33.2
1 1 1 0 18.4 33.6 32.8 33.7 33.4 29.4 33.7
1 1 1 1 18.8 33.3 32.8 33.4 33.0 29.4 33.4
15.0 28.8 28.2 28.9 28.6 25.5 28.8
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Table A.24: Average national-scale generous auction revenue (revenue3), in bil-
lions of dollars. The final row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Average Generous Auction Revenue (Revenue3)
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 12.3 26.1 26.0 26.1 26.1 24.8 26.1
0 0 0 1 12.6 25.5 25.4 25.5 25.4 24.5 25.5
0 0 1 0 11.6 26.1 26.0 26.1 26.1 24.8 26.1
0 0 1 1 11.9 25.6 25.4 25.5 25.5 24.5 25.6
0 1 0 0 14.6 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.0 26.3
0 1 0 1 15.2 25.6 25.6 25.6 25.6 25.3 25.6
0 1 1 0 14.1 26.4 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.0 26.4
0 1 1 1 14.7 25.7 25.6 25.7 25.6 25.4 25.7
1 0 0 0 14.5 30.0 30.2 30.2 30.1 25.7 30.1
1 0 0 1 14.8 29.9 30.4 30.1 30.0 25.9 30.0
1 0 1 0 14.3 30.1 30.4 30.3 30.5 26.1 30.2
1 0 1 1 14.4 29.9 30.5 30.2 30.2 26.1 30.1
1 1 0 0 18.6 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.3 30.2 33.5
1 1 0 1 19.0 33.2 33.4 33.2 33.0 30.2 33.2
1 1 1 0 18.4 33.6 33.5 33.7 33.5 30.3 33.7
1 1 1 1 18.8 33.3 33.4 33.4 33.2 30.4 33.4
15.0 28.8 28.9 28.9 28.8 26.6 28.8
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Table A.25: Average national-scale optimistic auction revenue (revenue4), in
billions of dollars. The final row represents averages across all parameter sets.
Average Optimistic Auction Revenue (Revenue4)
Lexicographic SF Comp Mixed
ValVar nB Dem CInc IFA SMR IFA SMR IFA IFA SMR
0 0 0 0 12.3 26.1 26.1 26.1 26.1 25.3 26.1
0 0 0 1 12.7 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.4 25.0 25.5
0 0 1 0 11.6 26.1 26.2 26.1 26.1 25.3 26.1
0 0 1 1 11.9 25.6 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.0 25.6
0 1 0 0 14.6 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.1 26.3
0 1 0 1 15.3 25.6 25.6 25.6 25.6 25.5 25.6
0 1 1 0 14.2 26.4 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.1 26.4
0 1 1 1 14.8 25.7 25.6 25.7 25.6 25.5 25.7
1 0 0 0 14.5 30.0 30.7 30.2 30.1 26.1 30.1
1 0 0 1 14.8 29.9 31.0 30.1 30.0 26.4 30.0
1 0 1 0 14.3 30.1 30.9 30.3 30.5 26.4 30.2
1 0 1 1 14.4 29.9 31.1 30.2 30.3 26.6 30.1
1 1 0 0 18.6 33.5 33.8 33.5 33.3 30.4 33.5
1 1 0 1 19.1 33.2 33.7 33.2 33.0 30.6 33.2
1 1 1 0 18.5 33.6 33.8 33.7 33.5 30.5 33.7
1 1 1 1 18.9 33.3 33.8 33.4 33.2 30.7 33.4
15.0 28.8 29.1 28.9 28.8 26.9 28.8
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A.3 Direct Effects Models
Table A.26: Direct effects predicting the bidder bankruptcy percentage. All
coefficients were significant at the 1% level. Scaled coefficients are percentages
of the base value.
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc Lex SF Comp
Raw 1.23 −0.55 −0.38 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.33 −0.73
Scaled — −44.3 −30.4 2.1 7.5 1.7 26.4 −58.7
(a) Small scale
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc Lex SF Comp
Raw 7.78 0.03 −2.95 −0.28 0.43 1.43 1.54 −5.46
Scaled — 0.4 −38.0 −3.6 5.5 18.4 19.8 −70.2
(b) Bi-regional scale
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc Lex SF Comp
Raw 5.98 3.63 −2.33 −0.07 0.49 −0.93 −1.53 −5.47
Scaled — 60.7 −38.9 −1.2 8.2 −15.5 −25.5 −91.5
(c) National scale
Table A.27: Direct effects predicting the number of rounds per auction. All
coefficients were significant at the 1% level. Scaled coefficients are percentages
of the base value.
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 35.8 2.5 −0.7 0.0 −17.6 2.9 0.6 −0.1 −0.8
Scaled — 6.9 −2.0 0.1 −49.3 8.0 1.7 −0.2 −2.2
(a) Small scale
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 155.0 −21.2 −3.6 −7.7 −93.2 181.5 −12.1 4.3 −16.9
Scaled — −13.7 −2.3 −5.0 −60.1 117.1 −7.8 2.8 −10.9
(b) Bi-regional scale
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 190.9 −7.9 −23.6 −8.6 −113.6 213.3 11.4 −16.4 −44.2
Scaled —- −4.2 −12.4 −4.5 −59.5 111.7 6.0 −8.6 −23.1
(c) National scale
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Table A.28: Direct effects predicting pessimistic auction surplus (Surplus1). All
coefficients were significant at the 1% level. Scaled coefficients are percentages
of the base value.
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 29.22 9.43 1.76 0.39 −0.12 1.85 0.15 −0.30 1.01
Scaled — 32.3 6.0 1.3 −0.4 6.3 0.5 −1.0 3.5
(a) Small scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 4892 1475 449 90 −40 814 −22 −40 591
Scaled — 30.1 9.2 1.8 −0.8 16.6 −0.5 −0.8 12.1
(b) Bi-regional scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 22.00 8.69 1.78 0.20 −0.23 4.37 0.82 1.02 4.07
Scaled — 39.5 8.1 0.9 −1.0 19.9 3.7 4.6 18.5
(c) National scale (in billions of dollars)
Table A.29: Direct effects predicting optimistic auction surplus (Surplus2). Bold
values indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. Scaled coeffi-
cients are percentages of the base value.
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 30.87 9.08 1.68 0.38 −0.07 0.32 −0.01 0.09 −0.20
Scaled — 29.4 5.4 1.2 −0.2 1.0 −0.0 0.3 −0.7
(a) Small scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 5619 1492 354 64 −8 115 −50 12 22
Scaled — 26.6 6.3 1.1 −0.1 2.0 −0.9 0.2 0.4
(b) Bi-regional scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 25.35 10.11 1.01 0.09 −0.08 1.44 −0.90 0.37 1.02
Scaled — 39.9 4.0 0.4 −0.3 5.7 −3.5 1.5 4.0
(c) National scale (in billions of dollars)
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Table A.30: Direct effects predicting pessimistic auction revenue (Revenue1). All
coefficients were significant at the 1% level. Scaled coefficients are percentages
of the base value.
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 25.0 1.1 4.8 0.6 −0.5 3.1 −0.5 0.1 1.0
Scaled — 4.5 19.2 2.4 −2.2 12.3 −2.2 0.4 4.1
(a) Small scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 3760 −43 1057 85 −25 1392 −500 −80 909
Scaled — −1.2 28.1 2.2 −0.7 37.0 −13.3 −2.1 24.2
(b) Bi-regional scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 19.1 4.1 2.6 0.1 −0.4 7.5 −4.4 1.5 5.9
Scaled — 21.6 13.7 0.4 −1.9 39.1 −23.1 8.0 30.9
(c) National scale (in billions of dollars)
Table A.31: Direct effects predicting realistic auction revenue (Revenue2). Bold
values indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. Scaled coeffi-
cients are percentages of the base.
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 25.6 0.9 4.8 0.6 −0.5 2.5 −0.6 0.3 0.5
Scaled — 3.7 18.6 2.5 −2.1 9.7 −2.3 1.0 2.1
(a) Small scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 4038 −49 1049 91 −7 1099 −507 −44 670
Scaled — −1.2 26.0 2.2 −0.2 27.2 −12.6 −1.1 16.6
(b) Bi-regional scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 20.6 4.9 2.3 0.0 −0.3 6.0 −5.3 1.4 4.5
Scaled — 23.9 11.3 0.2 −1.4 28.9 −25.5 6.6 21.7
(c) National scale (in billions of dollars)
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Table A.32: Direct effects predicting generous auction revenue (Revenue3). Bold
values indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. Scaled coeffi-
cients are percentages of the base.
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 26.4 0.7 4.8 0.6 −0.5 1.8 −0.7 0.4 0.0
Scaled — 2.7 18.0 2.3 −1.9 6.9 −2.6 1.6 0.1
(a) Small scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 4217 −81 1045 71 4 959 −563 −39 560
Scaled — −1.9 24.8 1.7 0.1 22.8 −13.4 −0.9 13.3
(b) Bi-regional scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 21.6 5.1 2.1 0.0 −0.3 5.3 −5.9 1.1 3.7
Scaled — 23.6 9.7 0.1 −1.2 24.7 −27.1 5.2 17.2
(c) National scale (in billions of dollars)
Table A.33: Direct effects predicting optimistic auction revenue (Revenue4).
Bold values indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. Scaled
coefficients are percentages of the base.
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 26.5 0.7 4.7 0.6 −0.5 1.7 −0.7 0.4 −0.0
Scaled — 2.6 17.9 2.3 −1.9 6.6 −2.6 1.7 −0.2
(a) Small scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 4272 −88 1043 69 11 911 −574 −41 510
Scaled — −2.1 24.4 1.6 0.2 21.3 −13.4 −1.0 11.9
(b) Bi-regional scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Raw 21.9 5.2 2.0 0.0 −0.2 5.1 −6.0 1.1 3.5
Scaled — 23.6 9.3 0.1 −1.1 23.5 −27.4 5.0 15.8
(c) National scale (in billions of dollars)
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A.4 Two-Way Interaction Models
Table A.34: Two-way interaction effects predicting the bidder bankruptcy per-
centage. Non-constant coefficients are represented as a percent of the constant
coefficient. Bold values indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc Lex SF Comp
Base 1.30 −49.9 −42.5 2.0 16.3 −1.1 43.7 −86.8
ValVar −49.9 — 21.8 3.0 −19.1 1.0 −19.1 37.9
nB −42.5 21.8 — 0.1 −0.1 4.2 −20.3 26.6
Dem 2.0 3.0 0.1 — −1.2 −3.1 2.3 −3.3
CInc 16.3 −19.1 −0.1 −1.2 — 3.3 −0.1 0.9
Lex −1.1 1.0 4.2 −3.1 3.3 — — —
SF 43.7 −19.1 −20.3 2.3 −0.1 — — —
Comp −86.8 37.9 26.6 −3.3 0.9 — — —
(a) Small scale
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc Lex SF Comp
Base 7.51 3.8 −48.7 −4.5 13.5 58.3 20.8 −86.3
ValVar 3.8 — −0.5 15.5 −10.3 −20.9 −1.0 −1.0
nB −48.7 −0.5 — 0.5 2.6 4.9 −8.6 36.1
Dem −4.5 15.5 0.5 — 4.1 −47.9 10.6 0.3
CInc 13.5 −10.3 2.6 4.1 — −14.5 −1.6 −8.0
Lex 58.3 −20.9 4.9 −47.9 −14.5 — — —
SF 20.8 −1.0 −8.6 10.6 −1.6 — — —
Comp −86.3 −1.0 36.1 0.3 −8.0 — — —
(b) Bi-regional scale
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc Lex SF Comp
Base 4.97 110.0 −67.6 22.2 14.6 47.7 −39.2 −93.9
ValVar 110.0 — −24.9 10.9 14.8 −90.4 4.4 −63.4
nB −67.6 −24.9 — −5.8 −5.3 63.7 30.1 60.9
Dem 22.2 10.9 −5.8 — 2.8 −79.9 −16.8 −13.6
CInc 14.6 14.8 −5.3 2.8 — −26.1 −0.9 −16.3
Lex 47.7 −90.4 63.7 −79.9 −26.1 — — —
SF −39.2 4.4 30.1 −16.8 −0.9 — — —
Comp −93.9 −63.4 60.9 −13.6 −16.3 — — —
(c) National scale
131
Table A.35: Two-way interaction effects predicting the number of rounds per
auction. Non-constant coefficients are represented as a percent of the constant
coefficient. Bold values indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base 35.6 2.3 −3.2 −0.2 −46.0 11.9 5.2 −1.1 −3.2
ValVar 2.3 — 6.6 1.2 −4.0 7.0 −1.4 0.8 −0.4
nB −3.2 6.6 — 0.5 1.1 −6.5 −1.5 0.3 1.8
Dem −0.2 1.2 0.5 — −0.1 −1.6 0.4 0.1 0.1
CInc −46.0 −4.0 1.1 −0.1 — −4.6 −1.0 0.1 1.4
SMR 11.9 7.0 −6.5 −1.6 −4.6 — −3.4 0.4 —
Lex 5.2 −1.4 −1.5 0.4 −1.0 −3.4 — — —
SF −1.1 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 — — —
Comp −3.2 −0.4 1.8 0.1 1.4 — — — —
(a) Small scale
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base 118.6 −18.0 17.3 4.9 −54.6 241.0 −28.4 7.6 −11.3
ValVar −18.0 — 7.8 2.7 12.0 −27.7 1.7 0.7 0.6
nB 17.3 7.8 — −11.2 5.2 −50.9 10.8 −1.4 −14.6
Dem 4.9 2.7 −11.2 — 4.7 −19.7 −1.8 0.3 −4.7
CInc −54.6 12.0 5.2 4.7 — −87.0 4.9 −1.1 8.0
SMR 241.0 −27.7 −50.9 −19.7 −87.0 — 20.7 −6.5 —
Lex −28.4 1.7 10.8 −1.8 4.9 20.7 — — —
SF 7.6 0.7 −1.4 0.3 −1.1 −6.5 — — —
Comp −11.3 0.6 −14.6 −4.7 8.0 — — — —
(b) Bi-regional scale
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base 161.7 −9.0 −5.6 −5.7 −49.4 202.4 −20.4 0.8 −36.2
ValVar −9.0 — 1.9 6.2 2.2 −11.1 20.0 −8.8 2.6
nB −5.6 1.9 — 0.2 12.0 −43.8 4.3 5.3 −3.5
Dem −5.7 6.2 0.2 — 3.0 −13.5 6.0 −1.0 −0.2
CInc −49.4 2.2 12.0 3.0 — −76.0 −6.6 7.7 16.9
SMR 202.4 −11.1 −43.8 −13.5 −76.0 — 31.4 −25.2 —
Lex −20.4 20.0 4.3 6.0 −6.6 31.4 — — —
SF 0.8 −8.8 5.3 −1.0 7.7 −25.2 — — —
Comp −36.2 2.6 −3.5 −0.2 16.9 — — — —
(c) National scale
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Table A.36: Two-way interaction effects predicting pessimistic auction surplus
(Surplus1). Bold values indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base 30.2 25.5 0.6 0.6 −0.5 5.2 1.3 −2.9 4.9
ValVar 25.5 — 9.6 2.1 0.6 −0.6 −0.4 1.2 −2.5
nB 0.6 9.6 — −0.5 −0.1 1.9 −0.3 0.4 −0.5
Dem 0.6 2.1 −0.5 — −0.1 −0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1
CInc −0.5 0.6 −0.1 −0.1 — 0.1 0.0 0.1 −0.5
SMR 5.2 −0.6 1.9 −0.3 0.1 — −1.0 2.0 —
Lex 1.3 −0.4 −0.3 0.1 0.0 −1.0 — — —
SF −2.9 1.2 0.4 0.0 0.1 2.0 — — —
Comp 4.9 −2.5 −0.5 0.1 −0.5 — — — —
(a) Small scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base 5046 20.8 6.7 1.6 −1.5 16.5 −2.3 −1.1 13.2
ValVar 20.8 — 11.8 1.2 0.9 3.0 0.0 0.5 0.6
nB 6.7 11.8 — −0.4 −0.6 −4.7 −1.0 −1.1 −4.1
Dem 1.6 1.2 −0.4 — −0.3 −1.4 2.6 −0.2 −0.7
CInc −1.5 0.9 −0.6 −0.3 — 0.8 1.0 0.1 0.3
SMR 16.5 3.0 −4.7 −1.4 0.8 — 1.2 1.4 —
Lex −2.3 0.0 −1.0 2.6 1.0 1.2 — — —
SF −1.1 0.5 −1.1 −0.2 0.1 1.4 — — —
Comp 13.2 0.6 −4.1 −0.7 0.3 — — — —
(b) Bi-regional scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base 22.4 23.8 11.3 0.5 −1.8 20.6 6.3 10.2 18.6
ValVar 23.8 — 8.0 0.9 −0.5 18.0 4.3 −0.2 13.7
nB 11.3 8.0 — 0.0 0.0 −9.0 −4.6 −3.3 −8.7
Dem 0.5 0.9 0.0 — −0.2 −1.1 1.7 0.6 −0.7
CInc −1.8 −0.5 0.0 −0.2 — 1.2 1.5 0.3 0.5
SMR 20.6 18.0 −9.0 −1.1 1.2 — −8.1 −8.5 —
Lex 6.3 4.3 −4.6 1.7 1.5 −8.1 — — —
SF 10.2 −0.2 −3.3 0.6 0.3 −8.5 — — —
Comp 18.6 13.7 −8.7 −0.7 0.5 — — — —
(c) National scale (in billions of dollars)
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Table A.37: Two-way interaction effects predicting optimistic auction surplus
(Surplus2). Bold values indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%
level.
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base 32.0 21.9 −0.1 0.5 −0.2 −0.7 −0.2 0.4 0.0
ValVar 21.9 — 9.4 2.0 0.1 1.7 −0.0 0.4 −1.0
nB −0.1 9.4 — −0.5 −0.1 2.3 0.1 −0.1 −0.2
Dem 0.5 2.0 −0.5 — −0.1 −0.2 0.1 −0.0 −0.1
CInc −0.2 0.1 −0.1 −0.1 — −0.1 −0.0 −0.0 0.1
SMR −0.7 1.7 2.3 −0.2 −0.1 — 0.1 −0.5 —
Lex −0.2 −0.0 0.1 0.1 −0.0 0.1 — — —
SF 0.4 0.4 −0.1 −0.0 −0.0 −0.5 — — —
Comp 0.0 −1.0 −0.2 −0.1 0.1 — — — —
(a) Small scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base 5806 18.7 1.8 0.3 0.0 1.1 −1.4 0.3 0.9
ValVar 18.7 — 10.2 2.1 0.3 2.0 −0.9 0.5 −0.2
nB 1.8 10.2 — −0.3 −0.2 −0.8 0.2 −0.3 −1.0
Dem 0.3 2.1 −0.3 — −0.1 −0.1 −0.1 0.0 0.1
CInc 0.0 0.3 −0.2 −0.1 — −0.4 0.0 0.1 −0.4
SMR 1.1 2.0 −0.8 −0.1 −0.4 — 2.0 −0.6 —
Lex −1.4 −0.9 0.2 −0.1 0.0 2.0 — — —
SF 0.3 0.5 −0.3 0.0 0.1 −0.6 — — —
Comp 0.9 −0.2 −1.0 0.1 −0.4 — — — —
(b) Bi-regional scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base 26.2 32.7 1.9 0.1 −0.4 3.0 −6.3 1.7 2.2
ValVar 32.7 — 5.6 0.6 0.5 4.2 −1.9 2.6 4.0
nB 1.9 5.6 — −0.0 −0.1 −1.7 1.5 −0.6 −1.6
Dem 0.1 0.6 −0.0 — −0.0 0.1 −0.3 −0.0 −0.1
CInc −0.4 0.5 −0.1 −0.0 — −0.0 0.2 −0.2 −0.3
SMR 3.0 4.2 −1.7 0.1 −0.0 — 6.2 −2.3 —
Lex −6.3 −1.9 1.5 −0.3 0.2 6.2 — — —
SF 1.7 2.6 −0.6 −0.0 −0.2 −2.3 — — —
Comp 2.2 4.0 −1.6 −0.1 −0.3 — — — —
(c) National scale (in billions of dollars)
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Table A.38: Two-way interaction effects predicting pessimistic auction revenue
(Revenue1). Non-constant coefficients are represented as a percent of the con-
stant coefficient. Bold values indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%
level
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base 27.1 −8.2 7.6 1.0 −2.8 5.2 −4.6 0.1 5.5
ValVar −8.2 — 16.2 3.5 1.3 4.5 −1.1 2.0 −2.3
nB 7.6 16.2 — −0.5 −0.3 5.0 2.4 −0.8 −1.9
Dem 1.0 3.5 −0.5 — −0.2 −0.3 −0.1 −0.0 0.1
CInc −2.8 1.3 −0.3 −0.2 — 1.0 −0.1 0.2 −0.6
SMR 5.2 4.5 5.0 −0.3 1.0 — 4.0 −0.7 —
Lex −4.6 −1.1 2.4 −0.1 −0.1 4.0 — — —
SF 0.1 2.0 −0.8 −0.0 0.2 −0.7 — — —
Comp 5.5 −2.3 −1.9 0.1 −0.6 — — — —
(a) Small scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base
3968.0
−12.8 27.0 1.3 1.1 34.0 −27.3 −3.9 27.5
ValVar −12.8 — 19.4 2.2 1.4 −1.0 3.0 1.0 −3.7
nB 27.0 19.4 — −1.0 −2.4 −13.9 −1.1 −0.7 −13.1
Dem 1.3 2.2 −1.0 — −0.3 1.0 −0.8 0.0 1.4
CInc 1.1 1.4 −2.4 −0.3 — −3.3 0.4 2.3 −3.6
SMR 34.0 −1.0 −13.9 1.0 −3.3 — 28.0 1.1 —
Lex −27.3 3.0 −1.1 −0.8 0.4 28.0 — — —
SF −3.9 1.0 −0.7 0.0 2.3 1.1 — — —
Comp 27.5 −3.7 −13.1 1.4 −3.6 — — — —
(b) Bi-regional scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base 21.5 −0.9 12.3 −0.5 −1.9 21.9 −43.0 14.2 19.9
ValVar −0.9 — 13.8 0.8 1.1 17.4 4.7 3.6 16.0
nB 12.3 13.8 — 0.2 −0.4 −8.7 −2.8 −4.0 −9.1
Dem −0.5 0.8 0.2 — −0.1 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.5
CInc −1.9 1.1 −0.4 −0.1 — −1.0 1.9 −0.2 −1.3
SMR 21.9 17.4 −8.7 0.2 −1.0 — 40.7 −14.1 —
Lex −43.0 4.7 −2.8 0.1 1.9 40.7 — — —
SF 14.2 3.6 −4.0 0.5 −0.2 −14.1 — — —
Comp 19.9 16.0 −9.1 0.5 −1.3 — — — —
(c) National scale (in billions of dollars)
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Table A.39: Two-way interaction effects predicting realistic auction revenue
(Revenue2). Non-constant coefficients are represented as a percent of the con-
stant coefficient. Bold values indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%
level
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base 27.8 −9.3 7.2 1.2 −2.5 2.5 −5.0 1.5 3.3
ValVar −9.3 — 16.0 3.4 1.0 5.8 −0.9 1.6 −1.2
nB 7.2 16.0 — −0.5 −0.3 5.0 2.5 −1.0 −1.8
Dem 1.2 3.4 −0.5 — −0.2 −0.5 −0.1 −0.1 −0.1
CInc −2.5 1.0 −0.3 −0.2 — 0.9 −0.1 0.1 −0.4
SMR 2.5 5.8 5.0 −0.5 0.9 — 4.3 −1.8 —
Lex −5.0 −0.9 2.5 −0.1 −0.1 4.3 — — —
SF 1.5 1.6 −1.0 −0.1 0.1 −1.8 — — —
Comp 3.3 −1.2 −1.8 −0.1 −0.4 — — — —
(a) Small scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base
4229.0
−12.2 24.7 1.3 2.1 25.7 −25.0 −2.4 20.8
ValVar −12.2 — 18.1 2.7 0.9 −0.5 2.1 1.0 −3.2
nB 24.7 18.1 — −0.9 −2.0 −12.8 −0.3 −0.4 −12.5
Dem 1.3 2.7 −0.9 — −0.1 0.7 −2.2 0.5 1.1
CInc 2.1 0.9 −2.0 −0.1 — −4.0 −0.1 2.3 −4.0
SMR 25.7 −0.5 −12.8 0.7 −4.0 — 26.6 −0.7 —
Lex −25.0 2.1 −0.3 −2.2 −0.1 26.6 — — —
SF −2.4 1.0 −0.4 0.5 2.3 −0.7 — — —
Comp 20.8 −3.2 −12.5 1.1 −4.0 — — — —
(b) Bi-regional scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base 23.1 6.5 8.3 −0.4 −1.2 13.2 −46.0 10.3 12.2
ValVar 6.5 — 12.6 0.7 1.8 9.3 0.8 5.4 10.6
nB 8.3 12.6 — 0.2 −0.4 −5.8 −0.3 −2.9 −6.9
Dem −0.4 0.7 0.2 — −0.0 0.7 −1.0 0.0 0.7
CInc −1.2 1.8 −0.4 −0.0 — −1.6 1.3 −0.2 −1.8
SMR 13.2 9.3 −5.8 0.7 −1.6 — 45.4 −11.4 —
Lex −46.0 0.8 −0.3 −1.0 1.3 45.4 — — —
SF 10.3 5.4 −2.9 0.0 −0.2 −11.4 — — —
Comp 12.2 10.6 −6.9 0.7 −1.8 — — — —
(c) National scale (in billions of dollars)
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Table A.40: Two-way interaction effects predicting generous auction revenue
(Revenue3). Non-constant coefficients are represented as a percent of the con-
stant coefficient. Bold values indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%
level
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base 28.7 −10.7 6.7 0.9 −2.4 −0.7 −5.7 3.1 0.7
ValVar −10.7 — 15.8 3.4 0.8 7.2 −0.6 1.0 −0.2
nB 6.7 15.8 — −0.4 −0.3 5.0 2.6 −1.2 −1.7
Dem 0.9 3.4 −0.4 — −0.1 −0.3 −0.1 −0.1 −0.1
CInc −2.4 0.8 −0.3 −0.1 — 0.9 −0.1 0.0 0.0
SMR −0.7 7.2 5.0 −0.3 0.9 — 4.8 −3.0 —
Lex −5.7 −0.6 2.6 −0.1 −0.1 4.8 — — —
SF 3.1 1.0 −1.2 −0.1 0.0 −3.0 — — —
Comp 0.7 −0.2 −1.7 −0.1 0.0 — — — —
(a) Small scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base
4460.0
−13.5 22.8 0.4 2.6 19.4 −26.6 −2.2 16.0
ValVar −13.5 — 17.6 2.8 0.7 0.9 2.5 0.8 −2.0
nB 22.8 17.6 — −1.0 −2.0 −12.1 0.5 0.1 −11.8
Dem 0.4 2.8 −1.0 — −0.1 1.7 −2.5 0.3 1.9
CInc 2.6 0.7 −2.0 −0.1 — −4.3 −0.3 2.3 −4.0
SMR 19.4 0.9 −12.1 1.7 −4.3 — 27.7 −0.8 —
Lex −26.6 2.5 0.5 −2.5 −0.3 27.7 — — —
SF −2.2 0.8 0.1 0.3 2.3 −0.8 — — —
Comp 16.0 −2.0 −11.8 1.9 −4.0 — — — —
(b) Bi-regional scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base 24.4 7.5 5.1 −0.3 −1.0 7.7 −48.7 7.2 6.7
ValVar 7.5 — 11.8 0.5 1.7 7.2 0.2 6.5 9.5
nB 5.1 11.8 — 0.1 −0.4 −3.5 1.5 −2.2 −4.3
Dem −0.3 0.5 0.1 — −0.0 0.7 −1.0 −0.0 0.6
CInc −1.0 1.7 −0.4 −0.0 — −1.6 1.1 −0.3 −1.5
SMR 7.7 7.2 −3.5 0.7 −1.6 — 47.5 −9.1 —
Lex −48.7 0.2 1.5 −1.0 1.1 47.5 — — —
SF 7.2 6.5 −2.2 −0.0 −0.3 −9.1 — — —
Comp 6.7 9.5 −4.3 0.6 −1.5 — — — —
(c) National scale (in billions of dollars)
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Table A.41: Two-way interaction effects predicting optimistic auction revenue
(Revenue4). Non-constant coefficients are represented as a percent of the con-
stant coefficient. Bold values indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%
level
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base 28.8 −10.8 6.7 0.9 −2.3 −1.0 −5.8 3.2 0.5
ValVar −10.8 — 15.7 3.4 0.8 7.3 −0.6 1.0 −0.1
nB 6.7 15.7 — −0.4 −0.2 5.0 2.7 −1.2 −1.7
Dem 0.9 3.4 −0.4 — −0.1 −0.3 −0.1 −0.1 −0.1
CInc −2.3 0.8 −0.2 −0.1 — 0.9 −0.1 0.0 0.0
SMR −1.0 7.3 5.0 −0.3 0.9 — 4.9 −3.1 —
Lex −5.8 −0.6 2.7 −0.1 −0.1 4.9 — — —
SF 3.2 1.0 −1.2 −0.1 0.0 −3.1 — — —
Comp 0.5 −0.1 −1.7 −0.1 0.0 — — — —
(a) Small scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base
4524.0
−13.7 22.3 0.3 3.0 17.7 −26.7 −2.4 14.5
ValVar −13.7 — 17.4 2.9 0.6 1.3 2.5 0.8 −1.6
nB 22.3 17.4 — −1.0 −1.9 −11.8 0.7 0.3 −11.4
Dem 0.3 2.9 −1.0 — −0.1 1.8 −2.6 0.3 1.9
CInc 3.0 0.6 −1.9 −0.1 — −4.5 −0.4 2.3 −4.3
SMR 17.7 1.3 −11.8 1.8 −4.5 — 27.8 −0.7 —
Lex −26.7 2.5 0.7 −2.6 −0.4 27.8 — — —
SF −2.4 0.8 0.3 0.3 2.3 −0.7 — — —
Comp 14.5 −1.6 −11.4 1.9 −4.3 — — — —
(b) Bi-regional scale (in millions of dollars)
Base ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR Lex SF Comp
Base 24.8 7.7 4.3 −0.4 −0.8 6.4 −49.1 6.4 5.3
ValVar 7.7 — 11.7 0.5 1.8 6.6 0.1 7.0 9.0
nB 4.3 11.7 — 0.1 −0.4 −2.9 2.0 −2.0 −3.5
Dem −0.4 0.5 0.1 — −0.0 0.8 −1.1 −0.1 0.6
CInc −0.8 1.8 −0.4 −0.0 — −1.8 0.9 −0.4 −1.7
SMR 6.4 6.6 −2.9 0.8 −1.8 — 47.9 −8.7 —
Lex −49.1 0.1 2.0 −1.1 0.9 47.9 — — —
SF 6.4 7.0 −2.0 −0.1 −0.4 −8.7 — — —
Comp 5.3 9.0 −3.5 0.6 −1.7 — — — —
(c) National scale (in billions of dollars)
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A.5 Interaction Model Marginal Effects
Table A.42: The range of (within-strategy) marginal effects with respect to
bankruptcy rate, as a percentage of the corresponding constant coefficient.
ValVar nB Dem CInc
Scale Strategy Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
Small
Lexico -68.0 -24.1 -38.3 -16.5 1.9 -1.1 0.5 22.9
SF -88.1 -44.2 -62.8 -41.0 7.3 4.3 -2.9 19.5
Comp -31.1 12.8 -15.9 5.9 1.7 -1.3 -1.9 20.5
BiReg
Lexico -27.4 -1.6 -43.8 -41.2 -52.4 -32.8 -11.3 5.7
SF -7.5 18.3 -57.3 -54.7 6.1 25.7 1.6 18.6
Comp -7.5 18.3 -12.6 -10.0 -4.2 15.4 -4.8 12.2
Nat
Lexico -5.3 45.3 -39.9 -3.9 -63.5 -44.0 -16.8 6.1
SF 89.5 140.1 -73.5 -37.5 -0.4 19.1 8.4 31.3
Comp 21.7 72.3 -42.7 -6.7 2.8 22.3 -7.0 15.9
Table A.43: The range of (strategy-specific) marginal effects with respect to
bankruptcy rate, as a percentage of the corresponding constant coefficient.
Small BiReg National
Strategy Min Max Min Max Min Max
Lexico -4.2 6.4 -25.0 63.2 -148.7 111.4
SF 4.3 43.7 10.6 31.4 -56.0 -4.7
Comp -90.1 -22.3 -95.3 -50.2 -187.2 -33.0
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Table A.44: The range of (within-strategy) marginal effects with respect to the
number of rounds per auction, as a percentage of the corresponding constant
coefficient.
ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR
Scale Strategy Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
Small
Lexico -3.1 15.7 -11.2 3.5 -1.5 1.9 -51.1 -45.9 -4.2 15.5
SF -0.9 17.9 -9.4 5.3 -1.8 1.6 -50.0 -44.8 -0.4 19.3
Comp -2.1 9.7 -1.4 6.8 -0.2 1.6 -44.1 -43.5 — —
BiReg
Lexico -44.0 6.2 -34.0 41.1 -27.8 10.5 -136.7 -27.8 76.4 261.7
SF -45.0 5.2 -46.2 28.9 -25.7 12.6 -142.7 -33.8 49.2 234.5
Comp -17.4 5.1 -8.5 15.7 -11.0 7.6 -46.6 -24.7 — —
Nat
Lexico 1.0 21.1 -43.4 12.0 -13.2 9.4 -131.1 -39.5 90.6 232.7
SF -28.4 -8.3 -42.7 12.7 -20.3 2.3 -116.9 -25.3 33.9 176.0
Comp -5.9 3.4 -8.7 4.2 -5.9 3.2 -32.0 -15.7 — —
Table A.45: The range of (strategy-specific) marginal effects with respect to the
number of rounds per auction, as a percentage of the corresponding constant
coefficient.
Small BiReg National
Strategy Min Max Min Max Min Max
Lexico -2.1 5.6 -30.2 9.7 -27.4 41.5
SF -1.1 0.4 -1.4 7.6 -33.3 13.9
Comp -3.6 0.0 -30.6 -3.3 -39.8 -17.0
Table A.46: The range of (within-strategy) marginal effects with respect to
pessimistic surplus (surplus1), as a percentage of the corresponding constant
coefficient.
ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR
Scale Strategy Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
Small
Lexico 24.5 37.4 -0.2 11.8 -0.2 2.8 -0.6 0.1 3.3 6.1
SF 26.1 39.0 0.5 12.5 -0.3 2.7 -0.5 0.2 6.3 9.1
Comp 23.0 35.3 -0.4 9.7 0.1 2.8 -1.1 -0.4 — —
BiReg
Lexico 20.8 37.7 0.0 17.5 2.1 5.4 -1.4 1.2 11.6 21.5
SF 21.3 38.2 -0.1 17.4 -0.7 2.6 -2.3 0.3 11.8 21.7
Comp 21.4 35.3 1.6 14.4 0.2 2.1 -2.1 -0.3 — —
Nat
Lexico 27.6 55.0 -2.3 14.7 1.1 3.1 -0.8 0.9 2.4 31.7
SF 23.1 50.5 -1.0 16.0 0.0 2.0 -2.0 -0.3 2.0 31.3
Comp 37.0 46.4 2.6 10.6 -0.2 0.7 -1.8 -1.3 — —
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Table A.47: The range of (within-strategy) marginal effects with respect to
optimistic surplus (surplus2), as a percentage of the corresponding constant
coefficient.
ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR
Scale Strategy Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
Small
Lexico 21.9 35.1 -0.6 11.7 -0.1 2.6 -0.3 -0.1 -0.8 3.4
SF 22.3 35.5 -0.8 11.5 -0.2 2.5 -0.3 -0.1 -1.4 2.8
Comp 20.9 32.4 -0.9 9.1 -0.1 2.4 -0.2 0.0 — —
BiReg
Lexico 17.8 32.4 0.7 12.2 -0.3 2.3 -0.7 0.3 1.8 5.1
SF 19.2 33.8 0.2 11.7 -0.2 2.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.8 2.5
Comp 18.5 31.1 0.3 11.0 0.0 2.5 -0.7 -0.1 — —
Nat
Lexico 30.8 41.7 1.6 9.0 -0.2 0.5 -0.3 0.3 7.5 13.5
SF 35.3 46.2 -0.5 6.9 0.1 0.8 -0.7 -0.1 -1.0 5.0
Comp 36.7 43.4 0.2 5.9 0.0 0.6 -0.8 -0.2 — —
Table A.48: The range of (strategy-specific) marginal effects with respect to
pessimistic surplus (surplus1), as a percentage of the corresponding constant
coefficient.
Small BiReg National
Strategy Min Max Min Max Min Max
Lexico -0.4 1.3 -3.3 2.5 -6.4 13.8
SF -2.9 0.8 -2.4 0.9 -1.6 10.8
Comp 1.4 4.9 8.4 14.1 9.2 32.3
Table A.49: The range of (strategy-specific) marginal effects with respect to
optimistic surplus (surplus2), as a percentage of the corresponding constant
coefficient.
Small BiReg National
Strategy Min Max Min Max Min Max
Lexico -0.2 0.0 -2.4 0.8 -8.5 1.6
SF -0.1 0.8 -0.6 0.9 -1.4 4.3
Comp -1.2 0.0 -0.7 1.0 0.3 6.2
Table A.50: The range of marginal effects with respect to surplus when switching
from pure IFA complex strategies to pure SMR SF strategies, as a percentage
of the corresponding constant coefficient.
Surplus1 Surplus2
Scale Min Max Min Max
Small -1.0 6.0 -1.1 4.7
BiReg 1.0 7.1 -0.4 2.7
Nat 0.1 9.0 -0.5 3.3
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Table A.51: The range of (within-strategy) marginal effects with respect to
pessimistic auction revenue (Revenue1), as a percentage of the corresponding
constant coefficient.
ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR
Scale Strategy Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
Small
Lexico -9.3 16.2 9.2 31.2 -0.1 4.4 -3.4 -0.6 8.9 19.7
SF -6.2 19.3 6.0 28.0 0.0 4.5 -3.1 -0.3 4.2 15.0
Comp -10.5 10.5 4.9 21.9 0.4 4.6 -3.9 -2.1 — —
BiReg
Lexico -10.8 13.2 8.6 45.3 -0.8 3.7 -4.5 2.9 43.8 63.0
SF -12.8 11.2 9.0 45.7 0.0 4.5 -2.6 4.8 16.9 36.1
Comp -16.5 6.5 10.5 33.3 1.4 4.9 -5.2 -1.1 — —
Nat
Lexico 4.0 37.1 0.5 23.2 -0.3 0.6 -1.1 1.1 53.2 80.1
SF 2.9 36.0 -0.7 22.0 0.2 1.1 -3.2 -1.0 -1.6 25.3
Comp 15.3 31.0 2.7 16.7 0.1 1.0 -3.6 -2.2 — —
Table A.52: The range of (within-strategy) marginal effects with respect to real-
istic auction revenue (Revenue2), as a percentage of the corresponding constant
coefficient.
ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR
Scale Strategy Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
Small
Lexico -10.2 16.0 8.9 30.7 -0.1 4.5 -3.1 -0.7 6.3 18.5
SF -7.7 18.5 5.4 27.2 -0.1 4.5 -2.9 -0.5 0.2 12.4
Comp -10.5 9.9 4.6 21.4 0.4 4.5 -3.4 -2.0 — —
BiReg
Lexico -10.6 11.6 8.7 42.5 -1.8 2.5 -4.0 2.9 35.0 53.0
SF -11.7 10.5 8.6 42.4 0.9 5.2 -1.6 5.3 7.7 25.7
Comp -15.4 6.3 9.3 30.3 1.5 5.1 -3.9 -1.0 — —
Nat
Lexico 7.5 31.6 1.9 20.6 -1.2 0.0 -1.9 1.7 51.7 68.9
SF 12.2 36.3 -0.7 18.0 -0.2 1.0 -3.3 0.3 -5.6 11.6
Comp 17.4 32.3 1.2 14.0 0.4 1.1 -3.3 -1.3 — —
Table A.53: The range of (within-strategy) marginal effects with respect to gen-
erous auction revenue (Revenue3), as a percentage of the corresponding constant
coefficient.
ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR
Scale Strategy Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
Small
Lexico -11.3 15.9 8.6 30.1 0.0 4.2 -2.9 -0.8 3.8 17.2
SF -9.7 17.5 4.8 26.3 0.0 4.2 -2.8 -0.7 -4.0 9.4
Comp -10.9 9.1 4.3 20.8 0.3 4.2 -2.8 -1.6 — —
BiReg
Lexico -11.0 11.0 8.2 40.9 -3.2 2.4 -4.1 3.0 30.7 49.7
SF -12.7 9.3 7.8 40.5 -0.4 5.2 -1.5 5.6 2.2 21.2
Comp -15.5 5.6 8.0 28.6 1.2 5.1 -3.5 -0.7 — —
Nat
Lexico 7.7 28.9 2.8 18.3 -1.3 -0.1 -1.7 1.7 50.2 62.9
SF 13.9 35.1 -0.9 14.6 -0.3 0.9 -3.2 0.2 -6.4 6.3
Comp 17.0 31.0 0.5 12.6 0.3 0.9 -2.8 -0.9 — —
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Table A.54: The range of (within-strategy) marginal effects with respect to
optimistic auction revenue (Revenue4), as a percentage of the corresponding
constant coefficient.
ValVar nB Dem CInc SMR
Scale Strategy Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
Small
Lexico -11.4 15.8 8.8 30.1 0.0 4.2 -2.7 -0.7 3.6 17.1
SF -9.8 17.4 4.9 26.2 0.0 4.2 -2.6 -0.6 -4.4 9.1
Comp -10.9 9.0 4.4 20.7 0.3 4.2 -2.6 -1.5 — —
BiReg
Lexico -11.2 11.0 8.3 40.4 -3.4 2.4 -3.9 3.2 29.2 48.6
SF -12.9 9.3 7.9 40.0 -0.5 5.3 -1.2 5.9 0.7 20.1
Comp -15.3 5.6 8.0 28.3 1.1 5.1 -3.3 -0.7 — —
Nat
Lexico 7.9 28.6 3.0 17.8 -1.4 -0.1 -1.9 1.9 49.7 61.5
SF 14.7 35.4 -0.9 13.9 -0.3 1.0 -3.2 0.6 -6.9 4.9
Comp 16.7 30.8 0.4 12.4 0.3 0.9 -2.9 -0.8 — —
Table A.55: The range of (strategy-specific) marginal effects with respect to
pessimistic auction revenue (Revenue1), as a percentage of the corresponding
constant coefficient.
Small BiReg National
Strategy Min Max Min Max Min Max
Lexico -5.7 1.8 -29.2 4.1 -45.7 4.7
SF -1.4 2.3 -4.6 0.5 -3.9 18.3
Comp 0.7 5.5 7.1 28.9 9.6 36.2
Table A.56: The range of (strategy-specific) marginal effects with respect to real-
istic auction revenue (Revenue2), as a percentage of the corresponding constant
coefficient.
Small BiReg National
Strategy Min Max Min Max Min Max
Lexico -5.9 1.8 -27.5 3.7 -47.6 1.6
SF -1.3 3.1 -3.5 1.4 -4.0 16.3
Comp -0.1 3.3 1.1 21.9 4.0 23.8
Table A.57: The range of (strategy-specific) marginal effects with respect to gen-
erous auction revenue (Revenue3), as a percentage of the corresponding constant
coefficient.
Small BiReg National
Strategy Min Max Min Max Min Max
Lexico -6.4 1.7 -29.4 4.1 -49.8 1.8
SF -1.1 4.1 -3.0 1.2 -4.5 13.6
Comp -1.2 0.7 -1.8 17.9 1.0 16.7
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Table A.58: The range of (strategy-specific) marginal effects with respect to
optimistic auction revenue (Revenue4), as a percentage of the corresponding
constant coefficient.
Small BiReg National
Strategy Min Max Min Max Min Max
Lexico -6.5 1.8 -29.7 4.3 -50.3 1.8
SF -1.1 4.2 -3.1 1.3 -4.5 13.5
Comp -1.2 0.5 -2.8 16.4 0.0 14.7
Table A.59: The range of marginal effects with respect to revenue when switching
from pure IFA complex strategies to pure SMR SF strategies, as a percentage
of the corresponding constant coefficient.
Revenue1 Revenue2 Revenue3 Revenue4
Scale Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
Small -1.3 15.8 -1.6 14.7 -1.6 13.5 -1.7 13.4
BiReg 1.8 10.0 1.1 7.9 0.2 6.2 0.0 6.1
Nat -1.4 7.6 -2.0 4.0 -2.8 3.1 -2.7 3.6
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